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About the British Association for Korean Studies

The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) was founded in 1987 as a forum to host conferences and workshops on Korean Studies around the UK. At such events, papers have been presented on a wide range of subjects including archaeology, art, economics, literature, politics, and society. BAKS continues to hold annual conferences, sometimes in partnership with her sister organisations, The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) and The British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS).

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS Papers) was founded in 1991 to publish the editorially approved transactions of the then annual conferences of the Association. The journal for several years actively solicited submissions from outside the conferences as well. Fifteen volumes were published, the final two issues digitally.

Initially the quality of *BAKS Papers* was maintained by an internal editorial board and the editor. Since Volume 14 (2012), *BAKS Papers* became a fully peer-reviewed journal. There was established an external editorial board of 20 international scholars covering a range of areas within the humanities and the social sciences. The Editorial Board is under the leadership of the Editor. There are prescribed rules for the examination of submissions and regulations for writers making a submission. Just under half of the submissions (including external submissions) were rejected for publication in Volume 15 (2013).

Since its inception in the late 1980s, the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* has focussed on modern and contemporary Korea but has not neglected traditional culture and history. For example, Volume 5 (1994) was a special issue devoted to archaeology and material culture. The journal has published other special issues, such as Volume 6, which focused on 'Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia', reflecting the Association's broader interests in contemporary East Asia, and Volume 14 (2012), which focussed on British witnesses to the social, cultural, political and economic changes in late twentieth-century Korea.

About the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

At the General Meeting for The British Association for Korean Studies in London on 9 September 2016 the Association decided to re-launch *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (BAKS Papers) as the *European Journal of Korean Studies*.

The new name better reflects the existing breadth of the editorial board as well as the extensive range of submissions that result from expanded offerings on Korean Studies across the European continent, including Great Britain. Using our experience gained in publishing the *BAKS Papers* over the last 25 years, we are delighted to relaunch the publication as a Europe-wide journal dedicated to Korean Studies.

BAKS Papers has been blind, peer-reviewed since volume 15, and the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will carry on being blind, peer-reviewed. The new *Journal* will be published twice a year, rather than just annually. It is the only English-language journal in Europe devoted to the broad field of Korean Studies, and we hope that it will become the show-case journal for the outstanding work on Korea being done in Europe.

First published in 1991 and originally available in printed format, *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (informally known as *BAKS Papers*) is now available on-line through the Association's website. Volumes 1–16 are available for download, as will future issues of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. Since Volume 17 (1) the *European Journal of Korean Studies* is also available again in print and we endeavour to keep back issues physically available in the future. The *Journal* is free to BAKS members and those who want copies can access them on www.ejks.org.uk or contact Robert Winstanley-Chesters: treasurer@baks.org.uk

Editors

Editor's Note

Welcome to the Spring 2019 issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. Vol. 18, No. 2 marks growth and a step forward for the publication. This issue also finally sees our new website www.ejks.org.uk come online with the complete archive of previous issues of the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* and *European Journal of Korean Studies* available in an accessible format. For the very first time the individual articles from all the issues back to 1991 are available for download, an achievement which represents considerable effort over the last year or so. The website will in future allow keyword, title and author searching of our entire archive and along with conventional password and user id access will also be available to libraries and corporate subscribers via IP authentication. The entire archive of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* and *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* will soon be available from and linked via Crossref and have *doi* numbers making past, present and future work much more accessible and integrated with search platforms and citation indexes. Finally, with this new web platform in place, the *European Journal of Korean Studies* is in the process of being assessed by the citation indexes and we hope to have further good news on this for our authors past and present, in the months to come.

Aside from the redesign and being more accessible than ever before, we are very proud of this issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. Vol. 18, No. 2 has six research articles, a fascinating research note and six substantial book reviews. This issue's research articles include a special section guest edited by Dr Owen Miller of SOAS, University of London on Korean historical controversies. Within this substantial body of new work, Professor Vladimir Tikhonov of the University of Oslo returns to the journal with a detailed analysis of South Korea's New Right and its confrontations and conflagrations over historical memory. Professor Younghwan Cheong of Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, contests Park Yu-ha's *Comfort Women of the Empire*[1] and Dr Andrew Logie, in an extensive and richly documented piece explores both pseudohistorians and pseudohistories

1 Owing to pressures of time and printing deadlines, Professor Younghwan Cheong's article is not available in the first printed edition of European Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. The article will be available in the digital edition, online and as a paper offprint.

of early Korea. Finally, Professor Mark Caprio of Rikkyo University considers in greater detail than seen before the controversies and disputes surrounding the unfortunate *Ukishima-maru* and its unexpected destruction en route to Korea in 1945, and the implications for our histories of Korean laborers in wartime and postwar East Asia.

Beyond the special section, Duan Baihui of Yonsei University contributes an intriguing research paper on British conceptions of early encounters with Korea and Koreans, including clothes, housing and food. Peter Ward, of the University of Vienna and a frequently quoted source on North Korea's socialist economy, offers a deep archival review of the recently encountered 'Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party,' exploring the purging of fanctionalism in the Korean Workers Party of the late 1950s. This issue also has a wistful and beautiful personal account of Brother Anthony of Taizé's interaction with Korean poetry and its translation in the form of a Research Note, generously solicited and conveyed by the former President of the *British Association for Korean Studies*, Professor James Lewis. We also hope our book reviews affect readers reading habits over the next six months, and point out in particular a substantial review from Professor Hazel Smith of SOAS and Cranfield University of Cheehyung Kim's, *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961*. With this issue sincere thanks go to the Academy of Korean Studies without whose generous support (AKS-2018-P03), it would not be possible to produce the journal in this form. Thanks also go to the University of Leeds, School of History for hosting the *European Journal of Korean Studies* and to Rob Hayford our web designer who has made www.ejks.org.uk so functional and attractive.

Announcement of the Bill Skillend Prize 2018

The *British Association of Korean Studies* (BAKS) is delighted to announce that the 2018 prize for best undergraduate dissertation in Korean studies in a UK higher education institution (HEI) was awarded to Joseph Tollington, University of Leeds, for his thesis entitled "Disciplining the Masses: The Legacies of Manchukuo in the Formation of North Korea's State Control Systems, 1932–1950". Without exception, submissions were of very high quality. The winner, however, truly deserved the prize for outstanding thesis of 2018. Mr. Tollington produced a carefully argued, original, coherent and engaging piece of work based on advanced scholarly, analytical and professional skills.

The submissions covered the gamut of the arts, humanities and social science disciplines. Topics ranged through the relationship of image and beauty standards to the shaping of Korean national identity; investigating the socio-historical reality of Chosŏn Korea through select poems of Chong Yagong; South Korea and Japan's dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands; strategic alliances using Korea as an example; Evaluating the case of Imperial Feminism in South Korea; analysing Geriatric Suicides in South Korea and a discussion of the South Korean art movement, Tansaekhwa.

Despite this being a new award and therefore not yet on the scholarly radar, the Prize attracted nine submissions from five HEIs; the University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN), the Courtauld Institute of Art, the University of Leeds, the University of Sheffield and SOAS. The diversity and quality of these submissions demonstrate a growing, thriving, exciting Korean Studies teaching and research community in the UK. It is apposite that the prize is named for the late Professor Bill Skillend, who was a pioneer in the study of Korean language and literature and responsible for the introduction of its instruction in Britain. BAKS would also like to acknowledge Dr. James Hoare, whose generous donation made the award possible.

Hazel Smith PhD FRSA
BAKS Committee member
Professorial Research Associate, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Professor Emeritus, Cranfield University, UK

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Special Section: Korean History—Issues and Controversies

OWEN MILLER Lecturer, SOAS, University of London

Issues of history and memory are matters of vigorous public debate in many parts of the world, but there are few places where such issues can have as much weight and attract as much controversy as South Korea. This is amply illustrated by the fact that South Korea is a country where a controversy over history textbooks recently played a minor but significant part in the downfall of a president. The importance of modern (and even ancient) history in everyday politics derives partly from the country's vibrant democratic ethos and engaged civil society. South Korea is a country that has seen its citizens regularly intervene en masse in politics by taking to the streets, despite decades of military dictatorships and a still-unfinished democratic transition that has left significant parts of the old national security apparatus intact. Another partial explanation for the importance of historical issues in South Korean society is the precisely the unfinished nature of attempts to deal with the numerous traumatic aspects of Korea's modern history. It is the twentieth history of imperialism and decolonization in northeast Asia that is at the centre of this unfinished business, beginning with the many unresolved issues relating to Japanese colonial rule in Korea and especially the brutal wartime period of 1937–45. A second set of historical issues relate to the period of decolonization after 1945 which was marked by the beginning of the Cold War and the rise of Anticommunism and Stalinism as rival authoritarian ideologies on either side of the divided peninsula.

Museums and textbooks attempt to condense South Korea's intractable history down into threads and themes, imposing a type of coherence and arbitrary logic upon it, but Korea's recent history is extraordinary in its capacity to burst out and produce unexpected emotions and connections. The demands of the present

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very much influence how scholars, citizens, and the Korean diaspora look at the past, whether or not the past is seen as a glorious terrain of national triumph, or an area of stagnation which yet requires strenuous work to overcome—or obliterate. At times it feels as if South Korea itself inhabits a strange netherland of the nearly present, or the just past. The history of South Korea is thus still in process, still under production, malleable, fungible. The complexity of historical issues on the Korean peninsula is reflected in the fact that while controversies may appear to be either international in nature (eg the 'comfort women') or domestic (eg the National Guidance League massacres of 1950), in reality most of them comprize a set of interconnecting international and domestic dimensions. The papers gathered together in this special issue of the European Journal of Korean Studies offer stringent critiques of aspects of historical production on the Korean peninsula, but they also bring out clearly these complexities. They all, in various ways, show how issues that may appear to be limited to the domestic sphere are also international, and vice-versa. Above all, they demonstrate how history in South Korea is intricately bound up with politics, national identity and the problems of unfinished historical business and unresolved trauma.

This special issue was initially based on a symposium held at the Centre of Korean Studies, SOAS in February 2018 ('Colonialism and its Reverberations') at which two of the contributors (Younghwan Cheong and Vladimir Tikhonov) gave versions of their papers. The issue was also inspired in part by an earlier special issue of the Korean journal *Marxism 21* that I edited in 2016 (*Marxism 21* 13: 4). The two papers by Professors Cheong and Tikhonov have been joined here by two additional articles by Andrew Logie and Mark Caprio that significantly expand the scope of the subject and enrich the arguments by bringing in issues of pseudohistory in South Korea and a tragic moment in the repatriation of Koreans from Japan.

In the first paper Vladimir Tikhonov offers a detailed and coherent account of the rise and fall of the academic New Right in Korea, their attempt to turn the clock back by introducing conservative history textbooks and their place in South Korea's recent 'history wars'. In the second paper Andrew Logie has contributed an enormously powerful critique of what he terms pseudohistory and pseudohistorians in relation to the study of early Korean history. Younghwan Cheong,[1] in his contribution, offers a pointed analysis of Park Yu-ha's highly controversial book *Comfort Women of the Empire*, exploring the impact of South Korean historical

1 Owing to pressures of time and printing deadlines, Professor Younghwan Cheong's article is not available in the first printed edition of European Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. The article will be available in the digital edition, online and as a paper offprint.

revisionism on the issue of military sexual slavery, perhaps the most contested and traumatic historical issue of the Japanese colonial era. Finally, Mark Caprio gives an objective account of a moment subject to intense hyperbole and emotion, the destruction of the *Ukishima-maru* in August 1945, with the loss of more than 500 Korean labourers returning to Pusan (Busan). The terms 'textbook wars' and 'history wars' are in themselves controversial, but these articles leave us in no doubt that conflicts over the twentieth century history of Korea—and even over ancient state formation—are going to be around for some time to come. Together these papers constitute a powerful contribution to illuminating some of the most crucial current debates within Korean history today.

The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea[1]

VLADIMIR TIKHONOV (PAK NOJA)
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Abstract

The present article deals with one of the attempts by South Korea's privileged stratum to undermine the very basis for any criticisms against the colonial-age behaviour of its institutional—and in many cases familial—forefathers, namely the so-called New Right movement. Simultaneously an academic and political movement, it was launched in 2004 and had been acting as advocates of a new, post-nationalist neo-conservatism until its recent decline, more or less concurrent with the demise of Park Geun-hye (Pak Kûnhye) regime amidst the candlelight vigils and million-strong demonstrations in downtown Seoul in 2016–2017. On the academic plane, New Right aimed at shifting the axiological basis of South Korean nationalism from ethno-nation (*minjok*) discriminated and oppressed by the Japanese colonialists, to the capitalist 'civilization' which colonialism had supposedly helped to transplant onto Korean soil, and the South Korean statehood which allowed so many former members of the colonial-period elites to maintain their socio-economic positions. If the new order of priorities, with the market game rules, industrial growth and modern capitalist statehood put ahead of the traditional shibboleth of the ethno-nation (encompassing the majority of population which might not necessarily benefit, at least, immediately, from all these developments), was to be established, the defence of colonial-age collaboration would no longer be an onerous task. On the contrary, collaborators could be, in such a way, re-interpreted as patriots who had acted out of Korea's long-term interest in

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'civilizing' itself with the Japanese 'help' rather than pure opportunism. However, New Right never succeeded in putting the conventional South Korean historical paradigm—based, eventually, on the vision of Korea 'under-developed' by the colonial capitalism and heavily influenced by various left-nationalistic interpretations of Marxism—upside down. The present article aims at exploring how the movement proceeded and finding out what could have been the decisive factors in its failure. Moreover, it will shed the light on the general tendencies in the development of South Korean historiography in the neo-liberal age, in an attempt to understand to which extent the elite interests may be still influencing the historiographical trends, even despite the downfall of the New Right movement.

Keywords: ethno-nationalism, collaboration, neo-liberalism, New Right, Park Geun-hye, historical revisionism.

Preface

During the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, school textbooks and other components of South Korea's official history, alongside the mainstream historiography underpinning them, were typical of post-colonial history writing, in its more or less conservative version. Since the mid-1960s, the systematic refutation of the Japanese colonial view of Korean history was seen as one of the central tasks of South Korean historians. This mission was seen as particularly urgent since a similar job had been already done, to a very large extent, in the 1950s by Marxist historians under the aegis of the rival North Korean regime.[2] De-colonizing historiography did not, of course, imply any doubts about the modernist and largely Eurocentric basic premises of the Japanese colonialist views per se. It was more about minuses being replaced by pluses, with the basic teleological matrix of a pre-ordained march towards European-style modernity remaining largely unchanged. While the Japanese colonial historians saw Korea—in what we today would probably characterise as quintessentially Orientalist way—as a stagnant society unable to develop capitalism on its own, South Korean historians since the late 1960s have been following up on the colonial-era Marxist historians' endeavour of rescuing the supposed sprouts of capitalism in pre-modern Korea from oblivion.[3] While the Japanese colonial historians—again, in a typically Orientalist fashion—were striving to (mis)represent Korea as a weak peninsular victim of the perpetual struggle between China's successive dynasties and Japan, South Korean historians were emphasizing both the pre-modern history of anti-foreign resistance and the anti-colonial movements of the pre-colonial and

colonial periods.[4] There was, however, one obvious ideological taboo. Under the anti-communist military regimes, research on the history of Communist resistance were controlled and restrained, while the place of Communists in the official historical representations—and especially school textbooks—was kept to a bare minimum.[5]

Some important changes to the status quo of South Korean historiography came in the late 1980s and early 1990s, propelled by the general growth of a leftist milieu in history as well as in other disciplines,[6] mostly underground or in the grey zone between what was prohibited and what was de facto tolerated.[7] The liberalization that followed the re-introduction of institutional democracy in 1987 also brought significant changes. Research on the Communist movement of the colonial period became fashionable for a while, a phenomenon no doubt helped by the opening of Comintern archives after the Soviet collapse in 1991. In popular culture, such previously tabooed issues as the leftist guerrilla movement of the late 1940s–early 1950s were now widely used as a subject-matter. Good examples are such critically acclaimed and commercially successful masterpieces as *Nambugun* (南部軍 [*North Korea's*] *Southern Army*, 1990), a film treating leftist guerrillas in a largely sympathetic way,[8] and *T'aebaek sanmaek* (太白山脈 *The T'aebaek Mountain Range*, 1989), the ten volumes roman-fleuve by Cho Chŏngnae (b. 1943) presenting a left-nationalist revisionist account of late colonial and post-colonial history centred around the colourful lives of left-wing partisans.[9] By the mid-1990s, yet another taboo was broken. The issue of colonial period collaboration with the colonizers by a large segment of the local patrician society, including landlords, incipient entrepreneurs and such key cultural figures as writer Yi Kwangsu (1892–1950) or composer and performer Hong Nanp'a (1898–1941), was approached by professional historians in a popular way that was sure to produce a strong response from the reading public.[10] Books on colonial period collaborators (*ch'inilp'a*—'the pro-Japanese faction,' or more generally, 'pro-Japanese collaborators'), typified by a three volume-long series, *Ch'inil'p'a 99 In* (親日派 99人 *99 Pro-Japanese Collaborators*), written by the patriarch of South Korea's Marxist historiography, Kang Man'gil (b. 1933) and a number of his younger colleagues,[11] became a bestseller. This development signified serious problems for the shaky legitimacy of the South Korean ruling class, already undermined by the wide publicity around elite misdeeds under the dictatorial regimes.

It is a well-established fact that the nucleus of the modern Korean capitalist class formed during the colonial days, inside the web of close collaboration between the nascent Korean capitalists and Japanese authorities.[12] It is equally well-known that the officer corps of the South Korean military, the crucial power stakeholder during the dictatorship days, was initially recruited mostly from among Japanese

Imperial Army officers of Korean ethnicity. The biography of Japanese lieutenant-turned South Korean major general Park Chung Hee (Pak Chônghûi, 1917–1979), who ruled South Korea with an iron fist between 1961 and 1979, was possibly the best illustration for the thesis about colonial-to-postcolonial elite continuity.[13] Indeed, the elites with colonial background kept some of their influence until the 1980s: Sin Hyônhwak (1920–2007), South Korea's Prime Minister in 1979–80 and one of the key managers of the Samsung (Samsông) business empire in the late 1980s, began his career at the wartime Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of Imperial Japan.[14] However, this fact, disastrous for the political legitimacy of the ruling elite in a postcolonial society where colonial victimhood and anti-colonial resistance were the official narratives (especially in view of the confrontation with North Korea, ruled by the veterans of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war with impeccable nationalist credentials), was kept out of public consciousness until the late 1980s to early 1990s. Those few scholars who attempted to work on the issue—such as Im Chongguk (1929–1989), known for his meticulous collections on the collaborating activities of writers and other colonial-era public figures—were excluded from academia and barely recognized by mainstream scholarship.[15] Official history on the colonial period tended to omit the sensitive collaboration issue altogether, concentrating instead on the anti-colonial activities of exiled nationalists or the suppression of visible cultural figures, such as members of Korean Language Society, jailed in 1942–5.[16] It is no wonder then that the stream of revelations in the 1990s about the colonial roots of the South Korean elite astonished the public. It called forth a very significant popular response and put the accused—the members of the blood-based and institutional lineages whose prominent members were now revealed to have been collaborators and, by extension, the established elites in general—on the defensive.

The present article deals with one of the attempts by South Korea's privileged stratum to undermine the very basis for any criticisms against the colonial period behaviour of its institutional—and in many cases familial—forefathers, namely the New Right movement. Simultaneously an academic and political movement, it was launched in 2004. Since then, it had been advocating a new, post-nationalist neo-conservatism until its recent decline, more or less concurrent with the demise of Park Geun-hye (Pak Kûnhye, b. 1952) amidst the candlelight vigils and million-strong demonstrations in downtown Seoul in 2016–2017. On the academic plane, the New Right aimed at shifting the axiological basis of South Korean nationalism from the ethno-nation (*minjok*) oppressed by the Japanese colonialists, to the capitalist "civilization" which colonialism supposedly helped to transplant onto Korean soil, and the South Korean statehood so well served by so many former members of the colonial-period elites. The New Right movement therefore wished

to establish a new order of historical priorities. In this new order, the rules of the market, industrial growth and modern capitalist statehood were to be put ahead of the ethno-nation (*minjok*) which encompassed the underprivileged majority who might not necessarily have benefitted from these developments. If such an order of historical priorities could only be cemented, the defence of colonial period collaboration would no longer be an onerous task. On the contrary, collaborators could be re-interpreted as patriots who had acted out of Korea's long-term interest in "civilizing" itself with Japanese "help" rather than pure opportunism.[17]

However, the New Right never succeeded in turning the conventional South Korean historical paradigm upside down, despite their popularity with certain sectors of the ruling elite. In a way, the New Right's version of South Korean political nationalism, with its emphasis on pride in the success of the export-driven South Korea economy conceptualized as an effect of the long-term globalization that began under Japanese rule, dovetailed nicely with South Korea's developmental trajectory. South Korean capitalist development was driven by a nation state which utilized statist nationalism for its purposes and simultaneously profited greatly from the international Cold War regime and both global and regional capital and technology flows. The Japanese connection, which the New Right was seeking to exonerate, was indeed crucial to the developmental state visions of the South Korean elites and their drive to take over the sunset industries from Japan in the 1960–80s.[18] Seen from this perspective, the attempt by the New Right to vindicate South Korea's ruling class and its collusion with Japanese imperialism and colonialism in the name of South Korea's export-led economic success, embedded as it is in the logic of global and regional capitalism, is perhaps less self-contradictory than it looks at first sight. The present article aims to explore how this attempt proceeded and find out why it ultimately failed to win much support beyond elite circles. Moreover, it will shed light on the general tendencies of South Korean historiography in the neo-liberal age, in an attempt to understand the extent to which elite interests have been able to influence historiographical trends.

The "Collaboration Issue", Post-Nationalism and Neo-Conservatism

After the neo-liberal shift of 1997–8, the intellectual life of South Korea exhibited two important trends, mutually contradictory on the surface but in reality, simultaneously deeply interconnected. On the one hand, the drift from the neo-mercantilist accumulation regime of the pre-1997 years meant that official nationalism, with its emphasis on ethno-national belonging and the

time-honoured history of anti-foreign resistance, was no longer as desirable as before. The ethno-nation still had to be evoked in the context of the Sunshine Policy vis-à-vis North Korea, which was launched in 1998. After all, belonging to the same ethnic nation was the one thing the two states divided by their Cold War alliances had in common, despite the almost 20-fold difference in their per capita GNP.[19] However, ethno-nationalism was more of an obstacle if one had to accept the reality of, say, foreign investors possessing around 64 percent of all the bank stocks on the South Korean market by 2004 and effectively dominating the country's banking industry.[20] While neo-liberalism as the new politico-economic orthodoxy stimulated the post-nationalist turn on the Right, the Left discovered the urgency of post-nativist approaches witnessing the rapidly changing composition of South Korea's population. International marriages, typically between South Korean men and Chinese, Vietnamese, or Filipina women, were increasing steadily as neo-liberal South Korea was integrated into the regional network of marriage agencies, amounting to 13.6 percent of all the marriages by 2006.[21] At the same time more than half a million foreign manual workers were toiling for the profits of South Korea's small and medium-sized businesses.[22] Altogether, both marriage and labour migrants represented a sort of internal colony of advanced industrialism, and a natural object for the Left's advocacy and solidarity efforts.[23] Such efforts, however, implied dethroning the ethno-nation from the privileged position this concept enjoyed during the democratization struggles of the 1980s. In a paradoxical way, post- or trans-nationalism came to be a common denominator for the leftist advocates of multi-ethnic Korea and the neo-liberal establishment in need of justification for the ways in which the trans-border capitalist marketplace was supposed to function.

On the other hand, the issue of the Korean elites' collaboration with the colonial authorities was now a part of the legal and legislative, rather than simply public, discussion. After all, South Korea's transition from neo-mercantilism to neo-liberalism was led by the former standard-bearers of democratization who were able to impose a deeply unpopular marketisation agenda because they commanded the loyalty of a significant part of organized labour and progressively-minded civil society. Kim Dae-jung (Kim Taejung, 1924–2009), the erstwhile pro-democracy movement leader and a proponent of essentially social democratic 'participatory economics'[24] who came to preside over the shift to neo-liberalism as South Korea's president in 1998–2003, had to offer some plausibly progressive and popular policies to his supporters disheartened by the realities of layoffs and the growth of non-permanent employment. The same applied to his successor, Roh Moo-hyun (No Muhyôn, 1946–2009), a former human rights lawyer who was South Korea's president in 2003–8. The Sunshine

Policy was one such landmark policy, designed both to facilitate South Korean businesses' penetration into North Korea and please the liberal public at home. Yet another highly popular policy was the 'settlement' (*ch'ôngsan*) of long-tabooed historical issues, including colonial period collaboration. Several presidential investigative committees were set up under Roh Moo-hyun, to deal with hitherto "unsettled" historical issues, and the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Anti-National Pro-Japanese Collaboration Activities (親日反民族行爲眞相糾明委員會 Ch'inil Panminjok haengwi Chinsang Kyumyông Wiwônhoe, 2005–9) was one of them. Its first chairman was Kang Man'gil, one of the authors of *Ch'inil'p'a 99 In* mentioned above. The public discussions that had taken place during the 1990s on the collaboration issue were now absorbed into state historical policy. The Committee presented to the national assembly a shortlist of 106 leading collaborators later expanded to 1005 personalities. At the same time, a group of left-nationalist historical activists brought together by the Institute of Ethno-national Issues (Minjok Munje Yôn'guso) named more than 4770 collaborators in its monumental *Bibliographical Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Collaborators* 親日人名辭典.[25] While being included in the *Bibliographical Dictionary* was not supposed to have any legal consequences, those listed by the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Anti-National Collaborations were to be targeted by the Special Law to Redeem Pro-Japanese Anti-National Collaborators' Property (親日反民族行爲者財産의 國家歸屬에 關한 特別法 Ch'inil Panminjok Haengwija Chaesan ŭi Kukka Kwisok e gwanhan T'ŭkpyŏlpŏp, 2005), which stipulated that the property acquired as remuneration for collaboration activities was to be confiscated from collaborators' descendants.[26]

On the surface, the two developments in South Korea's intellectual and public life described above were mutually contradictory. On the one hand, books like the indictment of nationalism written and published in 1999 by one of South Korea's few experts on Polish history under the rather provocative title, *Nationalism is Treason*,[27] was avidly read by progressively-minded students on Seoul campuses. On the other hand, the same students were often likely to enthusiastically support the Roh Mu-hyun government's historical policies, despite the fact that the committee charged with investigating the collaboration issue had defined—even in its name—collaboration activities as both pro-Japanese and anti-(ethno-)national. In other words, the concept of ethno-nation could be accepted by a significant number of progressives when it was needed to be strategically deployed to promote inter-Korean reconciliation or to symbolically down-grade the position and prestige of the established elites by pointing to the "anti-national" misdeeds of its institutional or familial forefathers. The same concept, however, was to be shelved away when it came to the issue of immigration, in favour of

openness and a new, multi-ethnic Korea. However, this paradoxical parallelism in the development of a rather nationalistic movement for 'historical settlement' and at the same time post-nationalist criticism of ethno-nationalism is not necessarily inexplicable. Under the military dictatorships, the collaboration issue was largely tabooed. At the same time, the official nationalism, with its cults of supposedly sagacious King Sejong the Great (r. 1418–50) and illustrious admiral Yi Sunsin (1545–98) famed for his maritime victories during the Hideyoshi invasions of Korea (1592–8), and with its system of 'national ethics' (*kungmin yulli*) reminiscent of wartime Japanese Imperial ideology's totalitarianism, was a sacred cow.[28] Now, with freedom of expression more or less entrenched in the public sphere, the old taboos could be subverted and the erstwhile sacred cows were no longer inviolable. Thus, both historical activists striving to document the collaborationist activities and name and shame the 'anti-national' patricians of the colonial age and the leftist intellectuals attempting to dissect the pre-existing 'national' mythoi could perhaps view themselves in strikingly similar ways, as the people able at last to dismantle the labyrinth of taboos, ideological prohibitions and deleted memories inherited from the authoritarian past.

However, the new public mood and the Roh Mu-hyun government's legislative activities put some significant and important sections of the South Korean elite into an extremely awkward position. Their prestige and legitimacy, already compromised by their long history of cohesive ties with military governments, was being dealt a very painful blow. Those who were hit hardest included the famed Kim family from Koch'ang, who typified the landlords-turned-entrepreneurs of the colonial age. Its most prominent member, Waseda-educated businessman and educator Kim Sôngsu (1891–1955) known for having established one of the first Korean-owned textile factories of the colonial era, Kyŏngsŏng Spinning and Weaving Company (Kyŏngbang, 1919) and the newspaper that is still an influential mouthpiece of Korea's mainstream bourgeois opinion, *Tong'a Ilbo* (1919), was posthumously decorated in 1962 with the presidential Order of Merit for National Foundation (*Kôn'guk Hunjang*).[29] However, his name predictably was on the long list of collaborators (1005 persons) worked out by the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Anti-National Collaborators. His assistance to the Japanese war effort was more than well-known. The legal challenge mounted by his descendants failed after almost a decade-long litigation, and in 2018, Kim Sôngsu was—again posthumously—deprived of his Order of Merit for National Foundation.[30] As a result, *Tong'a Ilbo* could no longer legitimately characterise itself as a nationalist paper (*minjokchi*). Its most important symbolic capital, the (highly exaggerated and in many ways factually untrue) story of anti-colonial resistance via journalism, was gravely undermined. *Tong'a Ilbo*'s long-term competitor, *Chosôn Ilbo*, used

to be the best-selling and most influential among the established conservative papers.[31] However, it fared no better. Its proprietor and manager during 1933–50, Pang Ŭngmo (1883–1950), a mine owner-turned-newspaperman, ended up on the same collaborators' list—again, quite expectedly, since the assistance *Chosôn Ilbo* rendered to the Japanese war effort after the beginning of the full-scale invasion of China in 1937, was only too well-known.[32] Of course, the symbolic politics of history hardly had an immediate effect on real life. Regardless of the validity of its nationalist credentials, *Chosôn Ilbo* has remained the South Korean daily with the highest circulation, even at the time of writing this article.[33] Still, even this largely symbolic attack from the progressive camp required a response. In addition, by the mid-2000s the conservatives—with *Tong'a Ilbo* and *Chosôn Ilbo* as their most representative media organs—felt themselves embattled. Roh Mu-hyun won the 2002 presidential elections, thus extending the liberals' mandate for a further five years, and his party dealt a convincing defeat to the conservatives in the 2004 parliamentary elections.[34] The conservative establishment needed new discourses, strategies and faces if it was to regain both the symbolic capital undermined by the collaboration controversy, and political power. The New Right movement was one of its chosen instruments.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that *Tong'a Ilbo* was the cradle of the New Right. It was there that some conservative pundits first started to question the conventional (that is, unabashedly negative) attitudes of the South Korean public towards the Japanese colonial period *per se*, a prelude to the wholesale legitimation of colonialism attempted by the New Right afterwards. Yu Sôkch'un (b. 1955), a professor at Seoul-based Yonsei University's Department of Sociology and one of the ideologues of South Korea's neo-conservatism, had already published on April 11, 2001, in the midst of the controversy over the Japanese ultra-conservatives' attempt to publish revisionist history textbooks, a column in *Tong'a Ilbo*, in which he suggested that the "bright sides" of the colonial period should be recognized.[35] Japan was obviously not a threat, from the neo-conservatives' viewpoint. As yet another pundit of the Right, Nam Siuk (b. 1938), a former editor-in-chief of *Tong'a Ilbo*, opined in his column in the same newspaper on January 23, 2003, South Korea was supposedly threatened by leftists who viewed North Korea's nationalist credentials as superior and disregarded South Korea as "anti-national and subservient to the US and Japan."[36] It was now the Right's task to prove that it was indeed the collaboration with colonial rule rather than resistance to it (which symbolically empowered the rulers of North Korea) that, in the long run, benefitted Korea most.

Perhaps it was no accident that, when the New Right (Nyurait'û) emerged as a coherent academic and political faction in 2004, most of the recognizable faces

among the New Right politicians were indeed the defectors from the leftist camp. The most representative among them was Sin Chiho (b. 1963), a radical student-turned-socialist labour activist of the 1980s who went to Japan to receive a PhD in political science at Keio University after his 'thought conversion' (*chŏnhyang*) in 1992. While Sin Chiho belonged to the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist "PD" (People's Democracy) faction,[37] the rest of the erstwhile leftists in the New Right camp were mostly former members of the "NL" (National Liberation) left nationalist wing of the anti-establishment movement of the 1980s, and some of them confessed to having once espoused North Korea's *chuch'e* philosophy. Indeed, the Secretary General of the Liberty Union (Chayujuûi Yôndae), the first-ever New Right group founded in 2004, was Hong Chinp'o (b. 1963), a former activist of the Pan-National Alliance for Unification of the Motherland (Pômminryôn), an international NGO with close ties to Pyongyang whose South Korean members had been subjected to constant police repression.[38] Sin Chiho assumed the duties of the Liberty Union's representative. At the same time, its Organizational Committee chief, Ch'oe Hongjae (b. 1968), was a former "NL" student leader with three stints in prison on his record.[39] The conservative press promoted the Liberty Union though its pages from its inception. It was obviously hoped that former leftist dissidents, so persuasive before in their attacks upon South Korea's establishment, would be equally convincing in defending its legitimacy now.[40] As for the former socialists and *chuch'e* followers, the New Right movement was a good way of saving face while moving into the conservative mainstream of South Korean society. After all, the New Right was promising to establish a new, refreshing, and internationally respectable brand of conservatism. They were to focus on individual and economic freedom a well as human rights; of course, chiefly *North Korean* human rights rather than human rights issues at home. From the very beginning, however, the New Right started to demonstrate a rather problematic proclivity towards following the examples of the Japanese neo-nationalists, among all the possible foreign models. Sin Chiho, for example, was among the first to import and use the term 'masochist view of history' (自虐史觀 Kor. *chahak sagwan*, Jap. *jigyaku shikan*) so often used by the Japanese right-wing historical revisionists towards the critics of the Imperial Japanese Army's wartime predations.[41] In the jargon of the South Korean New Right, this term, naturally enough, was to be applied to any critics of the new, refurbished vision of South Korea's triumphant and glorious post-colonial history.

South Korean New Right Academia: Domestic and International Contexts

Indeed, on the intellectual level, the impulses emanating from Japan were just as important in the formation of New Right discourse as Japanese capital and technology were for the success of South Korea's developmentalist drive in the 1960–80s. The intellectual leader of the New Right was a well-known and widely respected economic historian, An Pyôngjik (b. 1936) who strongly influenced the "NL" movement of the 1980s with his definition of South Korea's economy and society as neo-colonial and semi-feudal. Having accepted the main premises of dependency theory, An argued in the 1970s and 1980s that the only hope for South Korea was 'de-linking' from the world capitalist system and launching on a course of independent, nationally oriented development. At the end of the 1980s, however, An, who stayed at Tokyo University in 1986–7, came to accept the conclusion of more mainstream Japanese economic historians who saw South Korea as a successful example of 'catch-up' development based on technology and capital imports from the core capitalist states.[42] Furthermore, he soon joined Kyoto University's Nakamura Tetsu and Hori Kazuō in their research on how the foundations of South Korea's post-colonial jump into the ranks of the 'middle-developed' (中進 Kor. *chungjin*) capitalist countries was supposedly based on the legacy of colonial period industrialization.[43] A large physical part of the colonial legacy, in the form of heavy and chemical industry plants etc. either ended up in what became North Korea after 1945 or was destroyed by the Korean War in 1950–3. The degree to which the colonial legacy might have indeed contributed to the process of post-colonial capital accumulation in South Korea is a subject of heated debates in international academia.[44] Even if such a contribution might have been substantial, such a conclusion does not necessarily translate into apology for colonial rule, with its political oppression and enormous social inequalities. Most economic historians agree that industrial growth in 1920–30s' Korea did not sufficiently benefit the poorer peasant majority.[45] However, An's conclusions were desperately needed by the New Right movement, for which he became the academic face after assuming the presidency of the New Right Foundation in 2006. After all, if colonial period economic development laid the foundations for South Korea's 'miraculous' growth then collaboration with the colonial authorities on behalf of the local entrepreneurial class by Kim Sôngsu and Pang Ûngmo[46] could be seen in a much more positive light.

Together with An, another major New Right theoretician was the economic historian, Yi Yŏnghun (b. 1951). In the field of late Chosŏn economic history—his original area of expertise—Yi was famous for his opposition to the idea of

internally developing 'sprouts of capitalism' in the Chosŏn economy and society, and idea which had dominated Marxism-influenced historical scholarship in Korea since the 1950s. In Yi's view, late Chosŏn society of small cultivators, with its established patterns of primogeniture and familial farm management, represented a good potential basis for the transplantation of capitalism from outside. However, it could hardly, institutionally or technologically, develop any sort of modern capitalism on its own. While this argument per se seems to be grounded in thorough factual research, some of Yi's judgements on late Chosŏn society appear to lack proper proof, being obviously designed to emphasize the supposed backwardness of pre-colonial Korea. A good example is his professed belief that Chosŏn did not develop a system of property ownership, as all land was supposed to be ultimately owned by the ruling dynasty.[47] Furthermore, drawing on pre-existing work, mostly by Japanese researchers, Yi highlighted the importance of the Japanese Government General's Land Survey (1910–8) for the establishment of modern-style property rights in Korea. Yi's rebuttals of the nationalist historians' customary accusations that the Land Survey simply represented a "Japanese land grab" obviously do hold water to a certain degree. Indeed, in most cases the Land Survey simply reconfirmed the existing property-holding patterns.[48] However, Yi seems to be completely uninterested in the *social* consequences of the Land Survey, which, by establishing modern patterns of exclusive property rights, discarded the customary rights which tenants used to enjoy in Chosŏn society, and deepened inequalities in the countryside. The same applies to Yi's rather triumphalist vision of the history of colonial Korea and post-colonial South Korea in general. Yi views what he (following, indeed, the time-honoured terminology of such colonial period Marxist theoreticians as Im Hwa, 1908–53) terms the 'transplantation' (*isik*) of capitalist institutions and internationally-oriented economic structures as an exclusively positive phenomenon, indeed, almost as a pre-ordained historical process with a Hegelian *telos*. At the same time, he appears to be, at best, oblivious about the *social* price of the triumphs of modernization, before and after de-colonization.[49] In fact, his unabashedly positive evaluations of the growth-first economic policies of the 1960–70s' military dictatorship are reminiscent of the modernization theories of the early Cold War-age, with their acknowledgement of Third World authoritarianism as a 'necessarily evil' on the path towards successful 'catch-up with the advanced countries.'[50]

Long-standing connections with the Japanese historical scholarship, mostly of a mainstream conservative flavour, were instrumental in the quest by An and Yi for arguments against the established left-nationalist version of Korea's early modern and colonial history. Indeed, this version could justifiably be accused of ideological

dogmatism. Unlike, say, the south-eastern coastal region of China or Bengal, late Chosŏn Korea definitely was *not* a world-wide manufacturing centre for which a sort of independent capitalist development could be postulated, even theoretically.[51] It is also clearly undeniable that, while using their Korean colony for their own purposes, the Japanese authorities did indeed transplant the metropolitan institutional infrastructure to the colonial soil.[52] The trouble with Yi and An's arguments was rather their ideological penchant towards ascribing exclusively positive historical significance to all these developments. That such a penchant could indeed lead the neo-conservatives away from any possibilities of gaining genuine popularity, was amply demonstrated by the 2005 'Han Sŭngjo Incident.' Han Sŭngjo (1930–2017), a Berkeley-educated and extremely conservative political scientist from Korea University, published a contribution in a Japanese right-wing monthly, *Seiron*, in which he characterised Japanese colonial rule as a "blessing" for Korea, and denounced the accusations against collaborators as supposedly "grounded in left-wing ideology." While that was hardly different from what Sin Chiho, Hong Chinp'yo, Ch'oe Hongjae, An Pyôngjik or Yi Yŏnghun might have thought themselves, the blunt way in which Han expressed his belief in the salubriousness of 'colonial modernization' made it difficult even for many of the New Right to adopt his cause when extremely negative public reactions eventually forced Han out of his emeritus professorship at Korea University.[53] Open apologetics for Japanese colonial rule, in the style of Japanese neo-nationalists or such Korea-born writers as the Japanese Right's favourite middle-brow author, O Sŏnhwa (Oh Sonfa, b. 1956),[54] turned out to be an unsellable intellectual commodity in South Korea, not only for the general public but among much less nationalistic scholarly audiences as well. While both An and Yi obviously did their best to distinguish themselves from unabashedly pro-colonial rhetoric of Han's kind, their vision of colonial period modern development, as we will see below, came to be regarded as simply a slightly more sophisticated version of Han's.

The 'Han Sŭngjo Incident,' interestingly enough, temporarily overlapped with yet another landmark in the history of South Korea's New Right of the 2000s—namely, with the publication of the seminal *For Reconciliation* (和解를 爲해서 *Hwahae rŭl wihaesŏ*) by Pak Yuha (b. 1957), a Japan-educated South Korean academic.[55] The book—quickly translated into Japanese[56]—was written in the then fashionable post-nationalist jargon. The author emphasized her willingness "to overcome the [obsession with] the state" and to criticize masculinist and nationalist oppression on all sides, including South Korea's own patriarchal society which, until the disclosure of the 'comfort women' atrocities by a former victim in 1991, tended to regard the victims of Japanese wartime 'comfort women' recruitment as 'fallen women.' After the disclosure, they were, as Pak suggests,

reclassified as 'worthy victims' representing the whole of the victimized Korean nation—their individualities, life histories and experiences being side-lined. Some of the criticisms made by Pak were certainly justified. Indeed, it is hard to deny that much of the gender- and class-based wartime victimization by the Japanese military and colonial authorities was absorbed into the South Korean national(ist) narrative as primary 'national' suffering, without due attention to the socio-economic circumstances or gender stereotypes which served as the background for the atrocities.[57] However, as such Zainichi (Japan-resident Korean) intellectuals as essayist Sŏ Kyŏngsik (b. 1951) or feminist historian Kim Puja (b. 1958) were quick to point out, Pak's own book was hardly free from the faults she (justifiably) found with the nationalist critique of colonial period atrocities. In prioritising 'reconciliation' between the nation states of Japan and South Korea, advocating friendlier 'understanding' of the modes of thinking and behaviour of Japan's right-wing political mainstream and demonstrating an unusual willingness to 'absolve' Japan from guilt for its imperialist past, the book was playing to Japanese nationalism. At the same time, it obviously suited the interests of South Korea's own ruling groups which saw improved relations with Japan as one of their priorities and were negative towards the 'anti-collaborationist' campaign of Roh Muhyun's government.[58] Pak Yuha—soon (in 2007) awarded a prestigious Osaragi Jirō Prize by *Asahi*[59]—become an important fellow-traveller for the New Right. As we will see below, less a decade after her first emergence as a public intellectual her hard-core revisionist stance would bring her into serious trouble which overlapped with the overall crisis of the New Right movement.

Back then, in 2005–6, however, the New Right and their allies were seen as representatives of an attractive new trend, distinctive from the old-fashioned ideological dogmatism on both Left and Right. Post-nationalism was riding a wave of popularity in rapidly internationalizing neoliberal South Korea, and the New Right was skilfully sailing along with the winning trend. Indeed, Sin Chiho even criticised the National Alliance of the New Right (Nyu Rait'ŭ Chŏn'guk Yŏnhap), the pan-national umbrella New Right group, for positioning itself too closely to the older, already discredited right-wingers, on the understanding that this tactic might inhibit the New Right's own growth in popularity and public recognition.[60] On the intellectual front, the reputation of the New Rights was to be cemented by the huge, two-volume, *Re-interpretation of History Before and After Liberation* (解放前後史 再認識 *Haebang Chŏnhusa Chaeinsik*, 2006). The book, edited by Yi Yŏnghun and a well-known conservative scholar of Western history, Pak Chihyang (b. 1953), was a collection of contributions by both renowned and early-career South Korean, Japanese and American scholars, including such prominent names as Harvard's Carter Eckert and University of Michigan's Meredith Jung-En Woo.[61] The book

represented a collaboration between the New Right, post-nationalists and Korea historians of different ideological persuasions in general. Many of the latter stood much to the left of the book's two editors. Yi Yŏnghun and Pak Chihyang, however, obviously wanted to selectively use the pre-existing—and not necessarily conservative—scholarship on colonial and postcolonial Korea in order to create a counterweight to the historical bible of the 1990s' left-nationalists, *Interpretation of History Before and After Liberation* (解放 前後史 認識 *Haebang Chŏnhusa Insik*, 1979–89), hence the telling title. The prodigiously large article collection did not include even a single piece on the history of anti-colonial resistance, or the colonial period workers' movement. However, at the same time a contribution on the colonial-period political participation by Koreans and its significance for Korea's post-Liberation history (by Namiki Masahito, Ferris Women's University) was visible.[62] In attempt to make their collection representative, Yi Yŏnghun and Pak Chihyang even succeeded in including some of the authors of the original, *Interpretation of the History Before and After the Liberation* among their contributors: for example, Prof. Yi Wanbôm, a known authority on post-Liberation political history and the Korean-American relationship, contributed chapters (on the trusteeship debates and the political struggles in the immediate post-Liberation years), written in an impeccably neutral, objectivist tone, to both collections in succession.[63] At this juncture, it looked as if the academic New Right, especially their representatives of Yi Yŏnghun's calibre, were going to acquire a sort of Gramscian hegemony over the modern history field in South Korea, buttressed by the general fascination with post-nationalist ideas and the authority of international academia (which at that point did not seem to distinguish between the New Right and their post-nationalist colleagues among its South Korean counterparts). However, the triumph, as we will see below, was short-lived.

The Textbook Revision Movement and the Downfall of the New Right

Already in 2006, a group of leading post-nationalist historians openly broke away from the New Rights. *Re-reading Modernity* (近代를 다시 읽는다 *Kûndae rûl tasi Ingnûnda*, ed. Yun Haedong, 2006), a collective monograph representative of this group's thinking, emphatically questioned the absolutization of the modern capitalist state so essential in the logic of the New Right and suggested instead the necessity of finding the ways of overcoming the teleology of modernity's in historiography.[64] The problem for the New Right was, however, not only their Hegelian tendency to absolutize the supposedly 'civilized' modern statehood, be it colonial Japanese or Korean. A further problem was that the ways in which

they formulated and distributed for general consumption their ideas increasingly resembled the hackneyed formulae of South Korea's official historiography, or sometimes even Imperial Japan's history-writing. A good example is offered by the earliest in the series of New Right 'alternative textbooks,' the one dealing with modern and contemporary history and published by Textbook Forum (Kyokwasô P'orôm), a major New Right group, in 2008. Edited by Yi Yŏnghun, the textbook acknowledges the 'oppression' of the colonial time, but simultaneously evaluates the Japanese colonial period as the "time when Koreans learned modern civilization and accumulated their social abilities," in language reminiscent of the Japanese colonizers' own self-serving descriptions of their rule in Korea. Together with the Japanese colonizers, both Syngman Rhee (Yi Sûngman, r. 1948–60) and Park Chong Hee (Pak Chônghûi, r. 1961–79) received generally positive evaluations in the textbook, as rulers who "consolidated liberal democracy" in South Korea and produced the "success of the South Korean economic model" respectively. At the same time, the democratic revolution of April 1960 which toppled the Syngman Rhee dictatorship was degraded to a 'student movement.'[65] The book—while being labelled as a 'textbook'—was not a textbook in the proper sense of the word. It was not authorised for school use by the Ministry of Education, and its authors indeed never applied for such an authorisation. Still, it was heartily welcomed by the political conservatives as a sign that history descriptions for schoolchildren were shifting at last in their own preferred direction. Park Geun-hye (Pak Kûnhye, b. 1952), daughter of Park Chong Hee and then the chairwoman of the conservative Grand National Party (Hannaradang), later to become South Korea's president (r. 2013–7), praised the book by saying that such a historical account caused her to worry less about schoolchildren learning the "distorted version of history."'[66] This praise from conservative politicians was of serious practical importance to the New Right in the situation where, after 10 years of liberal rule, a conservative, 'business-friendly' president Lee Myung-bak (Yi Myôngbak, r. 2008–13) was to assume power. However, in the end, collusive ties with the conservative governments proved to be the undoing of the New Right. The movement ended up falling together with its political backers.

The failure of the New Right, of course, was not simply a matter of politics. Post-nationalism, for example, still remains, in the time of the present writing, a serious force on the South Korean academic scene, and for a number of good reasons. One of them is the fact that, with the passage of time, the nationalistic historical myths created by the official historians of 1960–80s' neo-mercantilist developmentalist state, have the tendency to become history themselves, now ripe for critical academic analysis.[67] But, from a purely academic viewpoint of the post-developmentalist, post-authoritarian age, the historical accounts produced

by the New Right were suspiciously reminiscent of exactly these historical myths which the post-nationalists were so fond of publicly debunking. Was South Korea really a 'liberal democratic state' since its inception in 1948, as the New Right had been stubbornly claiming? Serious historians, armed with knowledge of the 'façade democracies' of inter-war Eastern Europe or, say, 'imitative democracy' in many post-Soviet states today, will find such a claim preposterous, regardless of the ostensible existence of supposedly 'liberal democratic' institutions in South Korea during the authoritarian developmentalist period.[68]

In a similar vein, the positive appraisal of Japanese colonial modernity and its supposed 'rational bureaucratic rule' sound rather disharmonious in an age when the boundaries between 'premodern' and 'modern' are seen as fuzzy and blurred, and the 'rationality' of modern governance is being increasingly questioned. To be sure, modernity has multiple varieties, and even the state Shinto theocracy or, say, ample use of physical torture by the repressive apparatus would not disqualify Japanese colonial rule as essentially modern. But does the regimented colonial rule have to be ascribed an exclusively positive historical significance? South Korea's historical scholarship of the late 2000s–early 2010s produced a number of critical analyses of the New Right historical accounts which seriously questioned the overall frame of reference, with its highly ideological glorification of various unsavoury forms of modern statehood. The critics also found Yi Yônghun's belief in the absence of private land ownership in pre-colonial Korea, or in the inherently driven 'self-destruction' of the pre-colonial Chosôn state to be deeply problematic.[69] By the beginning of the 2010s, the academic credibility of the New Rights was being seriously questioned. Hegemony in Korean academia, which seemed to be almost obtainable a few years before, was now out of their reach.

The New Right's lack of academic prestige was laid bare when the scholarly wing of the movement coalesced around the newly organized Association for the Study of Korean Contemporary history (Han'guk Hyŏndaesa Hakhoe) in 2011. An heir to the Textbook Forum, this new academic association was able to attract only around sixty members and only less than one-third of this number were professional historians. The rest were economists, political scientists or 'national ethics' (*kungmin yulli*) experts. The latter speciality, as liberal critics alleged, represented the totalitarian ideology of 'pan-national consolidation' from the 1970s rather than the academic field of ethics studies.[70] Sponsored financially by the Federation of Korean Industries (Chŏn'gyŏngnyŏn), an influential business lobby group, this supposedly academic association has been seen by the majority of professional historians as hopelessly prejudiced ideologically and lacking in integrity. In fact, many of the historians who joined it were rather public intellectuals of the neo-conservative bent (such as Prof. Kwŏn Hŭiyŏng of the Academy of Korean Studies, or Prof. Hŏ

Tonghyŏn of Kyunghee University) than purely academically-minded researchers. The Association did not produce either a scholarly journal or any recognizable academic publications.[71] Generally speaking, research publishing was not the forte of the New Right. The lion's share of the several hundred book the New Right has published so far, mostly through ideologically loyal publishers, such as Kip'arang (owned by a veteran conservative journalist, An Pyŏnghun, b. 1938) or Paengnyŏn Tong'an, have consisted of popular works of journalism, middlebrow at best, either praising the 'achievements' of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee or defending the colonial period businessmen and public figures accused of collaboration as the representatives of 'national capital' or 'national public life.' Few of these works have ever entered the bestsellers' list (traditionally dominated, in the field of history, by translated works, books by the liberally-inclined public intellectuals or apolitical historians of culture), and few were written professionally enough to be sympathetically reviewed by their peers in the historical field.[72] By the early 2010s, New Right academics came to appear as a sect-like group, increasingly isolated inside the professional milieu. Their further actions only deepened this isolation.

With two successive conservative administrations in power in 2008–17, the New Right was relied more and more on their clout inside the corridors of power in order to force their agenda of textbook change. In that, they had one particularly strong ally. President Park Geun-hye came into the Blue House (the presidential residence in Seoul) with a self-defined mission to 'restore the honour' of her dictatorial father,[73] an aim which overlapped completely with the desires of the New Right. In the beginning, they attempted to utilise the existing institutional mechanisms. In 2013, one more New Right-authored textbook, this time covering Korea's history as whole and targeting high-school students, was published by one of the most prestigious textbook publishers, Kyohaksa. Criticized by a number of professional historians for glaring inaccuracies and fallacious descriptions, this textbook—which, notoriously, went as far as to describe the massacre of the pro-democracy protesters in Kwangju in May 1980 by the South Korean army as 'clashes'—was, however, authorized and allowed into use (with a minimum of required edits) by the Ministry of Education, obviously on orders from the higher echelons of power. However, the ambitions of the New Right and Park's administration remained unrealized. By the beginning of 2014, practically no schools had adopted the textbook. The few which attempted to do so had to rescind their decisions after protests by parents, students and teachers' bodies.[74] The established institutional mechanisms were evidently not conducive to the neo-conservative re-writing of public memory.

As the failure of the textbook revision drive became visible, the Blue House, with the full support of its New Right academic allies, took a more radical turn. It

became obvious that the existing, relatively liberal system of textbook approval by the Ministry of Education and schools' free choice among the approved textbooks did not serve well the grand presidential project of full rehabilitation of Park Chung Hee and other ethnic Korean bureaucrats, soldiers and entrepreneurs of the Japanese Empire who then moved on to form the backbone of South Korea's ruling class. Thus, in the thinking of the Park administration, it was the system that had to be changed. In October 2015, the Park Geun-hye government publicly announced the plan to which it had repeatedly been alluding for several months before that. Under the plan Korean history textbooks would be 'nationalized' (*kukchŏnghwa*) in the way that they used to be during the period 1974–2002, when one, state-produced textbook was to be used uniformly in all the schools across the whole country. Given that the switch to the textbook approval and free choice system in 2002 was regarded as an important step forward towards further democratization of South Korea's notoriously over-centralized educational system, this measure was immediately criticized as harking back to the dictatorial past. After all, the shift from the ministerial approval system to unitary textbooks in 1974 took place against the backdrop of the Yusin ("Revitalization") dictatorship which was at that time clearing away the remaining formally liberal institutions. Moreover, since the background of Park Geun-hye's textbook gamble was more than clear, the historical and educational communities, as well as the majority of the politically active citizenry, understood the 'nationalization' to be tantamount to promoting the New Right vision of colonial period collaborators as pioneers of modernity to the status of an orthodoxy. In this way, 'nationalization' was seen as a de facto 'privatization' of national history for the needs of Park Chung Hee's descendants who aspired to exonerate their father. It was bad enough that the state's history was now to be written by the state itself, and forced upon the (mostly unwilling) learners, especially for the generations that had become accustomed to a more balanced relationship between the state and civil society since the institutional democratization of the late 1980s. But the additional reduction of public history to the family narrative of the current ruler looked even worse to those people who used to see the distinction between public and private realms as the benchmark of rational, modern governance.[75]

Hence, the backlash exceeded all the expectations. An absolute majority of professional Korean historians in South Korea (382 persons in more than 70 universities) refused to participate in writing what became popularly known as 'the New Right textbook.' That demonstrated once again just how weak the position of New Right was inside the professional academic community. Furthermore, around 97 percent of school history teachers were found to be critical of the project, as well as 77.7 percent of schoolteachers in general.[76] Unexpectedly, even conservative

educators and historians often took a public stance against the 'nationalization.' For many conservatives, the exoneration of colonialism and pro-colonial collaboration, even in the name of 'modernization', was too much to stomach. Even Han Yŏng'u (b. 1938), a veteran conservative historian who was once himself among the state-commissioned authors of 1970–80s history textbooks, voiced his objections to 'nationalization.'[77] The New Rights agenda of discarding the narrative of national anti-colonial resistance in favour of a pro-colonialist version of modernization theory turned out to be too scandalous even for a sizeable part of South Korea's traditional conservatives. While protest demonstrations and denouncements of the 'nationalization' project by various NGOs and civil groups were making the news, the government-run National Committee for History Compilation had no choice but to commission the new textbook from a motley group of mostly elderly historians headed by a retired specialist in Korea's ancient past from Ewha Women's University, Sin Hyŏngsik, who was 76 at the time of appointment. Among the six compilers of the most sensitive contemporary history part, four were either economic historians or political science experts with the views close to those of the New Right.[78] Since Sin and his co-authors—thirty-one in total—were to participate in a vastly unpopular endeavour which could forever tarnish their professional reputations among fellow academics, they were lavishly remunerated for their efforts. Sin, for example, pocketed a sum amounting to approximately 34,000 US dollars for his contribution, the highest-ever amount that the South Korean state ever paid to a textbook author.[79] By the end of January 2017, the new unitary textbook of Korean history, written in great haste, was ready. However, in less than two months, on March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court of South Korea reconfirmed the impeachment of Park Geun-hye, on accusations of corruption and power abuse. Nine years of conservative domination over South Korean politics thus ended, amidst million-strong popular demonstrations in the centre of Seoul.[80] And the first thing the newly elected liberal president, Moon Jae-in (Mun Chaein, b. 1953) did after entering the Blue House, was to order the 'nationalized' textbook to be discarded and to restore the previous system of textbook approval.[81] 'New Right textbooks' in the end failed to materialise and the New Right movement as a whole quietly disappeared from the forefront of South Korea's academic and political life, being now strongly associated with the disgraced Park Geun-hye and her unpopular presidency. The New Right organizations have not dissolved themselves, but at the time of writing (May–October 2018) they appear to be keeping an intentionally low public profile. In the end, their exceedingly close association with the Park Geun-hye regime meant that the New Right was badly wounded by Park's fall from grace.

Conclusion

In the wake of Park Geun-hye's downfall and the cancellation of the 'textbook nationalization' project, the New Right movement, by and large, failed to achieve its original objectives. The brand of intellectual and political conservatism which it had been developing may be referred to as "new" only with major caveats. Whereas claiming that pro-Japanese collaboration constituted a decisive contribution to Korea's modernization and that colonialism as a whole proved beneficial for Korea might have been relatively 'new' in the context of South Korean public space (but not necessarily internationally, if one takes the historical views of Japanese conservatives into consideration, for example), the New Right's laudatory views of South Korea's past authoritarian administrations were quite reminiscent of these administrations' own self-descriptions and pro-government propaganda, still fresh in the memory of older South Koreans. Their uncompromising hostility towards the DPRK was also hardly new, although the New Right did their best to dress it with the more fashionable discourse of modernity and individual human rights rather than the old-fashioned anticommunist formulae from South Korea's 1950s–80s. In the end, categorical and rather unnuanced denouncements of North Korea proved hard to reconcile with the discourse of inter-Korean peace and cooperation which currently enjoys relatively strong popularity among most South Koreans, including many self-described conservatives.[82] Rationalizations of the South Korean authoritarian period did not fit well with the New Right's own avowed belief in individual rights and freedoms and proved unpopular, to say the least, with younger generations of South Koreans more accustomed to viewing procedural democracy and international human rights standards as important norms.

Apologetics for Japanese colonialism and its Korean accomplices failed to persuade the majority of South Koreans, socialized to regard the post-colonial master narrative of colonial period victimhood and the heroism of the anti-colonial resistance, about the validity of the national(ist) credentials of the collaborators' heirs. Both the New Right's vision of colonization as a part of capitalist globalization ultimately benefitting South Korea's economy and the shared view of the majority of ordinary South Koreans who commonly identify colonialism as the age of suffering for the colonized and pro-colonial collaboration as treason,[83] may be described as nationalistic in their own ways. However, the pro-globalist nationalism of the South Korean elites leaves little space for popular memories of colonial period suffering and resistance, and thus proved unable to win a popular following. It appears that South Korea's ruling class, with its colonial roots, will, for the time being, have to be content with the sort of 'managerial legitimation' that

it has been enjoying since the age of high-speed economic growth.[84] The majority of South Koreans do appreciate the relatively high living standards that were achieved under the domination of the country's present ruling stratum, but retain their scepticism concerning the historical legitimacy of the collaborators' heirs who have continuously occupied high-level positions in South Korean society.

The failure of the New Right project does not mean that ruling class interests do not, and will not influence the process of history-writing. They certainly will—as they do elsewhere—but in much less direct ways than those attempted by the New Right, with their crude apologetics for dictatorial rule and outdated modernization theories. For example, in the field of modern or contemporary history, the history of the middle classes, their consumption patterns, and the commercial mass culture they have been enjoying since the colonial days is represented much more strongly in today's South Korea than the history of the underprivileged, of their resistance, or of the social movements in general. However, even amidst the general turn towards a de-politicized history of "modernity" and/or "culture" (rather than that of capitalism and/or socio-political struggles),[85] direct apologetics for colonialism and dictatorship remain, and will most likely continue to remain, the unpopular view of an ultra-conservative minority.

Notes

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2. On the South Korean history textbooks, see: Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "One colonialism, two memories: representing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and South Korea" In *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*, edited by Gi-Wook Shin, Daniel C. Sneider, 173–191 (London: Routledge, 2011).
3. In some versions of this colonial historiography, Korea was even proclaimed an "ancient" society incapable of reaching the stage of feudalism.
4. See Yun Haedong, *Kŭndae Yŏksahak ŭi Hwanghon* (The Twilights of Modern Historiography) (Seoul: Ch'aek kwa Hamkke, 2010), 19–119.
5. See Han'guk Yŏksa Yŏn'guhoe 1930 nyŏndae Yŏn'guban, *Ilcheha Sahoejuŭi Undongsa* (The History of the Socialist Movement under the Japanese Colonial Rule) (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1991), 15–24.
6. On the leftist movements of the 1980s, see: Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
7. On the leftist movements of the 1980s, see: Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).

8. On the tradition of cinematic protest to which this film belongs, see: Han Sang Kim, "Film Auteurism as a Cold War Governmentality: Alternative Knowledge and the Formation of Liberal Subjectivity" *Journal of Korean Studies* 22.2 (2017): 317–342.
9. On this novel, see: Kim Chŏngja, "Kŏdaehan 'kutp'an'ŭro pon T'aebaek Sanmaek kwa kŭ Chinjŏngsŏng" (The *T'aebaek Mountain Range* seen as a Giant Space for Shamanic Exorcism and its Authenticity) *Hyŏndae Sosŏl Yŏn'gu* 30 (2006): 283–31.
10. On the historiography of collaboration since the late 1980s, see: Koen De Ceuster, "The Nation Exorcised: The Historiography of Collaboration in South Korea" *Korean Studies* 25.2 (2001): 207–242.
11. Kang Man'gil et al., *Ch'inil'p'a 99 In* (99 Pro-Japanese Collaborators) (Seoul: Tolpegae, 1993).
12. On the process of formation of Korea's nascent capitalist class during the colonial age, see O Miil, *Kŭndae Han'guk ŭi Chabonka tŭl* (Korea's Modern Capitalists) (Seoul: P'urŭn Yŏksa, 2014). On the make-up of the incipient modern bureaucratic elites under the Japanese rule, see: Kim Yŏngmo, *Ilcheha Han'in Chibaech'ŭng Yŏn'gu* (the Research on the Korean Ruling Class under the Japanese Rule) (Seoul: Kohŏn, 2008), 125–176.
13. On the role of the former Japanese officers of Korean ethnicity in the building of South Korean army, see: Han Yongwŏn, *Han'guk ŭi Kunbu Chŏngch'i* (South Korea's Military Politics) (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1993), 128–138.
14. On Sin, see: Yun T'aegon, "'Yŏngwŏnhan TK Taebu' Sin Hyŏnhwak i Han'guk Hyŏndaesa e namgin Chokchŏk" (The Imprint left by the 'Eternal Leader of the Taegu-Pusan Network', Sin Hyŏnhwak, on South Korea's Contemporary History), *Pressian*, March 26, 2007: http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=11726 Accessed on August 23, 2018.
15. See Im's recent critical biography: Chŏng Unhyŏn, *Im Chongguk P'yŏngjŏn* (A Critical Biography of Im Chongguk) (Seoul: Sidae ŭi Ch'ang, 2006).
16. See, for example, the orthodox historical descriptions in Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, ed. *Han'guksa* (Korean History), vols. 50 and 51 (Seoul: T'amgudang, 2001), dealing with the late colonial period. "Collaboration" is occasionally named there only in the context of the "divide and rule" policies by the colonial authorities.
17. On the priorities of the New Right movement, see one of the earliest research works dealing specially with the Korean New Right: Chŏng Haegu, "Nyu Rait'ŭ Undong ŭi Hyŏnsil Insik e Taehan Pip'anjŏk Kŏmt'o" (A Critical Evaluation of New Right's Perceptions of the Realities) *Yŏksa Pip'yŏng* 76 (2006: 215–237).
18. Bruce Cumings, "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences" *International Organization* 38.1 (1984): 1–40.
19. On South Korea's engagement policies vis-a-vis North Korea in the late 1990s and early 2000s, see: Key-young Son, *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy* (London, Routledge, 2006).
20. On the neoliberal restructuring in post-1997 South Korea, see: James Crotty and Kang-Kook Lee, "The Effects of Neoliberal "Reforms" on the Postcrisis Korean Economy" *Review of Radical Political Economics* 38.3 (2006): 381–387.
21. Yean-Ju Lee, Dong-Hoon Seol and Sung-Nam Cho, "International marriages in South Korea: The significance of nationality and ethnicity" *Journal of Population Research* 23.2 (2006): 165–182.
22. On the growing internationalization and ethnic fragmentation of the South Korean working class, see: Kwang-Yeong Shin, "Globalisation and the Working Class in South Korea: Contestation, Fragmentation and Renewal" *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 40 (2010): 211–229. According to the sources cited by Shin, by 2009 the foreign workers comprised more than 5 per cent of the total employees in the South Korean economy; their numbers doubled between 2002 and 2007.

23. On the pro-immigrant advocacy efforts by the progressive sector of the South Korean civil society, see, for example: Timothy C. Lim, "Racing from The Bottom in South Korea?: The Nexus Between Civil Society and Transnational Migrants" *Asian Survey* 43.3 (2003): 423–442.
24. See his book in English: Dae Jung Kim. *Mass-participatory Economy: A Democratic Alternative for Korea* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1985).
25. *Ch'inil Inmyông Sajôn* (Bibliographical Dictionary of the Pro-Japanese Collaborators) (Seoul: Minjok Munje Yŏn'guso, 2009).
26. On South Korea's historical policies of the 2000s, see: Kim Yŏngsu. *Kwagŏsa Ch'ŏngsan, 'Minjuhwa' rŭl Nŏmŏ 'Sahoehwa' ro* (Settling the Past History Right—from 'Democratization' to 'Socialization') (Seoul: Meidei, 2008), 67–124.
27. Im Chihyŏn. *Minjokchuûi nûn Panyôkida* (Nationalism is Treason) (Seoul: Sonamu, 1999).
28. Chŏn Chaeho. *Pandongjuŭijŏk Kŭndaejuŭija, Pak Chŏng Hŭi* (A Reactionary Modernist, Park Chong Hee) (Seoul: Ch'aek Sesang, 2000), 85–109.
29. The standard work on the history of Kim clan's enterprises is Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991). A more apologetic recent account is Kim Choong Soon, *A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur: A Life History of Kim Songsu, 1891–1955* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).
30. Nam Ŭnju, "'Ch'inil Haengwi' *Tong'a Ilbo* Kim Sŏngsu, Kŏn'guk Kongno Hunjang Sŏhun Pakt'al" (*Tong'a Ilbo*'s Kim Sŏngsu is deprived of his Order of Merits for National Foundation due to his 'pro-Japanese acts') Daily *Hangyoreh*, February 13, 2018. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/area/832216.html Accessed on September 10, 2018.
31. According to the South Korean ABC Association (www.kabc.or.kr), in 2010 the total circulation of *Chosŏn Ilbo* was 1,884,783. Quoted in: Han Jiyoung and Lee Gunho, "A Comparative Study of the Accuracy of Quotation-Embedded Headlines in *Chosun Ilbo* and *The New York Times* from 1989 to 2009" *Korea Journal* 53.1 (2013): 65–90.
32. In the end of protracted court battles, in 2017 the Supreme Court ruled that Pang was guilty of supporting Japan's military aggression by publishing pro-war articles in the periodicals he controlled, *Chosŏn Ilbo* included. Kang Aeran, "Kobŏp, 'Pang Ŭngmo, Ilche ch'imnyak chŏnjaeng tongjo kŭl kejae man ch'inil haengwi injŏng" (the Supreme Court, "Only the Publication of Articles Supportives of Japan's Military Aggression is recognized as Pang Ŭngmo's Pro-Japanese Actions) *Yonhap News*, May 12, 2017. http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/05/12/0200000000AKR20170512057700004.HTML?input=1195m Accessed on September 10, 2018.
33. By 2017, the *Chosŏn Ilbo* ranked first with its paid circulation of 1,254,297, followed by the *Tong'a Ilbo* with 749,414 and the *Chung'ang Ilbo* with 719,931. Yang-Hwan Jung, "Dong-A Ilbo ranks 2nd for paid circulation of daily newspapers" *Tong'a Ilbo* (English edition), June 3, 2017. http://english.donga.com/List/3/08/26/942598/1 Accessed on September 10, 2018. The trend for paper newspaper circulation is generally downward; still, *Chosŏn Ilbo* is understood to rank first in the time of this writing.
34. See an analysis of the election results in Eui Hang Shin, "Electron democracy, populism, and generational politics: The case of the April 15, 2004 general election in South Korea" *East Asia* 22.1 (2005): 51–81.
35. Yu Sôkch'un, "Pit kwa Kŭrimja rŭl hamkke pora" (Look at both Bright and Shadowy [Sides] Together) *Tong'a Ilbo*, April 11, 2001. https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=020&aid=0000057876 Accessed on September 10, 2018.
36. Nam Siuk. "Minjok Chisangjuŭi wihŏmhada" (Absolutization of Ethno-Nation is Dangerous) *Tong'A Ilbo*, January 23, 2003.
37. On Sin's life and career, see Ch'oe Ŭryŏng, "Sin Chiho—Oldŭrait'ŭ Ppyamch'in Nyurait'ŭ" (Sin Chiho—A New Rightist who Went Further than Old Rightists) *Inmul kwa Sasang* 164 (2011): 58–80.

38. Kim Chongmok, Hong Chinsu. "'Ch'ai' Chonjunghaetchiman, 'Solchikham' Aswiwŏtta" ([They] Respected [their] 'Differences' but Lacked in 'Frankness') *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, September 2, 2009. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=200909021754235&code=210000 Accessed on September 12, 2018.
39. Ku Yŏngsik, "Nyurait'ŭ, Taesŏn, Ch'ongsŏn Tongsi Sŏkkwŏn norinda" (The New Right Plans to Dominate both Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Simultaneously) *Ohmynews*, December 12, 2006. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000378514 Accessed on September 12, 2018.
40. On the promotion of the New Right by the conservative press, see: Kim Chaeyŏng, "Nyurait'ŭ wa Chŏngp'aji" (The New Rights and the Politicized Newspapers) *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, December 6, 2004. https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=032&aid=0000097279 Accessed on September 12, 2018.
41. Ha Chongmun. "Panil Minjokchuŭi wa Nyurait'ŭ" (The Anti-Japanese Nationalism and the New Right) *Yŏksa Pip'yŏng* 78 (2007): 175–197.
42. On An's academic career, see his dialogue with Chŏng Chaejŏng. An Pyŏngjik, Chŏng Chaejŏng, "Na ŭi Hangmun, Na ŭi Insaeng: An Pyŏngjik—Minjokchuŭi esŏ Kyŏngje Sŏngjangjuŭi ro" (My Research, My Life: An Pyŏngjik—from Nationalism to Economic Developmentalism) *Yŏksa Pip'yŏng* 59 (2002): 204–260.
43. A product of their research cooperation was Hori Kazuō and An Pyŏngjik. *Kŭndae Chosŏn kongŏphwa ŭi yŏn'gu* (A Study of the Industrialisation of Modem Korea) (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993).
44. On the debates on the role of the legacies of the colonial-age industrialization, see: Timothy C. Lim, "The Origins of Societal Power in South Korea: Understanding the Physical and Human Legacies of Japanese Colonialism" *Modern Asian Studies* 33.3 (1999): 603–633.
45. While its primary school enrolments, literacy, and survival rates rose, the farm incomes per household, agricultural real wages, and per capita calorie intake from staple foods declined. Mitsuhiko Kimura, "Standards of Living in Colonial Korea: Did the Masses Become Worse Off or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?" *The Journal of Economic History* 53.3 (1993): 629–652.
46. Colonial-era proprietor of the *Chosôn Ilbo* newspaper.
47. See Yi's own explanations on his view here: Yi Yŏnghun, "Chosŏn Hugi Irae Sonong Sahoe Chŏn'gae wa Ŭiŭi" (The Development and the Meaning of the Small Cultivators' Society since the Late Chosŏn Period) *Yŏksa wa Hyŏnsil* 45 (2002): 3–38. On the commercial transactions with land and land ownership in pre-modern Korea, see: Pae Hangsŏp, "Chosŏn Hugi T'oji Soyu Kujo mit Maemae Kwansŭp e taehan Pigyosajŏk Kŏmt'o" (Comparative Analysis of the Landownership Structure and Land Purchase/Sale Customs during Late Chosŏn period) *Han'guksa Yŏn'gu* 149 (2010): 189–237.
48. Yi Yŏnghun, "T'oji Chosa Saŏp ŭi Sut'alsŏng Chaegŏmt'o" (Reconsidering the View on the Land Survey as a Dispossession Measure) *Yŏksa Pip'yŏng* 24 (1993): 307–334.
49. See, for example, his recent outline history of contemporary South Korea: Yi Yŏnghun, *Taehan Min'guk Yŏksa* (The History of the Republic of Korea) (Seoul: Kip'arang, 2013).
50. See a critical review of the modernization theory and its historical background in Nils Gilman. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003).
51. Yi Hŏnch'ang, *Han'guk Kyŏngje T'ongsa* (An Outline History of Korean Economy) (Seoul: Pŏmmunsa, 2006): 146–154.
52. A good account of such transplantation can be found in Kyung Moon Hwang, *Rationalizing Korea: The Rise of the Modern State, 1895–1945* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2016).
53. See a detailed description of this scandal in Ha Chongmun. "Panil Minjokchuŭi wa Nyurait'ŭ", 187–189.

54. A book by O Sŏnhwa available in English translation is Sonfa Oh, *Getting Over It! Why Korea Needs to Stop Bashing Japan* (Tokyo: Tachibana Publishing, 2015).
55. Pak Yuha, *Hwahae rŭl wihaesŏ* (For Reconciliation) (Seoul: Ppuri wa Ip'ari, 2005).
56. Pak Yuha (transl. Satō Hisaya), *Wakai no tameni* (For Reconciliation) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2006).
57. Hyunah Yang, "Remembering the Korean military comfort women: nationalism, sexuality, and silencing" In *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, edited by Kim, Elaine H. and Choi, Chungmoo. 123–141 (London: Routledge, 1998).
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59. A full list of the receivers of this award is available online: http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/award/osaragi/. Accessed on September 27, 2018.
60. On Sin's criticisms, see: Ha Chongmun. "Panil Minjokchuŭi wa Nyurait'ŭ", 190–191.
61. *Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi Chaeinsik* (Re-interpretation of the History Before and After the Liberation), vols. 1–2. Edited by Pak Chihyang, Yi Yŏnghun et al. (Seoul: Chaek sesang, 2006).
62. Namiki Masahito. "Singminji sigi Chosŏnin ŭi Chŏngch'i Chamyŏ" (Korean Political Participants during the Colonial Era) In *Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi Chaeinsik* (Re-interpretation of the History Before and After the Liberation), Vol. 1. 655–697.
63. In his case, see: Cho Unch'an, To Chaegi, "Nyu Rait'ŭ sigak *Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi Chaeinsik* Ch'ulgan" (*Re-interpretation of the History Before and After the Liberation* written from the New Right Viewpoint, is published) *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, February 8, 2006. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=200602082240031 Accessed on September 27, 2018.
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66. Kim Tonghyŏn, "Nyurait'ŭ Kyogwasŏ Kŭkch'anhan Pak Kŭnhye ŭi Yŏksagwan" (Pak Kŭnhye's Exalted Praise for a New Right Textbook and her View of History) *Views and News*, May 27, 2008. http://www.viewsnnews.com/article?q=35206 Accessed on September 27, 2018.
67. See, for example, the persuasive critique of South Korea's mainstream historical "victimhood nationalism" by a foremost post-nationalist historian, Im Chihyŏn (Jie-Hyun Lim): Jie-Hyun Lim, "Victimhood Nationalism and History Reconciliation in East Asia" *History Compass* 8.1 (2010): 1–10. Back in 1999, Im authored one of the pioneering post-nationalist historical books, *Minjokchuûi nûn Panyôkida* (Nationalism is Treason) (see note 27 above).
68. On South Korea's history of developmental authoritarianism, see, for example: Eun Mee Kim, *Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960–90* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997).
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70. See typical criticism in Kim Sangbong, *Todŏk Kyoyuk ŭi P'asijŭm* (The Fascism of the Ethics Education) (Seoul: Kil, 2005).
71. Paek Ch'ŏl, "Han'guk Hyŏndaesa Hakhoe nŭn Nyu Rait'ŭ in'ga?" (Does the Association for the Study of Korean Contemporary history [belongs to] the New Right?) *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, June 8, 2013. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201306081616321 Accessed on September 28, 2018.

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Diagnosing and Debunking Korean Pseudohistory

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Abstract

In current day South Korea pseudohistory pertaining to early Korea and northern East Asia has reached epidemic proportions. Its advocates argue the early state of Chosŏn to have been an expansive empire centered on mainland geographical Manchuria. Through rationalizing interpretations of the traditional Hwan'ung-Tan'gun myth, they project back the supposed antiquity and pristine nature of this charter empire to the archaeological Hongshan Culture of the Neolithic straddling Inner Mongolia and Liaoning provinces of China.

Despite these blatant spatial and temporal exaggerations, all but specialists of early Korea typically remain hesitant to explicitly label this conceptualization as "pseudohistory." This is because advocates of ancient empire cast themselves as rationalist scholars and claim to have evidential arguments drawn from multiple textual sources and archaeology. They further wield an emotive polemic defaming the domestic academic establishment as being composed of national traitors bent only on maintaining a "colonial view of history." The canon of counterevidence relied on by empire advocates is the accumulated product of 20th century revisionist and pseudo historiography, but to willing believers and non-experts, it can easily appear convincing and overwhelming. Combined with a postcolonial nationalist framing and situated against the ongoing historiography dispute with China, their conceptualization of a grand antiquity has gained bipartisan political influence with concrete ramifications for professional scholarship.

This paper seeks to introduce and debunk the core, seemingly evidential, canon of arguments put forward by purveyors of Korean pseudohistory and to

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expose their polemics, situating the phenomenon in a broader diagnostic context of global pseudohistory and archaeology.

Keywords: Korean History, Academic Disputes, South Korea, Pseudohistory, Mythologies

Introduction

To scholars working on early Korea, the phenomenon of pseudohistory is well known. During 2014–15 it reached a crisis point. Under the sway of the argumentation of pseudohistorians a subgroup of the National Assembly named "the special committee for counter policies concerning distortions in Northeast Asian history," forced the government's own Northeast Asia History Foundation to terminate funding for two flagship projects, the Harvard-based Early Korea Project (2006–2017), and a Korea-based digital historical atlas project (2008–2015).[1] Korean pseudohistorians argue that professionally trained scholars promote a continuation of Japanese era colonial historiography that seeks to diminish the supposed grandeur of early Korea, both in terms of territory and antiquity, and that establishment historians are consequently hiding the truth of ancient Korean ancestors having ruled an expansive continental empire bequeathing civilization to greater northern East Asia.

This vision of ancient empire is built on a series of flawed arguments—textual, linguistic, archaeological and folkloristic—the evolution of which can be reconstructed as a history of ideas, tracing back through the 20th century to pre-20th century antecedents.[2] It can principally be understood as a revisionist discourse characterized by a combination of historical negationism and chauvinism that emerged in reaction to the Japanese takeover of Korea in the early 20th century. Today it remains situated at the intersection of 1) calls for ethnic revitalization still framed against the colonial experience (1910–1945), 2) desire for unification of the Korean nation, 3) new religions, and 4) a sense of marginalized "Korean" identity stemming from foreign cultural hegemonies and globalization. From this perspective, pseudohistory may be contextualized as a distinct sociological phenomenon in its own right, however, from the perspective of critical professional history and archaeology pertaining to early Korea and geographical Manchuria, such approaches should not detract from a clear appreciation that the basic argumentation and content of this "alternative" or "grand history" is both factually wrong and methodologically flawed.

Beyond the small world of Early Koreanists, resistance to the admittedly derogatory label of "pseudohistory" is readily encountered. Those to be referred to as pseudohistorians in this paper purport to have a body of textual evidence supporting their assertions, and to lay observers this easily appears convincing. Korean pseudohistory dominates the popular publishing industry, such that it is hard to believe so many books could be published if there were not some truth in their arguments.[3] In addition, pseudohistorians frame their vision against both the memory of Japanese colonialism, and the ongoing history dispute with China over jurisdiction of the heritage of Koguryŏ (c.1st century BCE–668 CE) and Parhae (698–926), thus exploiting postcolonial sentiments pertaining to emotively charged topics of public discourse instilled into the national consciousness at schools and through national media.[4]

The aim of this paper is not to persuade true believers, but to provide an overview of the canon of topics and arguments Korean pseudohistorians constantly recycle, and to expose the fallacies of their methods and evidence. This will demonstrate that Korean pseudohistory is not merely a misinformed or folksy alternative view of the past, but genuinely pseudoscientific in nature. With this aim in mind, and in view of space limitations, this paper takes a synchronic approach focusing on the arguments and evidence, and only referencing the contextual history of their development when necessary. It also seeks to show that what may be presented as ostensibly secular and evidentialist arguments are closely intertwined with more extreme premises and irrational imaginings to which the same pseudo scholars are often sympathetic, when not themselves active proselytizers.

Korean Pseudohistory: A Brief Diagnosis

Pseudohistory is a phenomenon far from unique only to Korea, and Korean idioms have been in contact with external ideas throughout the 20th century. From the mid 1910s during the formative period of Korean revisionist history, various ideas were introduced from contemporary Western scholarship including the Ural-Altaic language hypothesis, diffusionism and folkloristics; in post-liberation South Korea more explicitly pseudoscientific notions of lost civilizations and continents have further been incorporated. However, in addition to these direct connections, current day Korean pseudohistory shares other analogous traits to world pseudohistories, particularly in terms of methodology and rhetorical strategies.

In response to the 2014–2015 crisis, referred to above, since 2016 a new generation of Korean historians has emerged, publishing vigorous critiques through journals and mass media. In an edited book collating their first articles and published

under the name of the "Young Historians" (젊은역사학자모임), Ki Kyoung-ryang (Ki Kyŏngnyang) observes that the practice of Korean pseudohistory matches definitions pertaining to Western pseudohistory given by Fritze in *Invented Knowledge: False History, Fake Science and Pseudo-religions*.[5] Ki reduces these to the following six core points, to which following a semi-colon, I append the most immediate examples from Korean pseudohistory, to be discussed throughout this paper:

1. Approaching a topic with preconceptions and a hidden agenda; presumption of an ancient Korean empire.
2. Cherry-picking evidence to support a theory while ignoring evidence to the contrary; uncritical usage of later, distorted sources for historical geography over earlier sources.
3. Making use of outdated scholarship which has since been disproven; the Ural-Altaic language hypothesis, diffusionism, and evoking the accumulated lineage of 20th century pseudohistory.
4. Interpreting myths and legends as historical; rationalization of the Hwan'ung-Tan'gun foundation story.
5. Legalistic argumentation that fails to distinguish between remote possibility and actual likelihood of a given scenario having occurred; reliance on aberrant toponyms as concrete evidence for locating early polities, and arguing for theoretically possible but unlikely long-range migrations.
6. Disputing basic facts such as whether a historical event even occurred or not; questioning the success of 109–108 BCE Han invasion, the location of the Han commanderies and separately of the Samhan polities, and reorienting the locations of Liaodong and Liaoxi.

Fritze's definitions are based on those of Fagan's (2006) *Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the Present*, from whom we can add:

7. Disparaging academia; accusing the establishment of promoting "colonial historiography."
8. But conversely, appealing to academic authority from other fields; flawed evidentialism, utilization of archaeology, as well as astronomy.
9. Obsession with esoterica (myths, writing systems); assertion of a proto-religio-philosophy and ancient vernacular script.
10. Expectation of a reward at quest's end; proven ancient empire.[6]

To briefly elaborate points 1 and 10, on the former, Fritze suggests an underlying hidden agenda for current day authors of pseudoscience is to make money from their books. In Korea this can only be a secondary motivation for the most prolific writers, namely Yi Tŏgil, and possibly in the case of *Hwandan kogi* derived sales for the Chŭngsando Sangsaeng organization. The not-so-hidden agenda of Korean empire advocates is clearly political, as demonstrated by the National Assembly hearings, the underlying networks that enabled those hearings, and lobbying activities concerning history textbook content. If there is a genuinely hidden agenda to Korean pseudohistory, it is rather in the quasi-religious aspect promoting worship of Tan'gun as inherited from the 20th century new religion of Taejonggyo (est. 1909); in this case the ostensibly rationalist evidentialism may be understood to constitute a form of religious apologism.

As for a promise of reward to the reader at quest's end, to Fritze this is the empty snake-oil of decoding "pyramid-derived knowledge of cometary impacts." However, in the highly charged context of Northeast Asian geopolitics, the reward for proving an ancient Korean civilization has multiple functions. More tempered criticisms of Korean pseudohistory, usually aimed at the consumer than the creators, speculate on the cathartic value provided in the discovery—or reaffirmation—that ancient Korea was a grander place than early China or Japan had been, thus compensating for Korea's later self-subordination to Central Plain culture and the 20th century ethnic traumas of colonialism and division. Still more reassuring, if early examples of "colonial occupation" such as the Chinese Lelang commandery (108 BCE—c.313 CE) could be proven false, then this would provide further evidence for the illegitimacy of 20th century annexation to Japan, and serve to rebuff China's recent claims to have historically ruled the northern half of the Korean peninsula. Further, if Chosŏn is established as having been the charter state of Manchuria, then the historical continental conquest territory of Koguryŏ can be argued to be legitimately "Korean" bolstering Korean claims to ethnic jurisdiction over Koguryŏ heritage in China. Indeed through this model, Koguryŏ's historical expansion of the 4th century—that saw the overthrow of the Xuantu and Lelang commanderies, occupation of Liaodong to the west and annexation of Puyŏ (c.2nd century BCE—346 CE) to the north—can be presented, not as aggressive conquest, but as a restoration movement to reclaim Korea's supposed charter territory. The logical conclusion to such arguments, and final reward, is a boost to current day irredentism: if ancient Korea can be proven to have possessed a continental empire, then not only are China's claims to Koguryŏ void, but Korea—especially if unified—may still have legitimate claim to Manchuria.

Parallel Postcolonial Pseudohistories: India and Korea

In addition to the more generalizing definitions given above, Korean pseudohistory displays characteristics analogous to that of other postcolonial nations. If, for example, we compare the phenomena of pseudohistory in Korea and India, two otherwise differing states with largely unconnected histories, we can identify certain further parallels.[7]

Firstly, in both cases pseudohistory was born of nationalist reaction to being colonized; they were forged under the conditions of colonial rule including the introduction of Western "rationalism" and sciences such as linguistics and archaeology, which were seemingly wielded to legitimate colonial rule. In order to engage and reject the content, colonized historians had to adopt the discursive practices and methodologies of the colonizers and seek to revise them to their home advantage.

Secondly, these revisionist histories take as a primary premise the opinion that contemporary colonial historiography was not only a misuse of known history, but was *factually* wrong. They are particularly concerned with notions of invasion: for India this remains the question of Aryan invasion; for Korea the 108 BCE Chinese commanderies and the question of Japanese Mimana. If the colonial historiography is wrong, then an alternative—ideally the opposite—must be true: even before looking for evidence, this leads to the conclusion that if articles of civilization were not introduced from outside, then the countries in question must have been generators of their own indigenous culture; if they were not invaded, then they must have expanded and invaded surrounding territories themselves.

Narratives of exclusive indigenous development are in turn substantiated by identifying supposedly continuous cultural traditions, tracing down from a pristine golden age to the present. In Indian pseudohistory, this is the *Hindutva* tradition. In Korea various idioms exist, such as Park or diachronic narratives of the *hwarang* martial order that premise the transmission of a Korean religio-philosophy, but all derive popular authority from their linkage to Tan'gun and all incorporate notions of sky worship. Proposing early empire in place of being invaded, revisionist defences against imperial chauvinism respond with their own "subaltern chauvinism." While the Indian landmass is large enough to constitute continental empire in and of itself, Korean pseudohistory looks to Manchuria and evokes wider "Dongyi" and "pan-Altaic" chauvinisms, discussed below.

It should be stressed that this reverse chauvinism is no more gratuitous than that of imperial powers, but is a distinct variant. However, revisionist rollback takes on its own momentum; the search for a pristine early empire leads to claims of regional, or even global, proto-civilization to which even more fantastic notions

of lost civilizations, submerged continents and landbridges are further adjoined. However, because the initial logic has extended from proving colonial historiography wrong and providing an alternative, even the more modest schemes of indigenous empire necessarily remain premised on the notion of an opposing colonial historiography. Thus conspiracy theories in Indian and Korean pseudohistory continue to be framed in postcolonial nationalist term. This, in turn, imbues them with greater political valency than is available to their current day Western analogues and this leads into a final shared characteristic.

While Western pseudohistory is typically regarded as an amateur fringe pursuit self-funded through royalties of book sales and increasingly social-media, postcolonial pseudohistory such as in Korea and India influences mainstream discourses and enjoys a higher level of institutional and governmental support. Governments of states liberated from colonialism similarly legitimize themselves in opposition to the colonial regimes they replace; they thus utilize narratives of colonial resistance, to which revisionist patriotic historiography is highly congenial. In India, *Hindutva* informs political nationalism while Korea has now witnessed the defunding of major projects through allegations of colonial historiography by those advocating the notion of Old Chosŏn as an ancient empire. Before turning to the details of this empire, it is useful to highlight two flawed conceptual premises that underlie Korean pseudohistory which I label "Dongyi conflationism," and the "Altaic fallacy."

Ethnic Dongyi Conflationism and the Altaic Fallacy

Dongyi (東夷 K. Tong'i "eastern barbarian") and equivalent labels occur throughout pre 20th century Chinese sources to refer to surrounding "non-Chinese" peoples, including those of the Korean peninsula. In the pre-Qin period, Dongyi referred to people immediately east of the Central Plain state of Zhou (1045–256 BCE), broadly in the region of the Shandong peninsula.[8] These Dongyi—also referred to as the Nine Yi (九夷)—were ultimately absorbed into a broader Central Plain identity and became an integral part of early Chinese historiography with several culture heroes identified as Dongyi in early canonical texts. However, following the Qin unification and territorial expansion under the Qin and Han empires, the Dongyi label was reused for previously unknown peoples newly encountered in geographical Manchuria, the Korean peninsula and Japanese isles, such that from *Sanguozhi* (completed 280 CE, covering 221–280) and *Hou Hanshu* (compiled 3rd–mid 5th century, covering 25–220) onwards, descriptions of continental Manchurian and Korean peninsular polities are located in "Dongyi treatise" chapters of the official Chinese histories.[9]

During the medieval period (c.8th–13th centuries), with the adoption of Confucianism and through the Kija (箕子) tradition, discussed below, peninsular Koreans came to positively self-identify as "civilized Dongyi" and found their purported ancestors in the pre-Qin sources. This conflation of the ancient Dongyi of Shandong with later Dongyi of Manchuria and Korea continues to be employed within current day Korean pseudohistory in order to lay claim to a pan "Dongyi civilization" of which Koreans are chief inheritors. While the Kija legend utilized the Dongyi conflation to claim the transmission of classical civilization to Korea, pseudohistorians today either reverse this claim, asserting classical Chinese culture to have been a product of Dongyi Chosŏn civilization, or they distinguish Dongyi identity as antithetical to China, embracing rather the non-Chinese "barbarian" aspect of the dichotomy.[10]

In 20th century revisionist Korean historiography, Dongyi identity has been further married to the late 19th century Ural-Altaic language hypothesis, which premises a shared ethnolinguistic commonality among the peoples of the Eurasian steppe. During the 19th century this hypothesis initially premised a linguistic homeland in the Altai region of Central Asia, but by the 1930s, the group of Uralic languages, principally located to the west, were regarded as a separate family.[11] Consequently the proposed point of expansion for the remaining non-Uralic languages was placed in western Manchuria, however, despite the shift in location, they maintained the evocative but thereafter misleading moniker of "Altaic." From west to east, the "core Altaic" language groups are Turkic, Mongolic and Tungusic; in "macro Altaic" schemes, Koreanic and Japonic are secondarily incorporated to the east. The Manchurian peoples labelled as Dongyi in post-Qin sources would principally have included speakers of Tungusic, Koreanic and Japonic, as well as non-Altaic language groups such as Amuric.[12] Thus, the Altaic premise both supports the notion of a common Dongyi identity across Manchuria, and further expands it to incorporate historical northern steppe peoples, such as the Xiongnu, Khitan and Mongols, not previously classified as Dongyi.

Included in post-liberation school textbooks, the notion of an Altaic identity has permeated Korean society. It is usually invoked in Korean pseudohistory and popular imaginings fossilized in its pre-1930s' form to support theories of long-range migration out of Central Asia. More critical, however, is that the hypothesis itself has failed to be substantiated in a manner comparable to other established language families.[13] Current consensus opinion is that the constituent Altaic language groups are not, in historical linguistic terms, genetically related. As a consequence, although there has clearly been a real contact resulting in a "trans-Eurasian" continuum of typological similarities and lexical borrowings, there can be no common ancestral proto-Altaic language, and therefore no proto people or

civilization associated with speaking it.[14] Assumptions of ethno-linguistic affinity between historically Korean speaking peoples and any other Dongyi or steppe people, even within Manchuria, therefore become void, though, just as in the case of areal typologies, this is not to deny cultural transmissions.

It is safe to say that nearly all pseudohistory pertaining to early Korea and northern Asia utilizes Dongyi conflationism and Altaic affiliation as underlying, if not explicit, premises. All further take an interest in the polity of Chosŏn (c.3rd century BCE–108 BCE) as the charter state of Korean history. This has been the case from the first generation of revisionist scholars, that include Kim Kyohŏn (1868–1923), Sin Ch'aeho (1880–1936) and Ch'oe Namsŏn (1890–1957).[15]

Today we can locate individually authored schemes on an interpretative continuum between those emphasizing Altaic connections and a search for origins in Central Asia, and those that focus on aggrandizing Chosŏn as the source of northern East Asian civilization. These schemes differ only in emphasis but writers associated with the latter category include those most efficacious in concomitantly promoting the colonial historiography polemic and who devote most energies to delineating the territory of their imagined "charter empire."[16]

The Problem of (Old) Chosŏn as the Charter State

The notion of Chosŏn as the charter state of Korea appeared in peninsular sources from the late 13th century, starting with *Samguk yusa* ("Remaining records of the Three Kingdoms" c.1283) and *Chewang ungi* ("Rhyming record of [Chinese] emperors and [Korean] kings" c.1287), and was utilized as a core aspect of the Chosŏn dynasty's (1392–1910) historical identity. This same notion of Old Chosŏn being the "first state of Korean history" is maintained today in official and popular historiography of both North and South Korea.

Earliest Chinese sources reliably attesting Chosŏn include the *Shiji* (87 BCE), *Hanshu* (76 CE) and *Sanguozhi*. They principally attest the following facts: the state of Chosŏn was in existence during the Warring States period as the eastern neighbour to Yan; around 280 BCE Chosŏn lost a swathe of territory as Yan expanded eastwards establishing five commanderies; around 195 BCE a high ranking refugee from Yan named (Wi) Man (衛滿) was given refuge and control of Chosŏn's western frontier—the western border being delineated by the P'ae (浿水 Ch. Pei) River—from which he soon acquired an army and usurped the Chosŏn throne around 128 BCE, Ye lord Namnyŏ (南閭) defected to Han China triggering the first Han invasion attempt and establishment of a shortlived commandery; from 109–108 BCE Han China led a punitive conquest against the usurped Chosŏn polity, by then under third generation rule, resulting in its overthrow and replacement

with four new commanderies east of those Han had inherited from Yan, and around 82 BCE, the four commanderies were consolidated as two, Lelang and Xuantu. According to these sources, there is only one Chosŏn state, with the last century of its existence under the rule of the Wi Man dynasty.

The same Chinese sources also introduce an ahistorical legend. This asserts that prior to the usurpation by Wi Man, the Chosŏn royal line traced their lineage to the personage of Jizi (K. Kija "Marquis of Ji"), a royal sage of Shang (c.1554–1046 BCE) who came to Chosŏn following the Zhou conquest of Shang and introduced articles of civilization including agriculture and laws. Jizi is a culture hero first attested in *Shangshu* (Book of Documents), wherein he transmits the tenets of Shang civilization to Zhou. However, his association with Chosŏn and going to rule there appear only from *Shiji* and *Hanshu*. The evolution of the Jizi story is thus explainable as Han period political propaganda developed to legitimize the punitive conquest and imposition of commandery rule. However, association with Jizi also had the attendant effect of extending Chosŏn's supposed known antiquity from 3rd century BCE back to the 11th century Shang-Zhou transition.

As is well known among specialists, pre-20th century Korean orthodox historiography distinguished three sub-periods of their charter state of Chosŏn: Tan'gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn and Wiman Chosŏn. The earliest period, that of Tan'gun, is unattested in Chinese sources and is a peninsular Korean innovation of the 13th century, as is the term Old Chosŏn (古朝鮮), both being first attested in *Samguk yusa*. As during the Chosŏn dynasty itself, in current day surveys of Korean history, the moniker "Old Chosŏn" remains a useful term in order to distinguish the early historical polity in question from the later Yi dynasty state of Chosŏn (1392–1910), a name that continued to be used during the colonial era and in North Korea still today. However, in the context of popular and pseudohistory this notion of Old Chosŏn is highly problematic as it serves to obfuscate the distinction between the historical periods of Wiman, and pre-Wiman Warring States era Chosŏn, and the ahistorical periods of Tan'gun and Kija.

Revisionist and pseudohistorians reject the period of Kija Chosŏn, but tend to allow for the historicity of a Kija ruled polity, locating it outside of the Korean peninsula. By contrast, however, they embrace the Tan'gun period as the true Old Chosŏn and object of their aggrandizing schemes.[17] Indeed, as it first occurred in *Samguk yusa*, in which Old Chosŏn explicitly refers to the section covering the Hwan'ung-Tan'gun foundation story, to which mention of Kija is appended; it thus serves to distinguish these "old" periods from Wiman Chosŏn. *Chewang ungi* makes a variant distinction terming the Tan'gun period simply as Chosŏn, and grouping Kija and Wiman as "Later Chosŏn." During the Chosŏn dynasty period,

Wiman Chosŏn was recognized as historical but regarded as illegitimate, with the line of legitimate dynastic rule (*chŏngt'ong* 正統) flowing from Tan'gun and Kija Chosŏn to the Samhan (三韓) states and thence to Silla and Koryŏ; the legitimate Chosŏn periods were Tan'gun and Kija.

From the 20th century until the present, with Kija diminished or negated, the popular notion of Chosŏn has remained inexorably linked to Tan'gun. For example, the common trope of Korea possessing a 5,000 year history refers to the orthodox foundation date of Tan'gun Chosŏn, 2333 BCE, generously rounded up. In the 13th century accounts, the date of Tan'gun Chosŏn was matched to the reign of mythical Chinese emperor Yao, whose own dates had only been fixed in China during the 3rd century CE. In Korea the Tan'gun Chosŏn date was calibrated by scholars during the 17th century as the 25th reign year of Yao. 20th century revisionist historians thus sought to detach Tan'gun from China and push the date earlier, initially by newly historicizing a pre-Tan'gun period corresponding to the time between Hwan'ung's descension to Korea and the establishment of Chosŏn by Tan'gun.

In official South Korean historiography today, Old Chosŏn is increasingly treated as a proper noun, romanized into English as Gojoseon (Kojosŏn). The orthodox foundation date of 2333 BCE is still regularly cited, such as to result in a single polity name Gojoseon with conventional, though not unchallengeable, dating of 2333–108 BCE. The Tangi calendar similarly counts from 2333 BCE. However, under the influence of 20th century revisionism, the designation of Old Chosŏn becomes still more ambiguous, because not only do these schemes diminish Kija, they further assert that the territory usurped by Wi Man—that would constitute Wiman Chosŏn—occupied only the western frontier region of Chosŏn proper, and that the subsequent 108 BCE Han campaign similarly reached no further. According to this interpretation, the Chinese sources attesting Chosŏn and the commanderies refer only to this western frontier zone; Old Chosŏn proper—ruled by *Tan'gun* lords—continued to exist across geographical Manchuria and the Korean peninsula until, due only to internal conflicts, it eventually evolved into the constituent historical Korean polities.[18]

In short, influential idioms of current day Korean pseudohistory that argue for a charter empire named Chosŏn, effectively combine the following elements. Firstly the notion of a historical polity named Chosŏn (as attested from *Shiji* onwards); secondly Dongyi conflationism that had originally been connected to the Kija legend but is now dissociated; thirdly the orthodox and still current notion of Tan'gun Chosŏn having been the first state of Korean history; and, finally, the usage of Old Chosŏn as a now ambiguous umbrella term encompassing both the mythical charter state of Tan'gun Chosŏn, and the historical Chosŏn polity attested

in Chinese sources and associated with the Yan expansion, Wi Man's usurpation and the Han conquest. This last factor in particular, both enabled the historicization of Tan'gun Chosŏn and encourages a forced association of archaeological cultures, with the ambiguously defined polity of "Old Chosŏn."

Delineating the Charter Territory: Culture-Historical Archaeology and the Imprint of Political Manchuria

Together with textual evidence, discussed below, pseudohistorians seek to delineate the borders of their ancient Chosŏn empire through the supposed distribution of a range of diagnostic archaeological cultures, including, polished stone implements, various earthenware types, dolmen megaliths, bronze daggers and fine-lined bronze mirrors.[19] For each case, the argument is that their distribution matches Chosŏn territory stretching from the Korean peninsula to southeastern Inner Mongolia, that the physical culture is entirely distinct from non-Dongyi China, and that the culture is a product of indigenous innovation originating in the Liaoning region rather than from any outside influence. Emphasis is placed on dolmen for their monumentalism and megalithic qualities, and on bronze items both for their sophistication and as evidence of indigenous metallurgy. In addition to the questionable reliability of any such distribution maps produced for this predetermined purpose, the fundamental problem in such methodology is the underlying "culture-historical" premise that material cultures can be directly equated to ethnic or political boundaries. But this is rarely the case, for, just as in the 21st century case of smartphones and yoga studios, desire for prestige or practical items and ritual practices may all transcend ethnic or political identification.

Owing to the depth of written antiquity found in Chinese sources, it further reflects the tendency to match these same archaeological cultures to the polities and peoples attested in sources. This approach works as long as there are: reliable sources giving locations and dates, clearly defined archaeological sites (e.g. fortress or palace structures, or cemeteries), no immediate candidates for alternative identification, and ideally *in situ* epigraphic confirmation. This method proved successful for identifying Lelang commandery remains at Pyongyang (P'yŏngyang) and works for identifying the capital locations of the later Three Kingdoms, as the above conditions are fulfilled. However, in the case of Chosŏn, aside from flawed historical geography concerning the western frontier, there are no sources that describe the extent of Chosŏn's territory, and in particular none associating it with central or northern geographical Manchuria, so in reality

there is no culture-historical correlation to be made between the Chosŏn attested in historical sources and physical remains.

Nevertheless, empire advocates assert that Chosŏn's territory incorporated all of China's current Dongbei or northeastern provinces up to the Amur river or just beyond, as well as the Russian Primorsky Krai.[20] This claim to geographical Manchuria is based on two flawed strategies. The first derives from premising the early central Manchurian state of Puyŏ to have been subordinate to Chosŏn. This claim is first attested in *Chewang ungi*, which alongside *Samguk yusa*, saw Chosŏn being cast as Korea's sole charter state. Prior to this, Puyŏ had independently played a significant role, particularly in the foundation stories of Koguryŏ and Paekche and from which Chosŏn was entirely absent. Puyŏ was less important to Silla, but with Silla's post-conquest incorporation of Koguryŏ tradition, Puyŏ survived on the periphery of Korean historiographical memory, principally as the northern homeland of Koguryŏ's mythological founder, Chumong, a story which itself had been adapted from the Puyŏ foundation story of King Tongmyŏng, recorded in earlier Chinese sources, and whose homeland is north of Puyŏ.[21] Today the link to Puyŏ is reinforced by later Korean claims to continental Koguryŏ and Parhae (698–926) territory, both of which maintained administrative districts named Puyŏ.[22]

The second strategy used by pseudohistorians to claim continental Manchuria as Chosŏn territory is based on the circular premise that Chosŏn was the original charter state not only of Korea but of greater Manchuria. With no other historical polities or peoples regarded to have occupied Manchuria prior to Chosŏn, there is no reason for its territory not to have expanded to the eastern coast and indefinitely northwards. According to this model, there would also be no reason not to claim all subsequent Manchurian peoples as descendents of Chosŏn, and this would be supported both by Dongyi classification and the broader Altaic hypothesis. However, while empire advocates typically incorporate early Dongyi peoples as attested in *Sanguozhi*, including those such as the Yilou treated as ancestral to later Manchurian peoples, advocates are often cautious in extending direct claim to medieval or early modern non-Chinese polities such as the Khitan or Mongols, and particularly the Jurchen-Manchu—presumably because these peoples and their associated conquest states were clearly subsumed into modern China and thus, in social Darwinist terms, were historical failures. Nevertheless, the northern border most often delineated by empire advocates, the Amur river, clearly corresponds to the Manchu Qing border with Russia. This implies a claim to the Manchu's core territory and by extension, that of contemporary mainland China, thus reflecting modern geopolitical concerns over assertions of Korean fraternity with the moribund Tungus peoples of Manchuria, to say nothing of

the speakers of Paleo-Siberian languages. Maps of the Old Chosŏn empire also resemble the shape of Japan's continental acquisitions during the first half of the 20th century, in particular reflecting the well-known ManSen (滿鮮 Manchuria–Korea) paradigm.[23] In both cases—Japanese Manchukuo (1932–1945) and Korean pseudohistory—the maps further reflect the formative influence of Qing territorial tradition and Qing period sources commandeered for the purpose.

Flawed Evidentialism: Historical Geography of Ancient Chosŏn and the Chinese Commanderies

As seen above, the broader delineation of an expansive territory is ostensibly based on projections of archaeology and subordination of early attested states to Old Chosŏn. However, concerning Chosŏn's western border, pseudohistorians go beyond these techniques, and claim to have more solid textual arguments principally derived from Chinese histories themselves. In contrast to the northern or eastern frontier delineations that encounter few competing claims, the western frontier of Chosŏn, both imagined and historical, bordered with polities well attested both in Chinese sources and through archaeology. West is also the direction from which perceived incursions of Chosŏn's territory came, including the ahistorical Kija polity, and historically the Yan expansion, Wi Man usurpation and the Chinese Han conquest. The position of the western frontier is consequently of utmost concern and there is a significant body of historical geography texts with which to work.

Professional consensus historical geography for early Korea is based on information learnable from the earliest contemporary sources. *Shiji* and *Hanshu* were compiled contemporary to the historical existence of Lelang and Xuantu, while *Sanguozhi* and *Hou Hanshu* were contemporary also to Lelang's southwestern partition of Daifang (c.200–314). The positions of Xuantu, Lelang and Daifang are broadly fixed by two schemes of interlocking data. The first is knowledge that the post 108 BCE conquest commanderies were established east of the administrative commanderies that had already been established by Warring States era Yan. Yan was centered at modern Beijing and the easternmost of its five conquest commanderies was named Liaodong (literally "Liao east") broadly corresponding to modern central and eastern Liaoning province. Revisionist historians assert the new conquest commanderies of Han to have been in western Liaoning, but this is impossible owing to the attestation of Yan commanderies in the same place and an increasingly dense historical geography towards Central Plain China.

The second scheme is based on information from the *Sanguozhi* and *Hou Hanshu* Dongyi treatises that locate Xuantu, Lelang and Daifang in relation to indigenous polities and peoples of southern Manchuria, the Korean peninsula

and Japan, all circa the mid-3rd century CE. Although the commanderies historically came to an end, these early indigenous polities continued to exist *in situ* and evolved into early medieval states of the Three Kingdoms period and beyond. Their locations are fully attested to in sources and confirmed through archaeology and epigraphy. The latter period of the commanderies and their relative positions further correlates to references in *Samguk sagi*. Based on this information, Lelang can be placed centered at modern Pyongyang with Daifang to its southwest. The Pyongyang location of Lelang is further supported by pre 20th century tradition, and has been confirmed through modern archaeology, both during the Japanese colonial era and through published results of North Korean excavations.[24]

The preceding state of Chosŏn is more enigmatic. There are no contemporary sources or epigraphy reliably attesting Chosŏn during its existence. Its location is therefore derived from two logical premises: 1) Chosŏn's territory was east of former Yan territory, i.e. east of Liaodong, and 2) Chosŏn's core was replaced by the principal commandery of Lelang, the capital prefecture of which, we learn from *Hanshu*, was named Chaoxian (K. Chosŏn). This second premise would locate the final—and only attested—Chosŏn capital of Wanghŏm (王險) at Pyongyang.

In their utilization of historical geography, pseudohistorians commit two principal fallacies: 1) working from predetermined negationist goals of locating Chinese incursions outside of the Korean peninsula, and 2) uncritically privileging later or less reliable sources over the earlier sources mentioned above.

Since its inception, the primary goal of revisionist historical geography has been to locate the Chinese commanderies of Xuantu, Lelang, and Daifang outside of southern Manchuria and the Korean peninsula broadly to the region of modern western Liaoning and eastern Hebei provinces. This repositioning most immediately serves the purpose of decontaminating early Manchuria and Korea proper of the modern colonial implications of four centuries of commandery rule (108 BCE–c.313 CE). As the commanderies are understood to have replaced Wiman Chosŏn, and Wi Man to have usurped Kija Chosŏn, it further serves to *provincialize* not only the commanderies, but the totality of preceding foreign interregna, while enabling claims that prior to these intrusions, Old Chosŏn's charter territory must have extended even further westwards, up to or even beyond, modern Beijing (Yan's historical capital).

On a concrete level, the textual arguments utilized by peudohistorians focus on five core topics: 1) identification of the P'ae river, attested as having formed the final border between Chosŏn and Han dynasty China during the 2nd century BCE, 2) the location of Wanghŏm, Chosŏn's final and only attested capital, and potentially the commanderies that replaced it, 3) identification of the Liao river as used to demarcate the regions of Liaodong ("Liao east") and Liaoxi (literally

"Liao west"), 4) the eastern terminus of the Yan and Qin "long wall" fortifications, recorded as having been in Liaodong, and 5) the existence at Pyongyang of an indigenous state of Nangnang (Ch. Lelang) in place of the Chinese Lelang commandery, the latter supposedly being named after its original, failed campaign objective. The question of the locations of the commanderies—of principal revisionist concern Lelang and Daifang—are interwoven within all five topics, but particularly the second concerning the preceding Chosŏn capital.

All of these problematized topics notably pertain to the historically attested periods of Warring States (pre-Wiman) Chosŏn, and Wiman Chosŏn; even the case of a Nangnang polity is argued as having existed during the equivalent historical period of Lelang commandery rule. To this extent, revisionist evidentialism is reliant on source arguments. Aside from Nangnang, these topics are first attested in the sources mentioned above, *Shiji*, *Hanshu*, *Sanguozhi* and *Hou Hanshu*. However, as seen in Table 1, pseudohistorians' revisionist arguments principally rely on historical geography sourced from texts postdating the historical existence of the commanderies, hereafter, in reference to the orthodox date for the end of the Lelang commandery labelled as "post 313 sources."

Although utilizing later sources is not in itself a fallacy, pseudohistorians privilege convenient entries from these sources, which, on the surface, appear to locate the entities in question in the region of western Liaoning or eastern Hebei, thus supporting their predetermined goal of provincialization. In so doing, they adapt "the story" from the earlier sources and fit it to the post-313 historical geography while wilfully ignoring the logical geography of the earlier sources. They adopt this methodology because the information concerning the entities

Table 1 Problematized topics of historical geography.

Problematized topic	**First relevant attestation**	**Sources relied on for revisionist arguments**
1) P'ae river	*Shiji* (87 BCE)	*Shuijing* (Han dynasty or later) *Liaoshi* (1344) *Shengjing tongzhi* (1684)
2) Wanghŏm and the commanderies	*Shiji* (87 BCE)	*Shiji jijie* (c.425 annotations to *Shiji*) *Weishu* (c.554) *Jinshu* (c.646) *Liaoshi* (1344)
3) Liao river or Liaodong	*Shiji* (87 BCE)	None
4) Eastern terminus of Yan and Qin walls	*Shiji* (87 BCE)	*Shiji suoyin* (8th century, annotations to *Shiji*) *Tongdian* (801)
5) Nangnang state	N/A	*Samguk sagi* (1145) *Samguk yusa* (c.1283)

in question given in pre and post-313 sources does not agree. The critical fallacy they commit is in failing to understand or take into account the processes by which the post-313 references that appear to support their vision came to be. Before addressing these processes, we should first have a taste of this seeming evidentialism as pertaining to the first two problematized topics.

Problem 1: The P'ae River

The Chosŏn treatise of *Shiji* (87 BCE) states the P'ae to have marked the border between Han China and Chosŏn; in this context it attests the P'ae being crossed both by usurper (Wi) Man c.195 BCE, then in 109 BCE by an envoy of Han China and subsequently by the invading Han army. Traditionally this P'ae, mentioned in *Shiji* and *Hanshu*, was identified as the current day Yalu river. Opinion among scholars today is divided between it having been the Yalu or the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn'gang rivers. By contrast, pseudohistorians argue the P'ae river demarcating Chosŏn's western border to have been the Yuni (淤泥河, or "silted-muddy") river located in western Liaoning province.

Revisionist textual evidence 1:

> *Liaoshi* (遼史 1344) identifies the P'ae river as the Ni (泥河) or Xuyuanluo (葖芋濼); the *Shengjing tongzhi* (盛京通志 1684) clarifies this as the present Yuni river (淤泥河) located 65 *li* southwest of Haicheng (海城).[25]

Ignored in this argument is that other passages of *Shengjing tongzhi* distinguishes between the P'ae identified in *Liaoshi*, and another, which it locates in contemporary Chosŏn; *Shengjin tongzhi* associates only this latter with Lelang.[26] Further ignored is the geography in question; the Yuni river identified by *Shengjing tongzhi* still exists today, but is quite insubstantial and dwarfed by the Liao river that enters the sea twenty kilometres to its northwest. This Yuni river is thus unlikely to have constituted a strategic frontier. A fuller explanation for the *Liaoshi* identification is treated in the discussion below.

Revisionist textual evidence 2:

> A *Shuijing* (水經) entry for the P'ae describes it originating in Loufang prefecture (鏤方縣) of Lelang and flowing southeastwards.[27] The P'ae, therefore, cannot have been the Yalu or Ch'ŏngch'ŏn'gang rivers because these both flow westwards.
>
> *Liaoshi*, equates Loufang to Zimeng prefecture (紫蒙縣), which in turn, can be located through the *Xin Tangshu* (新唐書 1060) as being in Pingzhou (平州), corresponding to western Liaoning.[28]

As utilized by pseudohistorians, the *Shuijing* entry for P'ae provides two separate arguments. The first concerns the direction of flow. Relying on this entry to revise historical geography is a strategy common to pseudoscience, in which one anomaly is emphasized over a majority of interlocking sources that otherwise agree. Both earlier orthodoxy beginning with *Shuijingzhu* (水經注)—the early 6th century source within which the original *Shuijing* text survives—and current day historians consider the description of a southeastward flow as irreconcilable with the *Shiji* account, and therefore either a scribal error, or simply a different river. The second argument again relies on *Liaoshi* geography.

Problem 2: The Location of Wanghŏm and the Commanderies

Pseudohistorians argue that Wanghŏm, as attested in *Shiji* as the capital of Wi Man's Chosŏn polity (traditional Wiman Chosŏn), was located not at Pyongyang but in "Liaodong," the latter a designation they further seek to problematize and relocate.

Revisionist textual evidence 3:

> A *Jijie* (集解 c.425) annotation to the *Shiji* account of Chosŏn, attests a tradition of associating Xiandu county (險瀆縣) of Changli (昌梨) in Liaoxi (modern western Liaoning) with the original Chosŏn capital of Wanghŏm (王險, C. Wangxian); this is based on the shared *xian* 險 (dangerous, precipitous, sheer) character found in their names.[29]

Pseudohistorians make much of this hypothesis but it is simply a trivial coincidence of a single character occurring in two unrelated toponyms. In representing non-Chinese words, certain characters were used for their phonetic value and therefore often occur in personal names and toponyms. This generates material for speculating on associative patterns and folk etymologies. It has also been argued, for example, that Wanghŏm could not have been at Pyongyang because it is not a "precipitous" (險) enough location.

In revisionist argumentation, the location of Wanghŏm becomes inseparable from the commanderies not only due to the presumption of it having been replaced by Lelang but due to the nature of the following post 313 attestations.

Revisionist textual evidence 4:

> The geography treatise of *Weishu* (魏書, compiled c.554 covering the period 386–550) records a Chaoxian (K. Chosŏn) county belonging to Beiping commandery (北平郡), corresponding to the region of modern eastern Hebei.[30]

Revisionist textual evidence 5:

> The geography treatise of *Jinshu* (晉 compiled c.646 but covering the earlier period of 265–420) records five commanderies of the same Hebei region—now named Pingzhou 平州—as Liaodong (遼東), Changli (昌黎), Xuantu, Daifang and Lelang.[31]

Revisionist textual argument 6:

> The geography treatise of *Liaoshi* describes Liaoyang-fu (遼陽府 modern Liaoyang) as having originally been the territory of Chosŏn and the location of the Four Han Commanderies.[32]

Historical Processes Distorting Post 313 Historical Geography

Aside from the aberrant case of *Shuijing*, the revisionist arguments listed above all rely on post-313 sources. These sources attest distorted understanding of historical geography owing to intervening processes between the historical existence of the commanderies and the sources' respective periods of compilation. These processes pertain firstly to the historical fate of the commanderies, that following their historical existence ultimately saw all three reduced to namesake status in western Liaoning and eastern Hebei; and secondly to at least one, if not several, historical instances of peoples being relocated *en masse* from the northern Korean peninsula and eastern Manchuria, again to the region of western Liaoning, and whose original history and geography was partially merged with records of their new locations.

Concerning the fate of the three historical commanderies, Xuantu was initially established in the far northeast coast of the Korean peninsula but it was relocated westwards to the northwest of Koguryŏ c.82 BCE; from there it was forced to relocate westwards by an emergent Koguryŏ before being overthrown c.333.[33] Lelang, by contrast, remained centered at Pyongyang throughout its historical existence. As the Han dynasty weakened, Lelang came under the control of the Gongsun rulers (c.189–238) based at the Liaodong commandery, during which time Daifang was established. Lelang and Daifang continued to be controlled by Chinese dynasties or proxies, until their final overthrow and absorption by Koguryŏ and Paekche, c.313 and 314 respectively.

Only after this period do the names of all three former commanderies re-appear in historical geography treatises concerning western Liaoning and eastern Hebei. Again, this is first reflected in the *Weishu* geography treatise and more clearly in *Jinshu*. These new attestations may in part be a reflection of actual

refugee communities who relocated in the wake of the commanderies' collapse. The *Weishu* entry above pertaining to a Chaoxian county of Beiping commandery describes Chaoxian as having originally belonged to Lelang, that Lelang had been abolished and that the Chaoxian in question was re-established in Feiru (肥如) by Chaoxian people in 432. Feiru is attested in *Hanshu* as a subordinate county of Liaoxi commandery, modern eastern Hebei.[34] The *Jinshu* entry attesting all three commanderies meanwhile appears to be more of a self-conceited attempt to incorporate the lost possessions into the textual record.

The second phenomenon to distort historical geography was the mass relocation of Parhae people by the Khitan Liao following the Khitan overthrow of Parhae in 926. As a consequence the geography treatise of the *Liaoshi* has been shown to conflate historical information pertaining to original Parhae sites in central and southeastern Manchuria with that of the relocated settlements in Liaoning and further westwards.[35] Thus *Liaoshi* describes the region of Haizhou in Liaodong (modern Haicheng, Liaoning province) as Parhae's southern capital, which historically had been located in Hamgyŏng province in the northeast of the Korean peninsula; this has led many scholars to wrongly assume that Parhae's southern capital was in Liaodong. The Hamgyŏng region of northeastern Korea, meanwhile, had originally been the territory of Okchŏ and in *Liaoshi* this fact, too, is transplanted to the description of Haizhou, thus appearing to show an early Korean peninsular polity, Okchŏ, as if it had been located in Liaoning. Okchŏ in Hamgyŏng, meanwhile, had also been the first historical location of the Xuantu commandery (c.107–75 BCE) and, although not explicitly included in the *Liaoshi* entry, we might further speculate that the Liaodong association of Xuantu, as first attested in *Jinshu*, may have reinforced the conflations caused by the relocated Parhae communities.

Liaoshi's mixing of information pertaining to relocated Parhae peoples also explains the P'ae identification with the Yuni river in Liaoning. The earlier *Xin Tangshu* Parhae treatise identifies a Ni river as demarcating Parhae's southern border with Silla; this Ni is also attested in *Samguk sagi* as Silla's northern frontier, and was thus clearly located on the Korean peninsula. The identification of the P'ae with the Liaoning Ni is likely another transposed tradition that already pertained with the Korean Ni. We can only speculate at how this peninsular Ni may have originally been associated with the P'ae but it is likely related to the fact that from the early medieval period the Taedong river of Pyongyang had similarly become identified in name as the P'ae.

Although the historical P'ae constituting Chosŏn's border would have been north of Pyongyang, between 108 BCE and Koguryŏ's 4th century expansion, there would have been several centuries before this river came under Koguryŏ's

territorial control and before Koguryŏ developed either the literacy or motivation to lay claim to Chosŏn's heritage. The Taedong association may either have been a product of Koguryŏ's incorporation of Lelang, the relocation of Koguryŏ's capital to Pyongyang, or Silla's post 668 incorporation of conquered Koguryŏ territory and the need to account for, and in the process *peninsularize*, northern Koguryŏ territory which it failed to take. For Parhae, meanwhile, Pyongyang and the lower Taedong remained just to the south of its frontier with Silla, the P'ae hydronym may therefore have been re-associated by Parhae peoples with any of the tributaries or nearby rivers that came to form the frontier. In short, any of these reconfigurations may have provided motivation to seek legitimization through evoking the memory of Chosŏn or Lelang resulting in new identifications of the P'ae, however, ultimately there is a historical disconnect to the river referred to as P'ae in *Shiji*.

The *Liaoshi* description of Liaoyang-fu (遼陽府 modern Liaoyang) having originally been the territory of Chosŏn and the location of the Four Han Commanderies may similarly be explained as a product of the Lelang associations. It has further been argued that in the medieval period claims to the heritage of Kija Chosŏn as a charter state for civilization east of the Central Plain, were maintained not only by Koryŏ, but by the Khitan Liao; in this case it would have been necessary for the Khitan to locate Chosŏn within their core territory.[36] In the subsequent Mongol Yuan period there was also the phenomenon of a significant Koryŏ community residing in Shenyang with Koryŏ princes bestowed the title "Shenyang king"; we could speculate that they, too, may have been keen to maintain a tradition of Chosŏn having been located in Liaodong, thus making them heirs to the eastern mandate.

The toponymic end result of these two main processes informing the distortions of post 313 sources appear to support Korean revisionist goals of locating Kija, Wiman and the commanderies to western Liaoning or beyond it is precisely because these sources provided inspiration to the first generation of 20th century revisionist scholars who established the empire scheme promoted by pseudohistorians today. Reliance on post 313 sources therefore constitutes circular argumentation.

Problem 3: Locating Liaodong and Liaoxi

Liaodong ("Liao east") and Liaoxi ("Liao west") were originally the two easternmost conquest commanderies of Yan but subsequently became broader geographical designations. Their respective meanings of east and west refer to the Liao river that runs through modern Liaoning province, though historically it was the Yiwulu

mountains (醫巫閭山) west of the Liao river that delineated the administrative border.[37] As discussed just above, toponymic traditions associated with Chosŏn and Lelang were transplanted to Liaodong subsequent to the historical existence of Lelang; revisionist historical geography relies on these Liaodong identifications, as well as those pertaining to eastern Hebei (Liaoxi). However, by arguing the Liao river, that gave its name to Liaodong and Liaoxi in early history, as having been a different river further west of the current day Liao river, pseudohistorians seek to shift the entire setting of Korea's early history even further westwards than the false arguments derived from post 313 sources already seem to enable.

Pseudohistorians therefore propose alternative rivers in eastern Hebei, most often the present day Luan (灤河), as having been an ancient Liao, the result being the region historically regarded as Liaoxi becomes "ancient Liaodong," while "ancient Liaoxi" is placed still further west in modern Hebei.[38] Such schemes rarely attempt to explain what should happen to the interlocking historical polities and districts located in Hebei and further west as this is immaterial to their Korea-centric predetermined goals. Pseudohistorians provide no textual argument to support alternative identifications of the Liao, but rather it is a circular premise feeding into the following argument pertaining to the Yan and Qin long walls.

Problem 4: The Yan and Qin Walls, and Jieshi Mountain

The *Shiji* records that in the process of Yan's c.280 BCE eastward expansion against Chosŏn, and establishment of its five conquest commanderies, Yan constructed a fortified long wall stretching eastwards and terminating in Liaodong. This fortification was inherited by the Qin which built further walls. Yan initially expanded to the Manpanhan (滿潘汗), presumed to be a river. Under Qin, the easternmost region was "emptied" as a buffer zone, and under Han some of this territory was relinquished with the border withdrawn to the P'ae. This means even pre-Han "Chinese" penetration of Chosŏn would have already extended beyond wherever the P'ae is located and involved the physical symbolism of the imposition of China's "long walls." To negate this historical scenario, pseudohistorians take the *Shiji* record and combine with their premise of an "ancient Liaodong" to argue that the eastern termini of the walls were both at modern Shanhaiguan, eastern Hebei, and were therefore the same location as the later Ming dynasty wall surviving today.

Revisionist textual evidence 7:

> *Shiji* and *Sanguozhi* record the Yan and Qin walls as terminating in Liaodong.[39] Concerning the Qin wall, *Shiji suoyin*, citing *Taikang dilizhi* (太康地理志), includes the following additional information: the terminus was in a coastal region, and

> was close to a mountain named Jieshi (碣石山 K. Kalsŏk-san), which located in Suicheng (遂城) county of Lelang.[40]
>
> The same *Shiji suoyin* entry (prior to quoting *Taikang dilizhi*), and *Tongdian* (通典 801) both identify this Jieshi mountain as a contemporary mountain located in Beiping commandery; this corresponds to the present day Jieshi mountain of Hebei.[41]

In this revisionist argument, Jieshi mountain can be seen to function as a lynchpin connecting the eastern termini of the walls together with Suicheng county of Lelang, so not only the walls, but a portion of Lelang commandery is further seen to be located in Hebei, on which the broader location of Lelang can be further premised. Here, however, information provided in the original *Taikang dilizhi*, which is extent only in citations, should be distinguished from the opinions of the later *Shiji suoyin* and *Tongdian* compilers. To the extent that the *Taikang dilizhi* may be taken as reliable, we learn only that there was a mountain called Jieshi (Kalsŏk-san) ("rocky") in Suicheng county of Lelang. The equation of this oronym to the Jieshi mountain in Hebei, which maintains its name still today, is the reflection of the *Shiji suoyin* and *Tongdian* compilers' contemporary 8th century knowledge, influenced by post 313 toponymy. In particular it should be recalled that it is under the *Weishu* Beiping commandery entry that the 432 establishment of a Chaoxian county is recorded, reminding us that Beiping was a region to which the Lelang communities relocated.

Problem 5: The Indigenous Nangnang State

In asserting Lelang and other commanderies to have been located outside of the peninsula, and Old Chosŏn initially centered in Manchuria, pseudohistorians must nevertheless account for a large number of references and archaeology associating Lelang with the region of modern Pyongyang. This they do by arguing that Lelang was named after its failed campaign objective, an indigenous Lelang state, which in Sino-Korean pronunciation becomes Nangnang. For this purpose they utilize references from Korean tradition.

Revisionist textual evidence 8:

> The *Samguk sagi* Koguryŏ annals attest a Nangnang king, Ch'oe Ri (樂浪王崔理).[42]
>
> The *Samguk sagi* Silla annals and *Samguk yusa* refer to Nangnang as a 'state' (國).

Korean pseudohistorians argue that Korean sources are more reliable than Chinese. That attestation of an indigenous Nangnang polity is absent from all

Chinese histories and occurs only in Korean sources is thus explainable as the product of a Chinese historiographical conspiracy.

However, the Korean authored references to a Nangnang state and king support only a convenient *ad hoc* explanation of what was at Pyongyang in place of the Lelang commandery. Like many toponyms, the name of Lelang/Nangnang may indeed have been taken from an earlier indigenous polity that gave its name to the region, if unfortunately unattested; the references found in *Samguk sagi* and *Samguk yusa*, are themselves better understood as the later product of an established, though already distant, memory of the historical Lelang commandery. Existing *in situ* for some four centuries, Lelang is recorded as having at times lapsed into periods of near autonomous rule, with its name consequently diffusing to usage in titles of local rulers across the peninsula. Thus rather than denying the historicity of the commandery, critical historians and archaeologists have rather focused on the processes of its localization, and even *indigenization*, circumstances that might be well analogized with the understanding of Romano-British identity during the same period.[43]

From a Central Plain perspective, meanwhile, Lelang became more broadly synonymous with the peninsula. The *Xin Tangshu* (1060) Silla treatise, for example, records in 620 Silla king Chinp'yŏng being enfeoffed by Tang emperor Gaozu as the "Lelang commandery king," (樂浪郡王) while *Samguk sagi*, which consulted Tang histories, similarly records Silla kings being enfeoffed as "Lelang commandery duke" (樂浪郡公).[44] The specific *Samguk sagi* reference to Lelang/Nangnang king Ch'oe Ri, which is both at an unlikely date of 32 CE and folkloric in nature, will be of similar provenance.

Korean revisionist historiography has long asserted a dichotomy between the supposedly "Sinocentric" *Samguk sagi* that, in their view, omits treatment both of Tan'gun and continental territory, and the "more authentic" *Samguk yusa*. This dichotomy is well known to be exaggerated, and, when convenient to their arguments, present day empire advocates are increasingly willing to privilege *Samguk sagi* over the earlier Chinese sources on the grounds that the former was nevertheless Korean authored and therefore more reliable. This pertains in particular to the question of the historical Samhan and dating of the southern Three Kingdoms era polities that followed.

Contesting the Samhan Polities

The Samhan, or "Three Han," polities of Mahan, Pyŏnhan (Pyŏnjin) and Chinhan, are first attested in the Dongyi treatises of *Sanguozhi* and *Hou Hanshu*. There they are described as occupying the southern third of the Korean peninsula, and

explicitly stated to be south of Lelang and Daifang commanderies. Pseudohistorians object to this identification, not only due to their broader rejection of the commanderies' northern peninsular location, but because the existence of the Samhan polities during the mid 3rd century CE negates the possibility of the southern Three Kingdoms era polities of Paekche, Kaya and Silla having been in existence any earlier than the late 3rd century. To counter this, pseudohistorians consequently argue the Samhan to have either been located across continental Manchuria as constituent domains of Old Chosŏn, or to have been lesser polities once more restricted to western Liaoning.

The evidence utilized for identifying the "continental Samhan" combines textual references from two separate misidentifications of the Samhan that arose long after their historical existence. One occurs in medieval Korean tradition wherein the Samhan polities were conflated with the subsequent Three Kingdoms era states of Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla. From this scheme, Koguryŏ is treated as the southernmost of the continental Samhan.[45] The second derives from distorted toponymy arising once more in *Liaoshi*, and carried further into the Qing period sources *Shengjing tongzhi* (1684) and *Manzhou yuanliu kao* (1783 滿洲源流考). Within these sources, Chinhan, historically located in the southeast of the Korean peninsula, emerges with a continental association. Firstly, *Liaoshi* records a Samhan county (三韓縣) subordinate to Gao province (高州) located in the region of Liaoxi.[46] Here it is explicit in noting this county as having been established to resettle prisoners of war taken from Koryŏ during the Khitan invasions of the early 11th century; the usage of Samhan in this region is therefore of no earlier provenance and reflects contemporary association of Samhan to refer to Koryŏ. However, in the same *Liaoshi* entry, the Samhan polities of Chinhan, Pyŏnhan and Mahan are aberrantly listed as having corresponded to Puyŏ, Silla and Ko[gu]ryŏ respectively. Here Puyŏ is likely confused for Paekche, which itself had adopted the moniker of South Puyŏ, but the result is to associate Chinhan with the continental polity of Puyŏ. *Shengjing tongzhi* later describes Gaiping county (蓋平縣) in central Liaoning, as having originally been Chinhan.[47] *Manzhou yuanliu kao* then takes the historical fact of Silla having evolved from Chinhan—in the southeast of the Korean peninsula—and conflates it with the Gaiping identification. The result is that *Manzhou yuanliu kao* appears to locate, not only Chinhan, but even Silla in Gaiping.[48] Owing to their problematic nature, pseudohistorians rarely cite these references verbatim but they clearly inspired the early revisionist notion of "continental Samhan," maintained by some empire idioms today.[49]

To account for the peninsular Samhan references, such schemes originally premised a gradual migration remapping the "continental Samhan" to the peninsula.[50] In this case, the dating of the peninsular Samhan is projected back

to the c.1st century BCE in order to dovetail with the orthodox dates of the Three Kingdoms as attested in *Samguk sagi*, and *Samguk yusa*. In recent years, however, a more polemical line of interpretation has been introduced by Yi Tŏgil that entirely rejects the notion of peninsular Samhan, arguing this to be another colonial-era conspiracy promoted by the Japanese in order to shorten the supposed deep antiquity of the subsequent Three Kingdoms era polities.[51] Here the colonial Japanese motivation is cast as having been to argue the Japanese state of Yamato as having emerged as a historical entity prior to the Korean Three Kingdoms, thus asserting Japanese civilizational pre-eminence and greater longevity. Yi's objection to the peninsular Samhan is that, as represented in the Dongyi treatise, and in contrast to the representation of the Three Kingdoms polities in *Samguk sagi*, they lack the qualities of consolidated states, including not least foundation dates, and records of consolidation and conquest. From a nationalist perspective it is also problematic that they are chiefly attested in Chinese sources. The Samhan are consequently another element to be diminished through provincialization in Liaoning.

These two interpretations of the Samhan—one treating them as a constituent part of Old Chosŏn, the other as an invented conspiracy—utilize the sources in two separate ways but share a commonality in rejecting the 3rd century date of the historical peninsular Samhan, as attested in *Sanguozhi*, in order to maintain the supposed historicity of the southern Three Kingdoms era polities, as found only in the later *Samguk sagi* and *Samguk yusa*. The critical weakness of these revisionist interpretations is that the southern Three Kingdoms era polities of Paekche, Kaya and Silla are not attested in any Chinese sources until the late 3rd century or after. Variants of their names are, however, present in *Sanguozhi* among the listed subpolities of the Three Han; there Paekche (伯濟國) is subordinate to Mahan, while Kuya (狗邪國) and Saro (斯盧國) are listed under Pyŏnjin (弁辰)—Saro being attested in *Beishi* (北史 650, covering 420–589) and *Samguk sagi* as the precursor to Silla.[52]

Pseudohistorians assert the early records of the *Samguk sagi* (covering 1st century BCE to late 3rd century CE), to be authentic. But these records are demonstrably proven to consist of a combination of supernatural foundation stories, folklore, empty filler, and artificially stretched lifespans of listed rulers as well as duplication of later kings. The details that may be historical, including records of conflict between Mahan and Paekche, have clearly been pushed back in date from the late 3rd or early 4th century.[53] In asserting the historicity of these early records, promoters of the conspiracy polemic are paradoxically mirroring the colonial Japanese scholars whom they would criticize for promoting the historicity of early Japanese mythology. Although pseudohistorians have conflicting

emotions towards the *Samguk sagi*, they take the 1st century BCE foundation dates as a minimum indicator of antiquity; as long as the Samhan and commanderies are not located on the peninsula, then there is no obstruction to projecting the Three Kingdoms' origins significantly deeper.

Extending the Time Depth of Ancient Korea: Hongshan, Yemaek Migrations and Park

In the 21st century pseudohistorians across the interpretative spectrum consistently lay claim to the Neolithic archaeological culture of Hongshan (c.4500–3000 BCE) as the origin of Old Chosŏn, The distribution of associated Hongshan sites straddles southeastern Inner Mongolia and western Liaoning, and the Hongshan culture is best known for its zoomorphic carved jades, and a ritual enclosure site discovered in 1979 in Niuheliang (牛河梁), western Liaoning; replete with evidence of idol statuary; the site is evocatively referred to as the "Goddess Temple."[54]

Pseudo claims of Chosŏn directly evolving from Hongshan serve several purposes. Core among them is to project the time depth of Korean antiquity to the Neolithic, and to cast Korean ancestors as the progenitors of a pristine Northeast Asian civilization. In these schemes, Hongshan is typically juxtaposed to the Yellow River culture, which is taken to represent early non-Dongyi "China." This simplistic binary itself represents a projection of the traditional Shang-Zhou opposition, wherein pseudohistorians claim Shang as having been ethnically Dongyi, and by extension subordinate to Old Chosŏn.[55] Thus, rather than claiming Hongshan as purely "Korean," pseudohistorians cast it as the origin of broader "Dongyi civilization." They proffer the material culture of Hongshan as physical evidence of a proto-civilization replete with a proto-religion. Chinese scholars have also made similar arguments of Hongshan having been an early northern Chinese civilization of the upper Liao river basin. However enigmatic and sophisticated as the carved jades may be, the material culture lacks most elements that might qualify it as a "civilization" in the sense desired by its promoters, including evidence of writing, urban settlement or metallurgy, that would place it on a par with Yellow River, Indus Valley, Mesopotamia or Egyptian civilizations.[56]

The mechanics to link the Hongshan culture spatially and temporally with ancient Chosŏn—which pseudohistorians situate east of the Hongshan locus in central Manchuria—comprise adaptations of two migration hypotheses, Yemaek and Altaic. These in turn, are supported by several conflationary associations including both Dongyi conflationism and between mountain names.

Yemaek (濊貊) is an enigmatic label attested in *Shiji* in the form Yemaek Chosŏn (穢貉朝鮮). Whether this should be read as 'Yemaek Chosŏn' or 'Yemaek and Chosŏn' remains ambiguous. Yemaek is further segmentable: in the *Sanguozhi* Dongyi treatises, the Ye (濊) are associated both with Puyŏ and an "East Ye" (東濊), while the Maek (貊) are associated with early Koguryŏ. The East Ye refer to a people residing on the central east coast of the Korean peninsula. From the Tang period, and pertaining today, East Ye has been associated with Kangnŭng, while Maek has been associated with Ch'unch'ŏn, both regions found in the central Korean province of Kangwŏn. While the label Ye has only ever been associated with Puyŏ and the peninsula, Maek—or Chinese Mo—is earlier attested in *Shijing* referring to a people thought to be located in a region to the southwest of Beijing.[57] Many historians in East Asia have been of a habit of assuming that the appearance of the same characters must indicate the same people, which means, however far apart in time or space they are attested, a migration must have occurred.

The notion of a Yemaek migration, or convergence of Ye and Maek peoples, is further married to a current hypothesis pertaining to archaeological mapping of ancient Chosŏn through typologies of bronze daggers. The academic version of the hypothesis suggests that in its early stage Chosŏn was centered in the region of the Liaodong peninsula, identifiable by "Liaodong type" leaf-bladed (or '"mandolin shaped") bronze daggers, but, with the 280 BCE Yan expansion, Chosŏn relocated to the Taedong basin around Pyongyang where they innovated "slender bladed type" daggers, found across the Korean peninsula. In order to impart a sense of ethnic continuity between Liaodong and northern Korea, the peoples in this "movement" model of ancient Chosŏn are labelled as being "ethnically Yemaek." Scholars also talk of an archaeological "Liao River culture," principally represented by the leaf-bladed bronze daggers and traced to the Lower Xiajiadian culture (2nd millennium BCE). Pseudohistorians take issue with, in their opinion, the limited territorial extent and shallow time depth, restricted to the Bronze Age, but they nevertheless utilize the Liaodong point of origin and notion of a "Liao culture" as both a temporal and spatial bridge back to Hongshan.

A second migratory scheme underlying claims to Hongshan ultimately derives from the Ural-Altaic language hypothesis. In this case, Hongshan is premised as a point of convergence and secondary expansion following supposed earlier migrations out of Central Asia, for which the Altai mountains are either evoked or substituted with the alternatively enigmatic Pamir or Tianshan ranges. This concern for mountains is itself informed by East Asian traditions of mountain reverence, which for Koreans has come to focus at the national level on Mount Paektu. That the largely incidental name of Hongshan for the archaeological culture in question contains 'mountain' is only too convenient for pseudohistorical

purposes; that *hong*, meaning "crimson/red," can be associated with primal sun worship, all the better.

This last aspect enables the incorporation of Hongshan within already Koreanized schemes of cultural diffusion that since the early 20th century have been a staple of world pseudohistory. These schemes, derogatively referred to as 'hyperdiffusionary,' premise an original proto-civilization from which all monument building civilizations of the world emerged by means of an elite people traveling the globe with their pyramid building know-how and primal sun worshipping religio-philosophy. In Western schemes, the proto-civilization has typically been premised as ancient Egypt, Atlantis, or as being of extra-terrestrial origin. In Korean authored schemes, both secular and religious, the proto-civilization is variously identified as Hongshan, Central Asia (Altai), or in the current North Korean variant, Pyongyang. The common factor are mountains, which in the absence of pyramids or ziggurats, are argued to have served as natural sky or heaven worshipping altars.[58]

South Korean pseudohistorians emphasize the civilizational import in the name of Hongshan through analogy to Mount Paektu, the sky worshipping qualities of which have been established through the hypothesis of an early sun worshipping culture termed "Purham" (不咸) or "Park." *Palk* is both the easily recognizable stem in the Korean word for 'bright' (밝-), and has been proposed as cognate to *pul* (fire), which in turn is premised as the underlying etymology for Purham mountain, and equated to Mount Paektu. In short: *palk* (bright) = *pul* (fire) = Pur[ham] (Mount Paektu).[59]

Purham is a historical oronym associated with the Sushen people, who in pre-Qin sources are originally attested as residing north of the Central Plain in northern China or southern Mongolia. In a process similar to Dongyi conflationism, the label of Sushen was reused to denote the ancestors of the Yilou people of far eastern Manchuria. Similar to the case of Maek—when addressed at all—the connection between the pre-Qin Sushen and later Yilou, is typically premised as a migration that disregards the extreme time and spatial differences.

The original Sushen, north of the Central Plain, are described in *Shanhaijing* as residing in the vicinity of a mountain named Purham.[60] The later Yilou historically resided to the north of Mount Paektu, and so, in borrowing the label of Sushen for Yilou ancestors, Mount Paektu became identified as Purham. The Sushen-Yilou conflation occurs in the earliest description of the Yilou, found in the *Sanguozhi* Dongyi treatise; Purham is first incorporated into the equivalent description of the *Jinshu* Dongyi treatise.[61] As argued by Byington (2016), the Sushen-Yilou conflation appears to have been created because the ancient Sushen were held in high regard, and both Sushen and Yilou peoples were known to present arrows as tribute.[62]

However, once this conflation of Purham/Sushen for Paektu/Yilou is understood as false, then unless a Koreanic language was being spoken in southern Mongolia, the *pul* / *park* pseudo etymology that would tie Mount Paektu—and by extension Korea—into light worshipping schemes, and crucially enables the connective association with Hongshan as another sun worshipping locus, also becomes dim.[63]

Hwandan kogi (1979) and The Lost Civilization of Hwan'guk

Current day Korean pseudohistory writings are superficially classifiable between secular evidential works that principally focus on historical geography of Chosŏn, and schemes associated with the 20th century new religious movement of Taejonggyo (est. 1909). In reality, however, there is significant overlap, both in their shared early 20th century origins and parallel development, and because the current day authors of secular pseudohistory are often either sympathetic to, or have been active practitioners of Taejonggyo. Diagnostic elements of Taejonggyo infused schemes include incorporation of two invented pre-Chosŏn periods, Hwan'guk (桓國) and Paedal (倍達), and uncritical reliance on several works of apocryphal history, chief and most recent among them, *Hwandan kogi* (Old records of the Hwan and Tan polities, 1979).[64] These Taejonggyo schemes blend extreme historicization of the orthodox Hwan'ung-Tan'gun story together with the Ural-Altaic premise of a Central Asian ethnic homeland, simultaneously marrying the latter to the notion of a proto-civilization, in the mode of hyperdiffusion schemes.

In Taejonggyo influenced schemes, the Central Asian proto-civilization is named Hwan'guk, while the subsequent Paedal period is today equated with the Hongshan culture. The Paedal period is then followed by Chosŏn, the latter matching standard empire conceptualizations. This three part periodization is based on attempts to argue that the Chosŏn foundation myth, as first attested in *Samguk yusa* and *Chewang ungi*, encodes historical information about ancient Korea. The original myth begins with sky god Hwan'in allowing his divine son Hwan'ung to descend to T'aebaek mountain; Hwan'ung then couples with a bear-turned-woman, giving birth to Tan'gun who establishes the state of Chosŏn. As a religion, Taejonggyo is based on the worship of this Tan'gun trinity, however, its historiography remains broadly rationalist.[65] The Hwan'guk-Paedal-Chosŏn periodization was adopted into *Hwandan kogi*, which as a fake history, was authored in literary Chinese; today multiple annotated translations into Korean exist, and from the first translation made circa 1986, the often extensive annotations of these editions have further emphasized rational interpretations.[66] Thus, in broad outline: Hwan'in is interpreted, not as a sky god, but as the period of

the proto-civilization of Hwan'guk that maintained a sky worshipping religion; Hwan'ung's descent corresponds to the migration of an Altaic speaking sun worshipping clan from Central Asia (Hwan'guk) to Hongshan; the bear-turned-woman, is a matriarch of a local bear totem clan, and Tan'gun is a title adopted by rulers of the subsequent state of Chosŏn. The last two of these interpretative explanations are also common to mainstream Korean explanations.

The replacement of Hwan'guk for Hwan'in has come to be supported by a specific conspiracy theory that claims colonial era Japanese historian Imanishi Ryū (1875–1932) to have altered the second character *kuk* (國 "state/polity") of Hwan'guk to read as *in* (因) on a copy of *Samguk yusa* previously belonging to famed historian An Chŏngbok (1712–1791). This alteration was supposedly used to further support for Japanese denial of Hwan'guk and their assertions that the Old Chosŏn foundation story was no older than its mid-Koryŏ period Buddhistic influences. This hypothesis problematically premises the original character to have been in its modern simplified form of *kuk* 国. However, the reality is that the logograph *in* 因 in question is written with a recognized variant consisting of 土 inside of 口.[67] The hypothesis is further undermined by the fact that the actual *kuk* (國) character occurs in the same passage and multiple times throughout *Samguk yusa*, and is clearly distinct from the variant *in* character. It also fails to account for copies of *Samguk yusa* and *Chewang ungi* remaining in Korea that also have Hwan'in and not Hwan'guk and could not all have been altered by Imanishi.

Hwandan kogi is separately notable for elaborating on assertions originating with Sin Ch'aeho that Old Chosŏn innovated its own phonetic script. Naming this script *karimt'o* (加臨土) and dating its creation to 2181 BCE, *Hwandan kogi* includes examples of thirty-eight letters which are clearly designed to resemble the modern vernacular Korean script, thus implying the Korean script we know as *han'gŭl* to be some three millennia older than the well attested fact of its mid-15th century CE invention.[68]

Since 2012, the most visible edition of *Hwandan kogi* to be found in the early history sections of Korean bookstores is that translated by An Kyŏngjŏn, the second generation patriarch of the millenarian new religion of Chŭngsando. Chŭngsan type religions evolved during the 20th century in parallel to Taejonggyo and principally concern themselves with messiahs, cosmic cycles of time and an imminent new era. Established circa 1974 by An's father and based in Daejeon (Taejŏn), Chŭngsando further situates itself within local prophetic traditions associated with nearby Kyeryong mountain. An's *Hwandan kogi* remains strictly rationalist but he seeks to incorporate it into his father's millenarianism by arguing that *Hwandan kogi* encodes Koreans' ancient religio-philosophy, knowledge of which will enable practitioners to survive the coming apocalypse, with Korea and

Daejeon thereafter becoming the centre of a future global civilization, mirroring Hwan'guk of an earlier cosmic cycle.[69]

Whether in his millenarianism or adoption of pseudohistory, An's work is notable for pairing Korean discourses with their Western analogues, for which purpose he cites both earlier and current day Western pseudoscience from Nostradamus, and the creator of the lost Pacific continent hypothesis of Mu, James Churchwood (1851–1936), to Colin Wilson's *From Atlantis to the Sphinx: Recovering the Lost Wisdom of the Ancient World* (1996), and prolific author of "lost civilizations" type pseudoarchaeology, Graham Hancock (b.1950). An asserts, for example, that Hwan'guk, which he characterizes as a "northern-father-sky" proto-civilization, had a corresponding "southern-mother-earth" civilization which was the lost Pacific continent of Mu, to which, he further claims, Atlantis was merely a secondary colony.[70] In this way, An frames Hwan'guk within the popular lost civilizations discourse that has evolved from pre-war Western hyperdiffusion hypotheses that already informed the *Park* scheme. Although aberrant to the typical chauvinism displayed in Korean pseudohistory pertaining to Chosŏn, An's embrace of Western pseudoscience nevertheless mirrors the earlier adoption of the Ural-Altaic hypothesis, as well as the folkloristic strategies underpinning the rationalization of the Hwan'ung-Tan'gun account. It further constitutes an appeal to alternative academic authority.

Astronomical Affirmations

In asserting the authenticity of *Hwandan kogi*, An's introduction also invokes the scientific authority of Pak Ch'angbŏm, an astronomer who in the mid 1990s claimed to have verified the historicity of astronomical events recorded in both *Hwandan kogi* and, separately, the early records of the *Samguk sagi*.[71] In the case of *Hwandan kogi*, Pak (1993) claimed to have achieved a positive correlation between a planetary parade described in *Hwandan kogi* as having occurred in 1733 BCE and an actual parade calculated to have occurred in 1734 BCE but, aside from the forged nature of *Hwandan kogi*, Pak's argument has been criticized for exaggerating both the degree of correlation as well as the rarity of the event.[72]

Concerning *Samguk Sagi*, Pak (1994) claimed to have verified the historicity of solar eclipses recorded in entries dating between the 3rd and 7th century by correlating the specific dates to eclipses he calculates to have occurred across mainland China, from the Yangtze river to northern Manchuria. Combined with this geographical spread, he further takes the lack of correlation between eclipses recorded in the separate three annals of *Samguk sagi* to argue that the Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla must each have had their own astronomical science. Rather than

seeing the calculated locations as evidence for the arbitrary nature of the entries and likely borrowing from Chinese sources, Pak allows for the implication that the Three Kingdoms could have possessed continental territories.[73] Pak's work continues to be cited as positive scientific support for authenticity of *Hwandan kogi* and the early *Samguk sagi* records.

The "Colonial View of History" Conspiracy Theory

In pseudoscience, conspiracy theories serve to explain why a given hypothesis is rejected by professional scientists and scholars. More often than not, pseudoscience advocates are non-professionals, a designation here including scholars trained in disciplines other than on which they publish. A notable phenomenon in Korea, for example, is the number of pseudohistorians who have majored in either economics or sociology.[74] Pseudoscientists can self-rationalize rejection and marginalization from the professional field through embracing their outsider identity. The more they are ignored or rebuffed, the more this identity is seemingly confirmed, together with the conviction that they have discovered a paradigm changing truth so uncomfortable to dogmatic scholars as to require continued suppression by the academy. This self-conceit is regularly evoked by advocates of "lost civilization" discourses such as Graham Hancock and Korean empire advocates.

In countries that have been subject to the trauma of modern colonization, meanwhile, the anti-establishment thrust can be closely tied to politically emotive postcolonial discourses. In the case of Korean pseudohistory, the preoccupation with early history and supposed lost continental territory is a direct product of popular ethno-nationalist historiography that was forged during and in response to Japanese colonization.[75] Current day pseudohistorians invariably cast themselves as inheritors of this tradition, and they consciously seek to associate their outsider identity with the hallowed status of colonial era independence activists who were suppressed and persecuted by the Japanese regime.[76] In turn, they mischaracterize the opinions of current day critical scholars—the academic establishment—as continuing Japanese colonial historiography for the reason that they locate the early "colonial" entity of Lelang at Pyongyang, and reject both the historicity of an ancient Korean empire and Taejonggyo periodization. This is the "colonial view of history" polemic and consists of three core arguments: the location of the commanderies, the foundation dates of the southern Three Kingdoms polities—both discussed above—and finally, the existence of the Mimana Nihonfu (任那日本府), understood as a Japanese administrative organ that supposedly governed peninsular territory south of the Lelang commandery as an imperial enclave of early Japan.

The term Mimana Nihonfu is attested in the Japanese history, *Nihon shoki* (720), and both its location and identity are equated with the Three Kingdoms era Kaya states of the Naktong river basin. Both *Nihon*—"Japan"—and the administrative unit of *fu*, are anachronistic terms for the period during which the Kaya states existed and the notion of an imperial Japanese enclave drawn from *Nihon shoki* is clearly a retrospective projection from the early 8th century. According to the "colonial view of history" polemic, any mention by critical historians of Mimana or usage of the *Nihon shoki* entries is tantamount to continuing colonial historiography. However, while Mimana Nihonfu may be an invention of the *Nihon shoki*, Mimana (K. Imna) is much earlier attested on the 414 Kwanggaet'o Stele inscription, in the compound form Imna Kara (任那加羅)—Kara being a variant form of Kaya. On the stele text, Imna Kara is associated with Wae (倭) people, an ethnonym for early Japanese, who were clearly active on the peninsula. Thus it is undeniable that there was an entity called Imna/Mimana associated with the Kaya states, and ethnic Wae people were historically present on the peninsula, and it is incumbent on professional scholars to examine these using all sources available. Although *Nihon shoki* was compiled at a later date and contains multiple problems of interpretation, it is still a key source significantly predating *Samguk sagi*. Indeed, professional South Korean scholars have worked to negate the colonial era interpretation of Mimana precisely through critical usage of the *Nihon shoki*, and either emphasize its connections to Paekche or its agency as a Kaya entity.[77]

Unlike the circumstance of Lelang commandery, archaeologists have failed to uncover any evidence of a Japanese Mimana on the peninsula. Thus, while the first two complaints found in the "colonial historiography" polemic, concerning the commanderies and early Three Kingdoms, are a case of pseudohistorians arguing against better consensus-forming evidence, their accusation concerning the Mimana Nihonfu is a strawman because critical historians and archaeologists also reject its historicity. Of the three topics, however, Mimana is most immediately evocative of imperial Japan and therefore most efficacious in painting establishment scholars as "pro-Japanese traitors."[78] It was thus both a serious accusation as well as indication of the continuing currency of the polemic, when in June 2017, Democrat Party assemblyman To Chonghwan stated, without citing evidence, that current domestic Korean research on Kaya is funded by Japan in order to maintain the Mimana Nihonfu interpretation.[79]

Alongside Mimana, pseudohistorians seek to further defame professional domestic historians by tracing their academic lineages to Japanese scholars and premising such lineages as the supposed reason establishment scholars should remain "loyal" to Japan.[80] This, again, is to be contrasted with pseudohistorians' own self-proclaimed independence activist lineages. However, the reality to this

latter claim, is that the intervening generation of pseudohistorians active during the Park Chung Hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi) era whose activities laid the foundation for the current day phenomenon—including establishing the colonial historiography polemic, propagating Taejonggyo and forging *Hwandan kogi*—all had privileged careers in the Japanese empire, and if judged by the same standard that pseudohistorians use against the academic establishment, would certainly be labelled as having been "arch collaborators."[81]

Making Korea Great Again?

While competing interpretations of Korea's contemporary history transparently align with political affiliations, visions of ancient greatness appeal across the political divide. Indeed, during the height of the government authored textbook dispute supported by New Right historians who were principally concerned with revising the account of modern and contemporary history, the inclusion of aggrandizing ancient history was touted by then education minister, Hwang Uyŏ to rebut charges of the project being pro-Japanese and anti-patriotic.[82]

In a 2013 Liberation Day address, then president Park Geun Hye stated, "According to the late Koryŏ scholar Yi Am, the nation is like the body to humans, history is like the soul." President Moon Jae In's historic September 2018 speech delivered in Pyongyang, meanwhile, included the line, "We have lived together for 5,000 years and lived divided for seventy." In the contexts in which they were delivered both utterances are relatively innocuous, if appropriately nationalistic in tone. Park's words, however, were lifted from *Hwandan kogi*, while Moon's figure of 5,000 years is derived from the foundation date of Old Chosŏn, premised on the assumed historicity of the Hwan'ung-Tan'gun myth.[83]

With the change of administrations, the textbook project promoted by the New Right was cancelled, but in 2018 the flow of pseudohistory publications showed no sign of abating. In Korean language the fallacies and chauvinistic nature of Korean pseudohistory are being more systematically exposed in both the academic and public arena by scholars associated with the Young Historians, as well as writer and blogger, Yi Munyŏng.[84] While alone they are unlikely to fully stem the tide, their cogent critiques are readily available for any Korean layperson willing to critically reconsider ideas that have long received official sanction and that remain closely entwined with both Koreas' postcolonial national identities.

Rather than the religiosity of Hindu nationalism or such as is inculcated in South Korea by Chŭngsando, perhaps the most tenacious force critical scholars of early Korea are competing against is the idea that history must serve the singular purpose of national revitalization and competition in the present. When

confronted with their own fallacies, the last line of defence resorted to by Korean pseudohistorians, and indeed, their starting premise, is that the notion of a grand ancient history is vital in countering Japan and China today. This is not to say that Korea's neighbours are historiographically innocent but Korean pseudohistorians would fight fire with fire; their disappointment with, and consequent targeting of, the Northeast Asia History Foundation was precisely because it supported methodologically sound research over promotion of an imaginary ancient empire.

The epidemic of Korean pseudohistory is certainly worthy of socio-political contextualization, and questions concerning its continuing appeal to the public, as well as, its close connections to political and new religious networks, should all be critically investigated; such endeavour may be illuminating of contemporary global post-truth discourses, as well as prescient in the context of evolving inter-Korean and East Asian political relations. However, any such research should not substitute the equally critical study of early northern East Asia which should proceed without obstruction from pseudohistory, and which has more to tell us about the actual development of human culture than we will learn from fantasies of ancient empire.

Notes

1. Transcripts of the hearings can be accessed in Korean from the National Assembly Minutes website, under a search for the committee "제19대국회 동북아역사왜곡대책특별위원회" likms.assembly.go.kr/record/. I would like to thank both the editors and anonymous reviewers for their sound suggestions on the drafts of this paper. Throughout this paper three words are used with particular meaning: "revisionist" refers to nationalist historiography authored during the colonial era; "historical" used as a qualifier refers to models of the past constituting professional consensus; "critical" is employed as an antonym to "pseudo."
2. Examples of "history of history" treatment include Logie 2016 and Xu 2016.
3. A non-exhaustive sample of recent publications, as well as republications includes: Chisŭng 2018, Chŏn 2017, Hwang 2017, Im 2018, Kim, Yi, Hong & Hwang 2017, Mun Sŏngjae 2016, Pak Kyŏngsun 2018, Ri 2018[1963], Sin 2018, Son 2017, Yang 2018, Yi Ch'angu 2018 and Yun 2017[1986].
4. For discussion of the history dispute over Koguryŏ, see Byington 2005.
5. Ki 2017 (1): 32, Fritze 2009: 12–16.
6. Fagan 2006: 30–42.
7. Understanding of Indian pseudohistory is based on Witzel (2006). Postcolonial characteristics may similarly be found in Chinese historiography, but owing to Korea and China's interconnected histories it would be hard to say whether such characteristics were diagnostic parallels or regionally contingent.
8. Recent critical Korean literature on the Shandong Dongyi includes Kim Chŏng-yŏl 2018, and Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan 2018.
9. The compilation dates for the official Chinese histories and the periods they cover are according to Wilkinson 2013: 626 (Table 112). For systematic analysis and diachronic distinction in pre and post Qin usages of "Dongyi" see Pak Chaebok 2018: 50–63.

10. The idea of Old Chosŏn Dongyi being the originators of Chinese culture began with early revisionist Sin Ch'aeho, but today the assertion is usually found within works influenced by Taejonggyo. The greatest variable is whether to claim Chinese logographic script as also being a Dongyi Korean innovation, or whether to contrast it negatively with the supposed early invention of a proto-han'gŭl type script. The latter has been favored by Sin and adopted into *Hwandan kogi* (1979), while the former was later professed by An Hosang (1979: 225); for a recent articulation of the former see the 2018 Hangul Day article, "Chinese writing was the creation of our Dongyi people" 한자는 우리 민족 동이족이 창제했다 www.sisapress.com/journal/article/177924 (accessed 2018.10.10).
11. Ramstedt 1928.
12. For discussion of Amuric, see Janhunen 2016.
13. For a cogent discussion see Janhunen 1996: 237 and Vovin 2005.
14. Typological similarities between the Altaic *type* languages are further present in the Uralic languages; this resurrected Ural-Altaic paradigm is now termed as Transeurasion, though this term is also used by Robbeets with assumptions of genetic affiliation. For critiques of Robbeets' work, see Vovin 2009 and Georg 2013.
15. Kim and Sin may be understood as the founding architects of revisionist historiography; in particular Sin's works, including *Chosŏn sanggo munhwasa* (朝鮮上古文化史 estimated c.1914) and *Chosŏn sanggosa* (朝鮮上古史 c.1924), provide the blueprint for the "charter empire" conceptualization of Old Chosŏn. For modern non-critical editions, see Sin 2006 and 2007. Ch'oe, meanwhile introduced folkoristic interpretations of the Hwan'ung-Tan'gun account.
16. The most influential empire advocates, whose works are the main concern of this article are Yun Naehyŏn and Yi Tŏgil: see Yi & Kim 2006, and Yi 2009, 2014 and 2015, and Yun 2017, 2014 (1 and 2) and 2013. Yi has also republished Ri Chirin's *Kojosŏn yŏngu*, as Ri 2018. Representative examples of pan-Altaic interpretations include Kim Unhoe 2006 and 2012, and Yi Kihun 2015.
17. This model begins with Sin Ch'aeho; the most influential recent iteration has been the work of Yun Naehyŏn, e.g. Yun 2017[1986].
18. This interpretation began with Sin Ch'aeho and is maintain by all empire advocates today.
19. The first treatment of "Old Chosŏn archaeology" is Ri 1963: 316–342, 399–410. For context of this work and the unlikelihood of it having been solely of Ri's authorship, see Kang 2018. Yi's methodology has been adopted by Yun Naehyŏn and Yi Tŏgil.
20. Only pan-Altaicists asserting Old Chosŏn's reach to the America's will show any interest in northeastern Asia beyond the Amur but usually only in the form of arrows depicting routes of migration across the Bering Strait, an early example being Pak 1970: 10.
21. Byington 2016 (1): 181–186.
22. Byington 2016 (1): 336 and 347.
23. For example, Yun 2017: 107 and the fold out map included in Yi Tŏgil & Kim (2016). For discussion of ManSen, see Tanaka 1993: 247–253.
24. For Lelang archaeology, Jung 2013 and An Chŏngjun 2016.
25. *Liaoshi* 38: 456–457 (Geography 2, Dongjing dao): 浿水, 亦曰泥河, 又曰蔚芋濼, 水多蔚芋之草. *Shengjing tongzhi* 25: 440: 淤泥河城北五十五里詳見海城縣 (Chinese Text Project).
26. *Shengjing tongzhi* 28: 353 (Old Ni): 古泥河… 明一統志從之又以朝鮮大通江為汨水考泥河在海城縣西南六十五里蓋平縣北五十里源出聖水山流至述真山散漫為遼時之蔚芋泊今為蔚芋濼水多蔚芋之草與朝鮮境內之浿江不同. 100: 37 (Liaoyang commandery 遼陽郡): 遼志云本漢浿水縣高麗改為句麗縣渤海為常樂縣浿水在漢樂浪郡今朝鮮界內金德常樂乃渤海中京顯德府縣名皆不在此.
27. *Shuijing zhu* 14: 浿水出樂浪鏤方縣, 東南過臨浿縣, 東入于海 (Chinese Text Project).
28. *Liaoshi* 38: 457 (Geography 2, Dongjing dao): 紫蒙縣. 本漢鏤芳縣地 (本漢鏤芳縣地 鏤芳, 漢書地理志·後漢書郡國志均作鏤方, 屬樂浪郡.) *Xin Tangshu* 39: 1021 (Geography 3, Pingzhou

Beiping jun): 平州北平郡… (永泰元年[765 CE]置. 有溫溝·白望·西狹石·東狹石·綠疇·米磚·長楊·黃花·紫蒙·白狼·昌黎·遼西等十二戍).

29. *Shiji* 朝鮮列傳第五十五 115: 2985 (Treatise 55, Chaoxian): 朝鮮王滿者, 故燕人也… 都王險 (集解 [*Jijie*] 徐廣曰 昌黎有險瀆縣也).
30. *Weishu* 106上: 2497 (Geography 2, part 5): 北平郡(秦置) 領縣二… 朝鮮(二漢·晉屬樂浪, 後罷. 延和元年[432 CE]徙 朝鮮民於肥如, 復置, 屬焉.) 昌新.
31. *Jinshu* 14: 427 (Geography 上, Pinzhou): 平州… 魏置東夷校尉, 居襄平, 而分遼東·昌黎·玄菟·帶方·樂浪五郡為平州, 後還合為幽州. 及文懿滅後, 有護東夷校尉, 居襄平. 咸寧二年[276 CE]十月, 分昌黎·遼東·玄菟·帶方·樂浪等郡國五置平州.
32. *Liaoshi* 38: 455 (Geography 2, Dongjingdao) 東京遼陽府, 本朝鮮之地… 武帝元封三年, 定 朝鮮為真番·臨屯·樂浪·玄菟四郡.
33. See Byington 2013: 320–332, and Byington 2016 (2): 31–70.
34. *Hanshu* 28下: 1625 (Geography 8下, Liaoxi): 遼西郡, (秦置… 屬幽州)… 縣十四… 且慮, 海陽, 新安平, 柳城, 令支, 肥如, 賓從, 交黎, 陽樂, 狐蘇, 徒河, 文成, 臨渝.
35. For a crucial discussion of conflations inherent in the *Liaoshi* geography, see Byington 2016 (1): 322–326.
36. Wang 2015: 366n70 citing Jiang 2011.
37. Byington 2016 (1): 52.
38. Sin Ch'aeho suggested the Luan while Ri Chirin argued for Dalinghe (大凌河). Yun Naehyŏn and Yi Tŏgil both argue the Luan.
39. *Shiji* 110: 2886 (Xiongnu treatise): 燕亦築長城, 自造陽至襄平. 置上谷·漁陽·右北平·遼西·遼東郡以拒胡. *Sanguozhi* 30: 850 (Dongyi treatise): 侯準既僭號稱王, 為燕亡人衛滿所攻奪 (魏略曰… 燕乃遣將秦開攻其西方, 取地二千餘里, 至滿番汗為界, 朝鮮遂弱. 及秦并天下, 使蒙恬築長城, 到遼東). For detailed parsing, see Byington 2016 (1): 41–45.
40. *Shiji* 2: 52 (Xia basic annals): 夾右碣石, 入于海 (索隱 [*Suoyin*] 地理志云 碣石山在北平驪城縣西南. 太康地理志云 樂浪遂城縣有碣石山, 長城所起).
41. *Tongdian* 186 (Frontier 2, Koguryŏ): 碣石山在漢樂浪郡遂成縣, 長城起於此山. 今驗長城東截遼水而入高麗, 遺址猶存 (按尚書云:「夾右碣石入於河.」右碣石即河赴海處, 在今北平郡南二十餘里, 則高麗中為左碣石) (Chinese Text Project).
42. *Samguk sagi* 14: 2 (Koguryŏ Annals, Taemusin 15/4): 王子好童遊於沃沮, 樂浪王崔理出行. *Samguk sagi* 1: 1 (Silla Annals, Yuri 14): 十四年, 高句麗王無恤, 襲樂浪滅之. 其國人五千來投, 分居六部. *Samguk yusa* 1: 1 (Wondrous records 1, Nangnang guk): 樂浪國.
43. Oh 2013.
44. *Xin Tangshu* 220: 6203 (Dongyi treatise, Silla): 武德… 後三年 [620], 拜柱國, 封樂浪郡王·新羅王. *Samguk sagi* 4 (Silla Annals, Chinhŭng 26/2 [565]): 北齊武成皇帝詔, 以王爲使持節·東夷校尉·樂浪郡公·新羅王; (Chinp'yŏng 16 [594]): 隋帝詔, 拜王爲上開府·樂浪郡公·新羅王 (Chinp'yŏng 46/3 [624]): 唐高祖降使, 冊王爲柱國·樂浪郡公·新羅王. *Samguk sagi* 5: (Sŏndŏk 4 [635]): 唐遣使持節, 冊命王爲柱國·樂浪郡公·新羅王, 以襲父封. *Samguk sagi* 8: (Sŏngdŏk 12/10 [713]): 降詔書, 封王爲驃騎將軍·特進·行左威衛大將軍·使持節·大都督雞林州諸軍事·雞林州刺史·上柱國·樂浪郡公·新羅王.
45. On the medieval Samhan—Three Kingdoms conflation, see Breuker 2010: 30.
46. *Liaoshi* 39: 481 (Geography 3, Chungjing dao) 高州… 統縣一: 三韓縣. 辰韓為扶餘, 弁韓為新羅, 馬韓為高麗. 開泰中, 聖宗伐高麗, 俘三國之遺人置縣. 戶五千.
47. *Shengjing tongzhi* 6: 盛京 (箕子避地朝鮮 武王卽其地封之 遂爲朝鮮界) 蓋平縣, 周(屬朝鮮 本辰韓地), 開平縣: 漢 (屬扶餘國). As cited in Bae 2014: 296n102. The association of Chinhan may have been at least partly derived from an earlier tradition wherein Parhae termed itself Chin.
48. *Manzhou yuanliu kao* 2 (Samhan): 方位準之蓋在今奉天東北吉林一帶壤接朝鮮與我國朝始基之地相. *Manzhou yuanliu kao* 6 (Samhan subordinate polities 三韓屬國): 謹案三韓在夫餘挹婁二國之南, 所統凡七十八國, 合方四千里. 馬韓在西, 辰韓在東, 弁韓在辰韓之南. 馬韓北與樂浪接, 所轄則在今蓋平復州寧海. *Manzhou yuanliu kao* 7 (Nine Silla provinces 新羅九州): 謹按新羅始附庸於百濟後兼加羅任那諸國與百濟為鄰考其疆土東南並有今朝鮮之慶尚江原二道西北直至今

吉林烏拉又西近開原鐵嶺… 渤海為契丹所侵於是新羅西與契丹以海州巖淵縣為界西北與契丹以鴨淥江東八里黃土嶺為界矣雞林州之名始於唐龍朔三年以其國為雞林州大都督府國王世襲都督之號以音譯及地理考之即今吉林.

49. An example citing *Manzhou yuanliu kao* is Yi 2009: 213–214.
50. This interpretation originates with Sin Ch'aeho.
51. Yi 2009: 171–219, Yi 2014: 327–337 and Yi 2015: 231–298.
52. *Sanguozhi* 30: 849 (Wuhuan Xianbei Dongyi treatise 30, Han): 馬韓在西… 有..伯濟國. 30: 852–853: 弁辰亦十二國… (853) 有.. 弁辰狗邪國… 斯盧國. For an English translation of the *Sanguozhi* Han accounts, see Byington 2009.
53. Best 2006: 8, 31 and 58, and McBride (forthcoming).
54. For an overview of Hongshan, Guo 1995; for recent critical discussion in Korean, Hong Ŭngyŏng 2018. For representative treatment of Hongshan in pseudohistory and new religion U Silha 2007, An 2012: 100–113, An 2014: 175–187, Chŏng Kŏnjae 2015, and Yi Ch'angu 2018.
55. The Shang-Dongyi equation was first hypothesized in works by Chinese scholars including Wang Guowei's (王國維 1877–1927) *Yin buci zhong suojian xiangong xian wang kao* (殷卜辭中所見先公先王考 1921) and Fu Shijian's (傅斯年 1896–1950) *Yixia dongxi shuo* (夷夏東西說 1933), however, with the excavation of further Shang oracle texts, the Shang capitals are now confidently associated with the Erligang and Anyang (Yinxu) sites of Henan, west of Shandong. K'ohen 2018: 152 and Yi Yup'yo 2018: 354, 364.
56. This is not to demean the communities that did construct the Hongshan sites and artefacts, and nor to say that the articles of civilization listed above should be the only scale by which to measure human civilization; both Hongshan and dolmen mortuary sites may be better situated in "alternative complexities" discourses, or compared with the megalithic sites of the British Isles such as Maeshowe (Orkney) or Stonehenge.
57. *Shijing* 3: 7 (Decade of Tang): 王錫韓侯·其追其貊. Byington 2016 (1): 32–34.
58. In the case of Pyongyang, the immediate mountain is Myohyang.
59. These hypotheses were first articulated by Sin Ch'aeho and Ch'oe Namsŏn. See Sin 2006: 89; on Ch'oe's "Way of Pârk" hypothesis, see Allen 1990 and Logie 2016: 290–297.
60. *Shanhaijing* 10 (Northern wastes 大荒北經): 大荒之中, 有山名曰不咸. 有肅慎氏之國 (Chinese Text Project).
61. *Sanguozhi* 30: 848 (Wuhuan Xianbei Dongyi treatise 30, Yilou): 挹婁在夫餘東北千餘里… 古之肅慎氏之國也. *Jinshu* 97: 2534 (Treatise 67, Sushen) 肅慎氏一名挹婁, 在不咸山北.
62. Byington 2016 (1): 36n27.
63. In reality the word Purham is in fact derived from "Buddha" via Chinese, and therefore cannot be evidence for a pre Buddhist civilization (Juha Janhunen—personal communication).
64. Recent Taejonggyo type histories include Yi Kangsik 2014 and Chŏn 2017. It should also be noted that Yun Naehyŏn is a prominent Taejonggyo practitioner, as was An Hosang, on whose exegeses of "ancient Dongyi philosophy" Yun clearly draws. An 1964 and Yun 2014: 40–71.
65. Foundational works are Kim Kyohŏn 1904 & 1914.
66. Im 1986.
67. See blogpost by Yi Munyŏng "Is it Hwan'guk or Hwan'in?" 환국인가, 환인인가 orumi.egloos.com/7419509 (accessed 2018.10.10). The theory is also found in An 2012: 25 and An 2014: 119.
68. See Im 1986: 67 or An 2012: 222.
69. In addition to the annotations, An's scheme is laid out in a four chapter introduction, An 2012: 14–165. Therein Chapter 3 explicating Korea's ancient philosophy draws heavily from Taejonggyo, while Chapter 4 introduces the tenets of *kaebyŏk* (開闢) millenarianism.

An's main books on *kaebyŏk* similarly incorporate multiple references to *Hwandan kogi*, see An 2014: 108.

70. An 2012: 144 and An 2014: 96.
71. An 2012: 61, and Pak 1993 and Pak 1994 respectively.
72. See Ki 2017 (2).
73. On the ahistorical nature of the solar eclipses recorded in the Paekche annal, see Best 2006: 58–59. For a critique of Pak 1994, see Lee 2008.
74. Prominent examples include Ch'oe Chaesŏk (sociology), Kim Unhoe (economics), U Silha (sociology) and Wontack Hong (economics). In this instance, Yun Naehyŏn and Yi Tŏgil are aberrant for having trained as historians.
75. Schmid 2002: 171–198, 233–236 Xu 2016: 96–106.
76. Chief among this pantheon are Kim Kyohŏn and Sin Ch'aeho.
77. See Sin Kayŏng 2016.
78. Yi 2014: 337 and Yi 2015: 270.
79. *Han'gyore* 한겨레2017.6.6. "[Exclusive] To Chonghwan responds to criticism of [his] view of history "I'll fight when I have to" "[단독] 도종환, '역사관 비판' 반박 "싸울 땐 싸우겠다" www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/797721.html (accessed 2018.10.10).
80. Yi 2009: 50 *passim*, 2014: 195, 232, 360 *passim*.
81. Prominent examples among this generation include: Ch'oe Tong (1896–1973), a medical doctor and colonial era Catholic leader; An Hosang (1902–1999), a self-proclaimed Hitler admirer and former professor of Keijō Imperial University; Mun Chŏngch'ang, who worked in the colonial administration; and Pak Ch'ang-am, a former Kwantung Army officer who adopted the pen name Manju ("Manchuria"). Their representative pseudohistorical works include Ch'oe 1966, An 1964 &1979, and Mun 1969 & 1979; Pak was editor of *Chayu* ("Freedom/Liberty" est. 1968), the journal through which pseudohistorians published.
82. See "President Park's *Hwandan kogi* quotation, the reason for touching on early history" 환단고기 인용했던 박 대통령, 고대사 건드리는 이유는 http://m.mediatoday.co.kr/?mod=news&act=articleView&idxno=125897#Redyho (accessed 2018.10.10).
83. Park's words are a translation of "國猶形 史猶魂 形可失魂而保乎" found in the preface to the "Tan'gun segi" section of *Hwandan kogi*, the compilation of which is attributed to Yi Am (李嵒 1297–1364), see An 2012: 204. Although Yi Am is a historical personage, the line itself is believed to be a paraphrase from Pak Ŭnsik's *Hanguk t'ongsa* (韓國痛史 1915). See Yi Munyŏng "The presidents *Hwandan kogi* quotation" 대통령의 환단고기 인용 http://orumi.egloos.com/4823408 (accessed 2018.10.10).
84. See Chŏlmŭn yŏksa hakcha moim 2017 and 2018, and Yi Munyŏng's blog *Chorokpul ŭi chaphak tasik* 초록불의 잡학다식 orumi.egloos.com.

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Investigating Tragedy at Sea: The *Ukishima-maru* Incident and its Legacy

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Abstract

On August 22, 1945 the *Ukushima-maru* set sail from the northern Japanese port city of Ōminato with the apparent intention of delivering an undisclosed number of Koreans to Pusan, Korea. The laborers had been both recruited and conscripted for construction work necessary to fortify the naval base that had been strategically located in this remote location decades from the time of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War to monitor ship traffic between the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. Two days later, while skirting the Japan Sea/East Sea side of Honshu island, the ship suddenly detoured into Maizuru Harbor in Kyoto prefecture, where it exploded sending hundreds, perhaps thousands of Koreans, and 25 Japanese to their watery grave. While other ships met similar fates after the guns of the AsiaPacific wars fell silent, the *Ukishima-maru* incident is unique in the cause of the explosion that sank the ship remains a mystery. While the Japanese government insists that a sea mine sank the ship, Korean groups continue to maintain that it was the Japanese navy that intentionally caused the explosion to sink it. This paper aims to first identify the points of contention by following the ship from its Ōminato departure to its Maizuru sinking. It then considers the ramifications for the incident remaining unresolved. In what ways might Japan adopt more positive means toward assisting investigations that seek resolution and closure? Is non-resolution truly in its interests, or might its failure to resolve this incident (and other outstanding colonial-era issues) return to haunt the Japanese government? Does non-resolution strengthen the colonial narrative

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that Koreans have scripted that frames Japanese colonial-era ambitions as seeking a long-term goal of cultural genocide?

Keywords: Korean History, Colonial Korea, Korean–Japanese Relations, Unresolved Memory, Historical Disputes

Introduction

At around 17:10 on August 24, 1945, just over a week after the Japanese emperor announced his country's intention to accept the Allied forces' surrender terms, the *Ukishima-maru* suddenly exploded as it entered the western Japan port of Maizuru. The explosion lifted the hull of the 114-meter, 4,730 ton transport ship straight up from the water in an inverted V-shape before it plunged into the sea. The ship had departed two days previous from the port town of Ōminato, Aomori Prefecture to repatriate thousands of Korean laborers. This tragic story did not end with the ship's sinking. Though other ships carrying repatriating peoples would suffer similar fates[2] the *Ukishima-maru* incident is unique in that even its most fundamental details—the cause of the explosion and the number of victims it claimed—continues to be debated. Did the ship sink accidentally after contacting a sea mine or did the Japanese navy intentionally destroy the vessel? Several investigations, both private and public, have produced a number of publications, documentaries, and films that suggest Japanese guilt and Korean victimhood,[3] one of the more recent being the popular 2000 North Korean film *Souls Protest* (K. *Sar'a innŭn ryŏnghondŭl*, 2000, Director Kim Ch'in-song) discussed toward the end of this paper. While the available evidence falls short of substantiating this conclusion, less than enthusiastic cooperation by Japanese authorities to investigate the cause of the ship's sinking, along with actions that suggest attempts to impede these efforts, have strengthened suspicions of Japanese culpability for the ship's sinking and the deaths of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Korean passengers.[4]

The incident has left in its wake several unresolved issues from the time the *Ukishima-maru* set sail from the lonely northern Japanese port of Ōminato: explanation of why the ship departed so soon after the war's end, before formal repatriation operations had begun; the location of records that detail the number of people who boarded the ship at the time of departure; the logic behind the crew choosing the inefficient, and potentially more dangerous, coastal route over the more direct route across the open seas; and the reasoning and timing behind its decision to detour into Maizuru Harbor rather than advance directly

to Pusan. Questions also remain about the explosion itself: whether the ship was carrying explosives; the number of detonations; and the number of people who perished from the incident. Suspicions of Japanese culpability strengthened during efforts to investigate the incident: the premature reduction of the primary piece of evidence, the *Ukishima-maru*, to scrap metal before it had been properly examined, and claims of witness tampering.

Time has eroded most known material and memory evidence to all but eliminate any chance of definitive conclusion being reached regarding the fate of the *Ukishima-maru*. The incident, along with other unresolved colonial-era atrocities, contributes to what Ann Stoler terms "imperial debris" of occupation rule.[5] Secondary "debris" of this incident is how the news of the ship's sinking, perhaps spread verbally by survivors who gravitated to Korean communities in Japan, affected repatriating decisions by Japan-based Koreans. As the majority of those directly affected by this incident have long passed, memories of this debris are preserved through second generation recollections passed down by the survivors and witnesses to the explosion, as well as through education institutions such as museum displays, cinema scripts, and more recently Internet sites. In the case of the *Ukishima-maru* these mediums tend to be utilized by victims' groups, the collective memory that they create draws on a general feeling of victimization that renders the possible as probable, or even verified, fact that leaves little margin for debate over the possibility of alternative scenarios.[6] These conclusions benefit from a Japanese silence that has stubbornly resisted Korean demands for cooperation. The *Ukishima-maru* incident on occasion finds its way into Japanese courtrooms. The purpose of this paper is to explore the tragedy of the *Ukishima-maru* as one example of this "imperial debris," and to consider the long- and short-term consequences of this and other such unresolved issues.

Ōminato and its Korean Residents

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Koreans were recruited, and later conscripted, for war-related work projects throughout Japan. One location for such projects was in the city of Ōminato in northern Aomori Prefecture first to extend a railway line and then to build facilities needed to protect a military instillation. The Ōminato Guard District (*keibifu*) was founded as a major Japanese naval base around the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) to monitor ship movement through the Tsugaru straits that separated the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. During the Asia Pacific wars Japan used the base as a springboard to attack Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands off of Alaska. The United States responded by targeting the base for aerial bombing attacks.[7] The

need to protect Ōminato increased exponentially toward the end of the war as defeat neared and the fear of Allied land invasion intensified. These threats led to the Japanese military requisitioning the construction of the Kabayama airbase to fortify the naval base.

The construction project required labor which the navy imported, primarily that conscripted from the Korean peninsula but also from among "free" workers recruited from different parts of Japan. Recruited labor may have differed from "conscripted" labor in name but not necessarily in practice, as suggested in Aoyama Torazō's account of how he "recruited" Korean labor. Offered 15 yen for every laborer he gathered, Aoyama turned first to local village offices in Korea for assistance in rounding up the laborers. He recalls, once Korean males had assembled at a local hotel they were immediately issued work garb, the donning of which certified them as "recruited laborers" to be dispatched via Pusan to mines and factories in Japan.[8] Kim Tongsŏp's case informs of this process from the Korean laborer's perspective. Married with four children he was brought to the local town office in Korea's South Ch'ungch'ong province where other Koreans had been gathered to be "pulled [*kkullyokatta*] to Japan." Upon arrival in Ōminato he was put to work at the Kabayama air base construction site where he was paid 70 won per month to lay a runway and build a large hanger for the airplanes.[9]

Laborers and their handlers remember the difficult situation that the Koreans faced at the northern Japan site, conditions echoed by others who labored at other work sites across the Japanese empire. The jobs to which they were assigned in Ōminato included their carving through Mt. Kamabuse to extend the railway and through the area's hilly terrain to construct runways and facilities required for the new airbase, work assignments that were reportedly more dangerous than the work assigned to their Japanese counterparts.[10] Working conditions were Spartan. Kim Sŏngdae, who also hailed from Korea's South Ch'ungch'ŏng province, recalled the "terrible food and tiring working conditions that pushed him to the limits of exertion."[11] Yun Hwisu, who was assigned to level a hill to build the airfield and later to construct a runway and a large hanger reports that the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter were despicable, more appropriate for cattle or pigs. Many injured laborers went without treatment. Yun saw little of his 70-won monthly salary, which was deposited and recorded in a deposit book that he ("stupidly") lost.[12]

The housing provided for the laborers mirrored their harsh working conditions. One son of a Japanese overseer verified that the structure that served as the laborers living space resembled a dark "scallop shack" (*hotate goya*), the space of which measured the equivalent of 2.5 tatami mats (approximately 15 x 7 feet). The Koreans collected grass and straw to make their bedding that they

laid out on a barren floor. These conditions alone caused an untold number of deaths among the laborers.

Japanese residing in the area corroborated the Korean laborers' recollections of harsh treatment. Yamamoto Saburō remembers Koreans being addressed by impersonal numbers rather than by their names ("Hey 7" or "Don't slack off 6"). Aoyama Torazō verified that while both Japanese and Koreans labored at the site, the division of labor separated the two people, and ensured that Koreans were assigned the more dangerous work. He noted that the workload and urgency to complete the project intensified as the U.S. bombing raids became more frequent and the fear of Allied land invasion increased accordingly.[13] Corporal, and even capital, punishment served as a control mechanism. Those caught trying to escape faced severe beatings and even "public lynching."[14]

It is probable that at one point records existed that contained the basic information on the Koreans brought to Ōminato, yet to date a complete record has not surfaced. Most probably such documents were included in the postwar burnings. The rising smoke reported by witnesses following defeat indicates that the Japanese here, like in other parts of the empire, destroyed potentially damaging files prior to the arrival of occupation troops.[15] In the haste to relocate the Koreans from Ōminato it is quite possible that the Japanese never bothered to register the basic information of those who boarded the *Ukishima-maru*, including whether any Koreans refused to board the ship. Without this information there remains little hope of ascertaining the number of laborers that the ill-fated ship carried, much less how many of these Koreans succumbed after the ship sank in Maizuru Harbor.

The haste in which the Japanese sought to clear Koreans from the Ōminato area reflected the panic that spread here and throughout the empire following the emperor's sudden announcement that Japan would accept the Allied surrender demands. Japan's uncertain future caused ill-founded rumors to rapidly spread from this time. One elementary school teacher, Akimoto Ryōji, recalled one such rumor that had "all commissioned officers being arrested and exiled to Australia." This uncertainty no doubt led to predictions over how Koreans would react upon learning of their country's liberation. Would they seek vengeance? Would they assist the approaching occupation armies? One Japanese witness recalls paranoia setting in among the colonizers as Korean "*manse*!" [J. *banzai*, literally "live for 10,000 years] chants grew in volume as the now liberated laborers paraded through the streets of Ōminato.[16]

Japanese, in an attempt to encourage the Koreans to board the *Ukishima-maru*, warned the laborers that they too faced punishment after the Allied forces arrived. Yi Yŏngchul offered a different twist to the anticipated power shift. He believed, to the contrary, that the Japanese feared that the Koreans would cooperate with

the occupying forces: "If the Americans began killing the Japanese it would be the Koreans who helped them," just like the Americans helped Koreans liberate their country from Japanese rule.[17] Was it the uncertainty over the now postwar situation coupled with Japanese having to coexist among a sizeable, liberated Korean population in this isolated part of Japan that encouraged the decision to quickly relocate them? Or, was this decision a cost-saving measure: the Japanese hoping to escape from having to compensate the Koreans for their labor and from reimbursing the "savings" that the company automatically deducted from their wages?[18]

Departure from Ōminato and Detour into Maizuru

The *Ukishima-maru* was built in 1937 by the Osaka Merchant Ship Company to transport people between Osaka and Okinawa. In September 1941 the Japanese navy requisitioned the ship for wartime purposes. In this capacity it served as the primary vessel along the Aomori (Honshu)—Hakodate (Hokkaido) run. Along this route, in April 1945, the ship encountered torpedo attacks from Allied submarines.[19] On August 15 the ship embarked for Hakodate on what its crewmembers believed would be their last wartime mission. To their dismay they returned to Aomori to learn that the ship had been scheduled to make one more "final mission": to transport Korean laborers from Ōminato to (presumably) Pusan on the southernmost coast of the newly liberated (but still Japan-administered) Korean peninsula.

The crewmembers' protests to this added assignment offers clues toward understanding the *Ukishima-maru*'s sad fate in their providing one possible reason for the ship's detour into Maizuru Harbor. Kim Ch'angjŏng's interviews with surviving crewmembers suggest that they had limited knowledge as to why the Koreans were in Ōminato, much less why they must repatriate them.[20] They were also concerned over the reception they would receive should they enter Korean territory: Would the Koreans seek retribution after the ship entered their homeland waters? One crewmember, First Class officer Kokufuji Gen, recalls his mistaken fear that the quickly advancing Soviet military would occupy the entire peninsula. Would the occupiers seize the ship, arrest the Japanese, and send them to Siberia for forced labor?

> How stupid! … The war was over so why did we have to go to Korea? The Soviets had entered the war and their military was going to occupy the peninsula. If we went there for sure they would have captured us. There were many reasons given but truth be told we felt that we had endured the war and survived. Why go out to sea again? We simply wanted to be deactivated and allowed to return home.[21]

The crewmembers laced their objections with threats of mutiny if forced to board the ship. While three did manage to escape prior to departure, they did so with the threat, if caught, of capital punishment hanging over their heads.[22] Perhaps the anger expressed by crewmembers succeeded in their forging a compromise in the ship's destination—to a Japanese port in Honshu rather than to Pusan.

A second fear may have stemmed from a genuine concern over the safety of the ship and for their personal safety during the voyage that would hug Japan's coasts. This course apparently was necessary because all sea charts had been destroyed, thus making it difficult for the officers to navigate the ship across the high seas.[23] However, by hugging the coast the *Ukishima-maru* risked contacting one of the 55,347 sea mines that U.S. B-29 bombers had littered along the Japanese coasts to prevent Japanese military ships from going out to sea.[24] It is difficult to imagine that minesweeping operations, entrusted to the Japanese, had advanced enough to ensure safe passage just one week after Japan had made the decision to surrender. Even the emperor's sudden announcement had not halted all military activity along these coasts where *kamikaze* pilots reportedly continued their attacks on Allied ships.[25]

Reports on the *Ukishima-maru* incident suggest the possibility that crewmembers had prior knowledge of the ship's unfortunate destiny. Other points support arguments that the ship never intended to sail to Korea. The limited fuel and supplies that the *Ukishima-maru* carried—enough for a one-way trip to Pusan or a round trip to a Japanese port such as Maizuru—suggests that the ship would make a call at a Japanese port either to replenish supplies (perhaps before advancing to Pusan), or as a terminal stop. If the latter, it would be fair to question what the Japanese intended to do with the Koreans had the ship arrived in Maizuru without incident.

The most frequently used assumption to justify this detour into Maizuru centers on the Navigation Prohibition directive that General Douglas MacArthur issued to the Japanese government from the Philippines on August 20, 1945, two days prior to the *Ukishima-maru*'s departure. In this Prohibition, the future Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) included five provisions that the Japanese needed to complete by 18:00 on August 24, one of which was that all Japanese ships were to have immediately removed any explosives they might be carrying to be stored safely on shore. The directive further ordered ships over 100 tons to

> report their positions in plain language immediately to the nearest United States, British, or Soviet radio station. They will proceed to the nearest Allied port or such port as the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, may direct and will await further orders.[26]

The directive did not elaborate on what directions the Allied navies might have issued had the *Ukishima-maru* complied with this directive by reporting its position and reason for the voyage. There is also no indication that the *Ukishima-maru* ever contacted an Allied radio station as the Prohibition ordered. Indeed, a fair question is whether this directive was ever passed on to the *Ukishima-maru* or to any other Japanese ship. Instead the Japanese government issued the "Directive of the Open Seas [*taikairei*] No. 52" which simply declared it "illegal" for such ships to be out of port after 18:00 on August 24 while omitting the direction for ships to contact an Allied radio station.[27]

Whether the Navigation Prohibition (or more probably the Japanese directive) caused the *Ukishima-maru* to detour into Maizuru Harbor is contingent on the timing in which it reached the ship's officers. Had the orders arrived prior to departure, the ship's captain could have easily concluded it to be impossible to complete the journey to Pusan before the imposed curfew. If so, a logical follow-up question is why the ship departed even though it could not reach its stated destination. Only if the order had arrived en route does the decision to detour into Maizuru Harbor make sense. Here, however, interview data is inconclusive. Onadera Kazuichi, who served as the ship's communications officer, contends that the directive did not arrive until the morning of August 24, just as the ship passed the Noto peninsula.[28] Yet others, including crewmembers interviewed for the documentary *Han no Umi* (Sea of distress), claim this to be untrue: officers were aware of a directive in time to reschedule plans. One account of the ship's sinking claims that a telegram with this information reached the ship's captain on August 22 at 19:20, just short of three hours before departure.[29] This appears more logical as certainly the Japanese government would have ensured that the *Ukishima-maru* officers received this directive prior to leaving port. Here, too, one might expect the existence of documentation detailing this rather fundamental piece of information. However, to this day none has surfaced.

To convince Koreans to board the ship the Japanese would have had to assure them that the ship's ultimate destination was a Korean port, such as Pusan. How successful they were remains an open question as no exact number of Korean passengers appears available. Estimates vary wildly from a conservative Japanese government estimate of 3,735 (plus an additional 225 Japanese crewmembers) to inflated estimates ranging from 6,700 to even 10,000 Koreans crowding onto a ship originally designed to transport 841 people (plus cargo). As for the number of deceased Japanese official records count 524 Koreans and 25 Japanese perishing from the ship's sinking. Korean estimates rise as high as 5,000.[30] Part of the reason for the large discrepancy between official (Japanese government) and unofficial (mostly Korean) casualty estimates is that the lower figure calculated only those

bodies discovered just after the explosion. Officials did not adjust this figure after more bodies surfaced at the time the ship was raised in 1950. As we shall see below, unreliable means for determining the number of people who boarded the ship and perished after its sinking would later frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate their presence on the ship at the time of its departure, thus providing Japanese courts reason to reject their claims for compensation.[31]

Intentional Implosion or Accidental Explosion: What Sank the *Ukishima-maru*?

The development of the city of Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture began as a naval base in 1901. Like Ōminato its importance grew after the Japanese went to war with Russia in 1904. Inaugurated as a city in 1943, it soon became engulfed in the battles of the Pacific War. Just prior to the war's end the United States dropped a rather large bomb on the city that some contend served as a trial mission for the *Enola Gay* crew who days later detonated the atomic bomb over Hiroshima.[32] Between June 30 and August 8, 1945 the U.S. military planted hundreds of sea mines into Maizuru Harbor to prevent Japanese war ships from exiting. Soon after the war the U.S. entrusted the Japanese navy with the responsibility of clearing the sea of these mines.[33]

Regardless of whether the ship's intended destination was Pusan or a Japanese port such as Maizuru, the cause of the explosion that sank the *Ukishima-maru* remains at the center of this controversy. The ship's detour into a Japanese port would not be an issue if not for the tragic loss of life. Resolving the mysteries surrounding the sinking of the *Ukishima-maru* thus lies in ascertaining the cause of the explosion. Here, too, unresolved questions have frustrated investigations. Had Maizuru Harbor been cleared of sea mines beforehand? Did actions by the Japanese crew, some reportedly seen escaping by lifeboats just before the explosion, signal that it had been the Japanese navy that planned the implosion? Do reports by passengers and witnesses of multiple detonations and of the lack of a water column rising from the sea support the conclusion that an internal, and thus intentional, implosion sank the ship? What clues might the sunken vessel have revealed had it been properly examined prior to its reduction to scrap iron in 1954?

The importance of the naval base would suggest its high priority in completing minesweeping operations to allow Japanese ships to safely comply with the August 24 curfew imposed by the Navigation Prohibition. Had the Japanese navy ordered the detour of ships such as the *Ukishima-maru* into Maizuru one could assume that minesweeping operations had been completed. Kim Ch'anjŏng's

comprehensive study acknowledges that ships did contact sea mines in Maizuru prior to the *Ukishima-maru*'s arrival. However, Kim documents at least ten ships safely entering the port on August 24 with the Navigation Prohibition deadline causing a sudden increase in sea traffic. He thus calculates the chances of the *Ukishima-maru* contacting a sea mine upon entering the harbor to have been "slim at best." It would have been an extraordinary stroke of bad luck had it done so despite following the same sea route as other ships that entered without incident.[34] Others disagree. Crewmember Umegaki Seiji explains that the ships that passed through safely were smaller than the *Ukishima-maru* thus affording them easier access into the harbor.[35] The possibility of a mine drifting into the ship's path also cannot be overruled. One report concluded that the harbor had not been declared completely safe until 1952, seven years after the accident.[36]

Whether the *Ukishima-maru* was sunk by a single or multiple detonations is another disputed point that also holds possible clues towards understanding the ship's fate. A single detonation gives plausibility to both theories—external explosion or internal implosion; multiple detonations favor slightly the latter over the former. Yet another possibility is a combination of both an external and internal detonation—both a sea mine and explosives within the ship's hull causing the ship to sink. This assumes that the ship originally carried explosives and that they had not been removed as ordered. A recently discovered Japanese Ministry of Defense document supports this: there is no indication that the ship's crew had complied with this order as witnesses did not recall seeing crewmembers dispose of any.[37] Similar to other evidence cited to support the internal implosion theory this conclusion must be considered with caution unless it can be better substantiated. Like the multiple explosion theory,[38] this information teases, but falls short of, the formation of a sustainable conclusion. Because no one recalls seeing crewmembers removing the explosives does not prove that they were there in the first place.

Other questionable events surround the incident. Several reports highlight suspicious actions by crewmembers that suggest their having prior knowledge of Japanese intentions to implode the ship. One survivor, Chung Jon sik, reported overhearing suspicious comments and witnessing Japanese fleeing from the ship prior to the ship's explosion. From this he concluded that the Japanese had triggered an explosion for the purpose of killing Korean laborers. His testimony, which appeared in a September 24, 1945 *G-2 U.S. Periodic Report* exactly one month after the incident, read as follows:

> On 22 August 1945, some 6700 Korean laborers and factory workers and their families of the OMINATO Naval Yards were told that they would be returned to KOREA. They departed aboard the UKIJIMA with a crew of Japanese sailors

> and officers. The warship arrived and anchored outside the harbor of MAIZURU (KYUSHU) JAPAN. After dumping the cargo overboard, the workers and their families were ordered to go to their compartments where they were beaten with swords and bamboo spears. The Japanese crew then debarked in small boats. Immediately after they left, a terrific explosion on the UKIJIMA caused it to sink, causing heavy casualties. The informant believes that this was planned because of the sailors' remarks, "We feel sorry for the children."[39]

That Chung's recollections erroneously placed Maizuru in Kyushu, strongly suggests passenger belief that the ship was heading for Pusan. His concluding that the Japanese intentionally imploded the ship on the basis of a simple statement, one devoid of context, is weak but strengthened by other rumors that the ship would be "sunk if it reached Niigata."[40]

Another Korean remembers hearing Japanese sailors yell "kill the bastards" (*yatsu wo korose*) as bodies flew into the water. This witness was a Mr. Paek who served as a Korean member of the Japanese military police (*kenpeitai*) under the adopted Japanese name of Minami. Koreans in his position were often given the task of watching over Korean labor due to their proficiency in the Korean language and their knowledge of Korean customs and mannerisms. His "implosion eyewitness explanation" that appeared in the May 24, 1965 edition of the *Chosŏn sinbo* reported that Paek warned fellow passengers that the "ship is going to sink. The Japanese intentionally imploded it to kill us all," as he dove from the ship's deck.[41] Yet, his story, rather than told first hand in Paek's words, was relayed by others, one being Kim Tonggyŏng whose elder brother had become close to the military policeman after surviving the sinking. Paek also claimed that the sinking was intentional because the explosion's failure to cause a water column rising about 10 meters from the sea in a way that he had seen other sea mines explode.[42] It is not clear what happened to Paek, but he was not around to testify at court hearings later in the century. Nor could his widow be found to offer what she might have learned from him regarding the incident.[43] While intriguing, decontextualized statements based on hearsay fall short of providing the convincing "smoking gun" that a Japanese court would require to render a verdict in the Koreans' favor. Also missing from this and other accounts is explanation for the loss of 25 Japanese lives. On the other hand, the Japanese failure to provide convincing answers to the charges and its reluctance to cooperate more positively in the investigations renders this circumstantial evidence as "fact" in the minds of intentional implosion conspiracy proponents.

Investigating Disaster: Efforts to Resolve the Case of the *Ukishima-maru*

Since the time of the incident several formal investigations have been organized to ascertain the cause of the *Ukishima-maru*'s sinking. None, however, have rendered conclusive evidence to quell primarily Korean suspicions of intentional implosion. The Japanese have been able to deflect these accusations by insisting that the accusers assume the burden of proof, while they maintain control over any available evidence needed to resolve the mysteries surrounding the incident. As mentioned above, evidence, both material and human, required by the victims to argue their case has not surfaced. As for documentary evidence, is it possible that important information regarding the Korean laborers had existed at one time, only to be destroyed along with other sensitive documents by Japanese officials at the naval base soon after surrender?

The initial report on the sinking appeared in the Korean language *Pusan ilbo* on September 18, 1945, just under one month after the incident. This was followed by other newspaper reportage that appeared in the Japanese language *Keijō* (Seoul) *nippo* on September 26, and the *Kyoto shinbun* on October 8, of that year. The first official account was the short September 24, 1945 *G-2 Periodic Report* quoted above. Kim Ch'anjŏng ponders why, given the magnitude of this event, the media did not give it attention immediately after the ship sank. This apparent secrecy is also curiously found in Miyaaki Sango's diary quoted earlier. Here the naval base employee penned detailed entries on Allied bombings of the city. However, he made no mention of the *Ukishima-maru* explosion in his entry on this or subsequent days, at least in his diary's published version.[44] Kim Ch'anjŏng suggests censorship as responsible for news of the sinking being contained to the immediate Maizuru area in the days following the incident.[45] However, we can imagine that Korean survivors spread news of the ship's sinking to Korean communities within Japan. To what extent did Japan-based Koreans privy to this news (either first or second hand) delay or even cancel their plans to repatriate to Korea?[46]

The U.S. Occupation government conducted the first formal investigation into the incident that produced a preliminary two-page summary dated December 12, 1945, and a final report in July of the following year. The initial report confirmed that protests had arisen among crewmembers who objected to being made to "sacrifice their lives for the sake of Korean (*sic*) especially at this time, to-day after the termination of the war." Their superiors answered these protests with threat: "you must comply with this duty with an idea of death." The report, obviously compiled by a non-native speaker of English (perhaps a Korean), continued as follows:

> After departed Aomori Bay, in the strait between Sadoga-shima [Sado island], they have dumped out all life-buoys and other articles which were usually equipped in the ship. The voyage continued, henceforth, and deviated her course to Maizuru Bay at the point off east Maizuru, Kyoto prefecture, and entered the port. Just before entering the port, the ship stopped a little while and signaled by hand flag-signal and entered the harbour slowly.

An explosion of "great sound" took place "about 150 meters from the shore" at around 1610 (*sic*) on August 24. The Koreans rescued from the sea were "confined in a boarding house [and] not allowed to go out, even one step, to meet with personnels (*sic*) who came to know whether their Kin were rescued or not …"[47] The file for this investigation also includes reports of interviews with witnesses that were conducted in Japanese and translated into English. These reports yielded little in the way of new information save for recollections by "Rikisan" who reported that the explosion occurred just as a small motorboat emerged and the ship sailed past a red flag.[48]

In the end the U.S. team deemed the evidence insufficient to carry the investigation further. A handwritten memo penned one month later termed the evidence "weak and appear[ing] to be based on conjecture" and recommended that no further action be taken.[49] The U.S. Occupation Forces, having arrived just days following the explosion, faced a more daunting challenge to solidify its presence on the archipelago. No doubt they were thus not in a position to devote sufficient time to thoroughly investigate the fate of the *Ukishima-maru* despite the large number of deaths that the incident claimed. Of greater urgency were the more pressing demands of pacifying and disarming militant Japanese, locating and arresting suspected war criminals, and feeding and housing starving and homeless Japanese under their supervision.

Japanese-based Korean organizations also pressured the Japanese government to provide the information needed to bring closure to the incident. One of the earliest such appeals demanded explanation of cause during negotiations with the Japanese government for victim compensation. The Japanese apparently conducted interviews in advance with members of the ship's crew, including the captain Torikai Kingo, in preparation for the meetings with the Koreans. Unfortunately none of the records for these investigations appear to have been made public. These discussions, which most likely took place in Tokyo, broke off in mid-October 1945 when the Koreans aggressively challenged the Japanese government's insistence that the explosion was accidental, and insisted that the Japanese admit its cause as an intentional implosion intended to kill Koreans.[50] As noted above Koreans would finally gain a favorable court verdict in August 2001, only to see the initial positive decision disappear by the Osaka Court of Appeals based

on the previous decision being driven by impression rather than by hard scientific fact.[51] In 2004, the *Ukishima-maru* incident became one of topics addressed by Truth and Reconciliation committees established by President Roh Moo Hyun (2003–2008). These investigations, which ended soon after Roh's term in office, managed to complete one report on this incident and the recent court cases.[52]

Soon after the ship's sinking the Japanese government did offer the families of victims established compensation packages totaling up to a paltry 1,550 yen (remains recovery costs [270 yen], funeral costs [80 yen], and general family support [1,200 yen]) to the families of deceased. Practical restraints limited the provision of this compensation to only those families residing in Japan. At the time there existed no means for transferring monetary funds between Korea and Japan. Japan ceased accepting claims from 1965 when the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) after the two sides agreed to a victimization fund of $364 million allegedly to compensate Koreans victimized over the three-plus decades of Japanese colonial occupation.[53] According to one Korean scholar, in 1974–1975 the Korean government offered to pay compensation to up to 8,000 people, perhaps with this fund in mind. However, like other similar overtures in the spirit of closure victims rejected this gesture as it came from a Korean, rather than a Japanese, government. Also, the 30,000 Korean ₩ figure—the "value of the head of a dog"—, must have been insulting to the potential recipients.[54]

Part of the problem in advancing efforts to conduct a fair and comprehensive investigation has been the difficulty to access information and evidence that potentially could untangle the mysteries surrounding the sinking. The earliest investigations, for example, were conducted with the primary piece of evidence—the ship itself—still submerged in Maizuru Harbor. As emphasized throughout this paper, not having available reliable documentary evidence such as a passenger list and the ship's travel log prevents investigators from understanding even the most fundamental facts of the case. The 65 plaintiffs denied compensation by the Kyoto District Court were surely victimized by the non-existence of a passenger list.[55] Finally, peculiar behavior by those in possession of potentially valuable testimony further suggests witness tampering to cover up facts. One example was the inability to gain the testimony of ex-*kenpeitai* Paek's widow, as noted above.[56]

Social Education as a Conduit for "Victimhood Nationalism"

Following Japan's surrender, and throughout the period of occupation, the United States occupied Ōminato and moved into the naval base. In 1959 the city merged with other municipalities to form the new city of Mutsu where the Japan Maritime

Self Defense Forces continue to be housed. Maizuru has also been used as one of Japan's primary naval bases since the country regained its sovereignty in 1952. The city keeps alive in museums and monuments its postwar role as a gateway for repatriates from the empire, many of whom endured harsh labor conditions in Siberia from the time of Japan's surrender to the early 1950s.[57] Also present in Maizuru, but rather inconspicuously located, is a memorial (*tsuitō*) dedicated to the tragedy's Korean victims. The location of the memorial is less enthusiastically publicized, and not as conveniently accessible, as the city's other historic sites.[58] This is partly due to its location being situated in close proximity to the ship's sinking. This inconvenient location and relatively limited exposure is unfortunate considering the valiant efforts made by many Maizuru residents to assist Koreans at the time of the sinking, as well as to support the construction of the monument. The monument comes alive in August when concerned peoples gather to commemorate the lives lost on that fateful late summer evening in 1945.

The chances of resolving the outstanding issues surrounding the fate of the *Ukishima-maru* have grown dimmer with each passing year as memories of the immediate first-generation passengers and witnesses fade and their lives pass. It is thus left to their descendants and other vehicles to protect the memory of the tragedy. Does this work in Japan's favor? Perhaps. The Japanese people are not exceptional in their attempts to purge less attractive elements from historical memory. Building national identities on a foundation of pride finds accusations of state-promoted acts of indiscriminate genocide, mass rape, and slave labor mobilization disturbing.[59] Such accusations by Japan's prewar and wartime colonized peoples tarnish the postwar image that Japanese have promoted of their country as a nation of peace. Might the less-than cooperative attitude displayed by the Japanese government in inquiries and investigations regarding the *Ukishima-maru* stem from the fear that the accusations might be true? What if the incident had been triggered by either an intentional act by the Japanese, or even by careless oversight?

At least over the short term it appears that Japan has gained the upper hand by simply deflecting accusations by those seeking deeper investigation to ascertain the truth. While the ship's sinking may garner occasional mention, most often in August as concerned people gather in Maizuru or at Tokyo's Yūtenji where the ashes of some of the victims are kept, for most Japanese and Koreans the incident remains forgotten.[60] It has not gained anywhere near the attention that other colonial assimilation or wartime mobilization policies have. However, as Ann Stoler notes, "imperial ruins [assume] durable forms in which they bear on the material environment and on people's minds."[61] The physical remains of the ship and documents on the voyage may no longer exist, but its place in the collective

memory of Japanese rule, though perhaps dim, lingers alongside other allegations of Japanese atrocities of this period. As with other aspects of victimization where critical particulars remain in question, Koreans rely on the known to assume the unknown, which over time becomes accepted as "truth."

The "truth" becomes engraved as historical "fact" that make its way into classroom textbooks, but also into other formal social education institutions, such as museums and monuments, as well as in popular culture—cinema and documentary film, print culture, and the Internet. The North Korean film *Souls Protest* offers one telling example in its depiction of the *Ukishima-maru* sinking, hoping to leave with viewers a simple impression: The Japanese intentionally imploded the ship for the purpose of massacring Korean laborers. It explained the ship's "sudden" detour into Maizuru as a ruse planned by the Japanese navy with MacArthur's Navigation Prohibition serving as a convenient excuse for not returning the Koreans directly to Pusan. The film attained screen exposure at several international film festivals, and in 2001 it was shown in Seoul. Grace M. Cho credits this international attention with bringing "the 1945 sinking of the *Ukishima-maru* back to memory."[62] Its production crew apparently did extensive research as much of the film reflects the verifiable facts of the incident. One viewer, a Lee Chul-woo [Yi Ch'ŏl'u], identified as a survivor of the ship's sinking, attested to its accuracy, save for the film's frequent accolades to Kim Il Sung.[63]

It is, however, necessary to separate the credibility that Lee offered into that which he was capable of delivering, and that in which he was not. As a Korean laborer he was no doubt in a position to verify the horrific labor conditions that the Koreans endured, the jubilation that Koreans felt at the time of their liberation, and the former laborers' descent to the ship prior to departure, along with the trip to Maizuru. It is also most probable that he would be able to comment on the film's depiction of the explosion and its aftermath. Other parts of the film he would be hard-pressed to verify such as the discussions limited to Japanese that the film inserts to "prove" Japanese culpability, their having imploded the *Ukishima-maru* and, the reasoning behind their intention of committing this hideous crime. These parts of the film are thus products of the film crew's imagination. To complete the narrative of Korean victimization the film draws on past Japanese victimization of Koreans—here portrayed in the form of laborer flashbacks—to encourage the audience to connect the dots—to conclude the unverifiable as probable, if not outright fact. This requires the film inventing text, or in Oliver Stone's words, "put[ing] dialogue into a real person's mouth."[64]

The film develops an argument that accuses the Japanese of intentionally sinking the ship by inserting "character evidence" to portray the Japanese as a people harboring a low value of human life, both that of Koreans and Japanese.

One of the film's opening scenes has Komura, a Japanese officer, preparing to commit ritual suicide. Flashbacks show this same Japanese severing the tongue of a Korean laborer as punishment, crippling a Korean girl for refusing his sexual advances, and sending another Korean girl to the Philippines as a "comfort woman." Toward the film's end Komura shoots a Japanese girl in the back as she runs to inform the Korean passengers of the Japanese plans to blow up the ship. The film demonstrates through flashback the inhumane treatment that the Korean laborers endured that brought about injuries and even death from overwork or aggressive beatings.

With the war's end the Japanese decide that only death will silence the Koreans who possess potentially harmful knowledge, as well as prevent any vengeance they might seek against their former subjugators. The conclusion, that the laborers needed to be eliminated, is supported by Korean interpretation of similar episodes of the colonial period, including the Japanese introducing a policy of assimilation attempted to complete the colonized people's "cultural genocide." A more recent ROK film *Battleship Island* (K. Gunhamdo, 2017. Director, Ryoo Seung-wan) has contributed to Koreans imagining the Japanese as genocidal by including a Japanese military plot to murder Korean laborers to hide its crimes against those brought to labor on Hashima, an island off the coast of Nagasaki that was recently designated a UNESCO Heritage site.[65]

Like many theories that surfaced after the *Ukishima-maru* sinking, the DPRK film *Souls Protest* had to create a "smoking gun" to justify its contention of Japanese culpability. The Japanese might continue to answer accusations of criminal activity with silence or with inactivity, while possibly sitting on documents that potentially could resolve some of the mysteries of the incident, as indicated throughout this paper.[66] While perhaps the most important mystery of cause may be beyond solution at this point, there are relatively simple actions that the Japanese could take as gestures of cooperation. These might simply entail their offering a sincere apology for failing to safely return the laborers to their homeland and their supporting the repatriation of the remains of Koreans still entombed in Japanese temples. Its reluctance to extend such assistance to the resolution of this and other colonial-era issues, while demanding greater cooperation in similar issues of Japanese victimization, such as the DPRK kidnappings (*rachi mondai*) that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, appears hypocritical.

Japan's failure to cooperate to resolve colonial-era differences such as the *Ukishima-maru* sinking may have greater consequences in Koreans forming a collective memory of Japanese colonial-era history that contribute to what Jie-Hyun Lin terms a "victimhood nationalism," the competing national memories for the position of collective victims in memory wars."[67] As "competing [colonial]

memories" draw conflict between Japanese and Koreans, "competing [political] memories" divide Koreans by generation, by location either along the Korean peninsula or between peninsula and archipelago. The unifying factor for these people is the historic victimization that the peoples faced. Victimization caused by the *Ukishima-maru* incident divided Koreans by residence to the extent it failed to repatriate one population of the ship's Korean passengers, and quite possibly caused countless others to reconsider their decision to repatriate.[68] This victimhood crosses generations as the memory of "colonial debris" tragedy is passed on to secondary victims, the descendants of the primary victims and other Koreans of this generation. Thus, while incidents like the sinking of the *Ukishima-maru* helped form geographic divisions among Koreans, their memory contributes to a developing national narrative that bonds reunifying peoples seeking common grounds to pave a renewed national identity.

Notes

1. The author would like to thank Mizuno Naoki for sharing his views on this issue during a trip we took to Maizuru in March 2016 and Satō Toshiya for keeping me informed of commemorative events regarding the *Ukishima-maru* incident. I thank Lee Young Mi for introducing to me valuable Korean-language sources. I am also indebted to Youngtae Shin and Andre Haag, as well as two anonymous readers for their comments on different versions of this article. Among the vast holdings of the library of the Zainikkanjin rekishi shiryō kan (在日韓人資料館 History Museum of J-Koreans) are valuable documents and videos related to the ship's sinking. It goes without saying that the views and conclusions remain my own.

2. The October 2, 1945 *G-2 Periodic Reports* noted two such tragedies, one the result of a mine explosion. On November 21 it reported the sinking of the *Nikai Masru*, a Korean tugboat. These reports also informed of attacks by pirates, many of them ex-*kenpeitai* officers, who robbed passengers of their valuables and on occasion their lives. A number of other ships also fell victim to inclement weather. These reports can be found at Institute of Culture Studies, ed. *Mikugun tonggun saryŏngbu G-2 iril chŏngbu yoyak* (미국극동군사령부G-2일일정보요약 Far East Command, U.S. Army G-2 Daily Intelligence Summary) (Seoul: Institute of Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University, 1999). See also Jeong Ae-Young, "Kwiguk haenansago rŭl t'onghae bun kangchedongwŏn-kwa kwihwan (귀국해난사고를통해본강제동원과귀환 Sea Accidents during the Repatriation of Mobilized Koreans) *Hanil minjok munje yŏn'gu* 19 (2010): 123–59.

3. Books on the *Ukishima-maru* incident, include Kim Ch'anjŏng's *Uk'ishima-maru Pusankō e mukazu* (浮島丸は釜山港へ向かず The *Ukishima-ho* did not turn toward Pusan) (Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan, 1996); Saitō Saguchi, ed. *Uk'ishimaho P'ukch'm sagŏn chinsang* (우키시마호폭침사건진상 The Truth behind the Ukishima-maru Sinking by Explosion), trans. Mukai Midori (Seoul: Tonghyŏn munhwasa, 1996; Chŏn Saechin, *Maguma* (마그마 Magma) (Seoul: Paeksan, 2007); and Shinada Shigeru, *Bakuchin: Rekishi no fuuka to tatakau* (爆沈—歴史の風化とたたかう Explosion: Battling Historical Efflorescence) (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2008). A committee formed by the Republic of Korea-based Truth and Reconciliation Commission investigating the incident released Ilch'e kangjŏmha kangchedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, *Uk'ishima-ho sakŏn sosong charyojip* (우키시마호사건소송자료집

Documents regarding the Ukishima-maru Incident) (Seoul: Ilche kangjŏmha kangchedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, 2007). Documentaries include NNN Document 94. *"Han" no Umi: Sabukaru Ukishima-maru jiken, sono jitsu ha* (「ハン」の海—裁かれる浮島丸事件・その実は Sea of "Regret": Trying the Reality of the Ukishima-maru), 1994. Films include *Eijian buruu: Ukishima-Maru sakon* (エイジアン・ブルー浮島丸サゴン Asian Blue: The Ukishima-maru Incident), 1995, Director Horikawa Hiromichi; *Souls Protest* (K. *Sar'a innŭn ryŏng'hondŭl* 살아있는 靈魂들), 2000, Director Kim Chun-song.

4. Twenty-five Japanese succumbed at this time as well. They, however, were considered "war dead," thus entitling their families to appropriate benefits.
5. Ann Stoler, ed. *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). Stoler here seeks to "track the uneven temporal sedimentations in which imperial formations leave their marks …" that is, "how empire's ruins contour and carve their the psychic and material space in which people live and what compound layers of imperial debris do to them" (Stoler, *Imperial Debris*, 2).
6. The North Korean film *Souls Protest*, for example, displays no sympathy toward the possibility of accidental explosion in arguing intentional implosion.
7. U.S. forces bombed the city on July 14–15, and from August 8–10, 1945. "Aircraft Action Report No. AG47#119" for the August 10 aerial raid where the operation was listed as its "mission": "Attack Targets of Opportunity, Aomori-Ominato Area: Ominato Naval Base (Aomori) (Honshu) 7500 Ton F.T.A. Ominato Airfield Oil Storage at Ominato." Japanese National Diet Library (http://iss.ndl.go.jp/books/R100000002-I000006866029-00). The information here is included in the Diet library's listing on this bombing incident.
8. Aoyama admitted that some Koreans did escape *en route*, Kim, *Uk'ishima-ho*, 65–66.
9. Chŏn, *Magŭma*, 231.
10. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 70.
11. Chŏn, *Magŭma*, 231–32.
12. Chŏn, *Magŭma*, 229–30.
13. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 69.
14. Shinada, *Bakuchin*, 39–40; Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 71.
15. John Dower writes that following the August 15 broadcast by the emperor "military officers and civilian bureaucrats threw themselves frenetically into the tasks of destroying their files and disbursing vast hoards of military supplies in illicit ways." John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 39.
16. Aoyanagi, *Ukishima-maru ha Pusan ni mukete shukkō shita* (浮島丸は釜山に向けて出航した The *Ukishima-maru* Left Port for Pusan) (Hyūga: Sōtokainokai, 2012), 5.
17. Kim, *Ukishima-maru* 81.
18. There are a number of cases of Koreans pressuring Japanese companies in Korea for money. The October 2, 1945 edition of the *G-2 Daily Reports* listed two such incidents, involving Hidachi Iron Works and Tōyō Wire Manufacturing Co. It is not clear by these reports, though, whether the former employees were seeking funds owed to them personally or simply taking advantage of the situation. See HQ, USAFIK [United States Armed Forces In Korea], *G-2 Periodic Report* (1945.9.9 to 1946. 2.12) (Institute of Culture Studies, ed. *Mikugun tonggun* (September 24, 1945), 300.
19. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 59.
20. Kim summarizes the reasons for crewmember objection in his *Ukishima-maru*, 49–51.
21. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 44. The idea that the Soviet military would arrest the crewmembers and send them to Siberia is probably a combination of a recorded concern (whether the Soviet armies would occupy the entire Korean peninsula), and invented memory (how these Soviet armies would treat captured Japanese military personnel).
22. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 110.
23. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 125.

24. Ukishima-maru zannansha tsuitō jikkō iinkai, *Ukishima-maru jiken no kiroku* (浮島丸事件の記録 A Record of the *Ukishima-maru* Incident) (Tokyo: Kamogawa shuppan, 1989), 46.
25. "Jap's again Battle U.S. Photo Planes over Tokyo Area: 1 U.S. Killed," *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (August 19, 1945) <https://bklyn.newspapers.com/image/52697500/?terms=%22Japs%2BAgain%2BBattle%2BU.S.%22> (accessed August 26, 2018). Ugaki Matome's diary ends with the admiral recruiting pilots to participate on a suicide mission to fly eleven *Suisei* dive bombers into the ships of "arrogant" Americans stationed in Okinawa. The diary's epilogue notes that "there is no record of Ugaki's suicide squad crashing into any U.S. ship at Okinawa. Apparently they went down at sea." Ugaki Matome, *Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945*, trans. by Masataka Chihaya (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991), 663–64.
26. "MacArthur's Landing Instructions," as carried in the *New York Times* (August 23, 1945). Proquest Historical newspapers: The New York Times with Index (https://www.nytimes.com/1945/08/23/archives/macarthurs-landing-instructions.html) (accessed September 5, 2018).
27. Quoted in Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 117. Kim includes a picture of the directive as dated simply August 1945.
28. Aoyanagi, *Ukishima-maru ha Pusan ni mukete shukkō shita*, 5.
29. Shinada, *Bakuchin*, 26. This would have made it impossible for the ship to complete the estimated seventy-hour journey to Pusan in time to meet the curfew.
30. United States *G-2 Daily Reports* on September 24, 1945 provided the earliest estimate of 6,700 passengers. 70. Other estimates are taken from Grace Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy and the Forgotten War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 172.
31. In August 2001 the Kyoto District Court awarded 15 out of 80 plaintiffs three million yen each for "stress-related hardships" (*seishintekikurō*). Though stopping short of determining cause, the court found fault in the Japanese stopping in Maizuru rather than delivering the Koreans to Pusan. In May 2003 the Osaka High Court overturned this decision, a ruling that upon appeal was upheld in November 2004 by the Japanese Supreme court. Naitō Hisako, "Korean Forced Labor in Japan's Wartime Empire," in Paul Kratoska, ed. *Asian Labor in Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories* (London: Routledge, 2015), 96–97.
32. Maizuru faced aerial bombings between July 29–30, 1945 as reported by Miyaaki Sango, *Maizuru daison kaigun kayakushō: Chōyōkōin nikki* 舞鶴第三海軍火薬廠徴用工員日記 [The Third Naval Gunpowder Ship in Maizuru: The Diary of a Drafted Factory Hand], Self-published, 1989), 285–286.
33. Kim Ch'anjŏng offers a comprehensive summary of the numbers and types of sea mines dropped by the U.S. military, as well as the number of Japanese ships that contacted sea mines after the war's end in his *Ukishima-maru*, 175–180.
34. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 181–182.
35. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 187–188. See also Inaba Kōichi, "Ukishima-maru jiken to Nitcho Kokkō seijōka (浮島丸事件と日朝国交正常化 The *Ukishima-maru* Incident and Japan–North Korean normalization), *Kagaku shakaishugi* 77 (September 2004): 86.
36. Ukishima-maru zannansha tsuitō jikkō iinkai, *Ukishima-maru jiken no kiroku*, 51.
37. "Ukishima Maru likely contained Explosives," *Korea JoongAng Daily* (on-line, August 10, 2016). http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3022406 (accessed June 21, 2018).
38. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 168–169; Ukishima-maru zannansha tsuitō jikkō iinkai, *Ukishima-maru jiken no kiroku*, 27.
39. Institute of Asian Culture Studies, ed. *Mikugun tonggun saryŏngbu* (September 24, 1945), 70.
40. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 123.
41. Quoted in Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 164.

42. Kim *Ukishima-maru*, 165–168.
43. Ilch'e kangjŏmha kangchedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, *Uk'ishima-ho sakŏn sosong charyojip* 46.
44. Miyaaki, *Maizuru daisan kaigan kayakushō*, 300–303.
45. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 16.
46. That the *Ukishima-maru* sinking contributed to Japan-based (*zainichi*) Koreans' decisions to remain in Japan is a point made in the exhibits of the Zainichi Kanjin shiryōkan (Japan-based Korean museum) in Tokyo, in Naitō, "Koreans Forced Labor in Japan's Wartime Empire," 97. For a discussion of other areas of danger that might have prevented Korean post-liberation repatriation see Mark Caprio, "Kiken na kikan: Nihon rettō to Chōsen Hantō no hazamano nanmin" (危険な帰還—日本レットと朝鮮半島の間の難民 Dangerous Repatriation: Refugees Sandwiched between the Japanese Archipelago and the Korean Peninsula). Translated by Kim Junko, in Ishii Masako et al., eds. *Kyōseiteki na idō/ryūdō* (Forced Migration and Mobility) Kyoto: Kōyō shobo, 2019. 3–33.
47. Kotai Sei (?) to Commander of Occupation Troops (untitled), December 12, 1945. GHQ/SCAP Records (RG331) Investigation Division Reports (No. 130). File available in the National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan. The compiler of this report was affiliated with the Korean Association of Japan, Hirosaki office. The report is dated just one week after an attempt was made to bring the case to Japanese court.
48. Headquarters of Aomori Korean League in Japan to Commanding General of Occupation Troops, "Report on Investigation in connection with S.S. Ukishima Maru Incident (December 22, 1945), GHQ/SCAP Records (RG 331). This report estimated the ship carrying 8,000 passengers.
49. Memo to chief Investigations Division, "Ship Sinking" (January 29, 1945).
50. Kim, *Ukishima-maru*, 202–203.
51. Ilch'e kangjŏm hakang chedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng ŭinhŭi, *Uk'ishimaho*, 47–48.
52. Ilch'e kangjŏmha kangchedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, *Uk'ishima-ho sakŏn sosong charyojip*.
53. Aoyanagi Atsuko reviews this compensation plan in her *Ukishima-maru ha Pusan ni mukete shukkō shita*, 26. Kim Insung addresses one problem with compensation as a means of resolving this issue being that many of the victims were without direct descendants. "Kusulchosa ŭl t'onghae pon Uk'ishimaho sosong ch'amgajadŭr ŭl sakkŏne taehan kiŏkkwa insik" (구술조사를 통해 본 우키시마호 소송 참가자들의 사건에 대한 기억과 인식 The Plaintiff's Experience and Memory of the Ukishima-maru Incident Suit), *Minjok yŏn'gu* 65 (March 2016): 103.
54. Kim, "Kusulchosa ŭl t'onghae pon Uk'ishimaho sosong ch'amgajadŭr ŭl sakkŏne taehan kiŏkkwa insik," 103; Ilche kangjŏm hakang chedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng ŭinhŭi, *Uk'ishimaho*, 94. These two publications both call for the South Korean government to assume greater responsibility in bringing closure to this issue.
55. See Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora*, 171. The documentaries *Ukishima-maru* ha Pusan e mukawazu" and Han no Umi" both discuss the issue of critical documents not being provided for the plaintiffs' lawyers.
56. Ilch'e kangjŏm hakang chedongwon p'ihae chinsang kyumyŏng ŭinhŭi, *Uk'ishimaho*, 46.
57. The Maizuru Repatriation Memorial Museum (Maizuru hikiage kinenkan) homepage informs that the city welcomed 346 ships carrying 660,000 overseas Japanese into its port between 1945–1958. Many ships brought men who had been transported from northern Korea and Manchuria to Siberia for hard-labor purposes. https://m-hikiage-museum.jp/english-education/04-repatriation.html (accessed January 3, 2019).
58. The "Maizuru kankō gaidomappu" (舞鶴観光ガイドマップ Maizuru Tourist Guide map) that the city distributes to tourists notes the position of the memorial on its map but does not include it among the 29 short descriptions it gives of the city's top tourist sites.

59. See Laura Hein and Mark Selden, "The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change." In Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds. *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, 3–50.
60. Upon a visit to Yūtenji two years ago a temple representative confirmed to me that the temple did (reluctantly) accept the remains of the ship's victims, along with those of other Korean wartime victims, as no other temple would take them. On August 24, 2018 50 people gathered at the temple to attend the 30th Wartime Victims Memorial Service (*Sensō higaisha tsuitōshiki*) to honor the souls of the 700 Korean wartime dead whose remains are kept at the temple, down from the 2327 in 1970. "Chōsenjin sensō giseisha tsuitōshiki hiraku: Yūtenji hondō ni neru Ukishima-maru giseishara" (Wartime Victims Memorial Service Held for Ukishima-maru Victims and others at Yūtenji), *Tōitsu nippō*, August 28, 2018) http://news.onekoreanews.net/detail.php?number=84938&thread=04 (accessed January 13, 2019.
61. Stoler, *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination*, 2.
62. Grace M. Cho reports the film gaining screen time in Moscow, Hong Kong, and even New York where a North Korean film festival was held in 2002. Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora*, 171, 174.
63. Sang-Hun Choe, "Ship Tragedy Involving Thousands of Koreans, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 24 August 2001.
64. "A Conversation between Mark Carnes and Oliver Stone," in Mark C. Carnes, ed. *Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996), 311.
65. The belief that Japanese colonial intention was to eliminate all Koreans was brought to my attention by a student of Korean ancestry enrolled in a course on Modern Korean History that I taught at UCLA in 2013. In an email message the student inquired whether I planned to lecture on the "Korean holocaust" that history classes tend to ignore.
66. Kumagai Taru warns of the "historical risk" (*rekishi risuku*) that nations accept that past wartime atrocities will return to haunt the state should they remain unresolved. He argues that compensating such victimized peoples is more out of concern for future Japanese generations to ensure that they do not have to carry the guilt of their ancestors. Kumagai Taru, *Nihon to Doitsu: futatsu no sengo* (日本とドイツー二つの戦後 Japan and Germany: Two Postwars) (Tokyo: Shueisha shinsho, 2015), 130–131.
67. Jie-Hyun Lin, "Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability," in *Memory in a Golden Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories*, edited by Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 139.
68. Ships sinking, as in the case of the *Ukishima-maru*, was just one of a number of dangers that Japan-based Koreans had to consider when contemplating repatriation to the peninsula. For a review of these dangers see Caprio, "Kiken na kikan: Nihon rettō to Chōsen Hantō no hazamano nanmin."

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Purging 'Factionalist' Opposition to Kim Il Sung: The First Party Conference of the Korean Worker's Party in 1958

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Abstract

In March 1958, delegates from across North Korea met in the National Art Theatre in Pyongyang for the First Conference of the Korean Worker's Party. To date, it has an event largely overlooked by South Korean and Western historians of North Korea because of a lack of source material. The newly unearthed official minutes, however, reveal a highly staged event in which the opponents of high-level party opponents of Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsŏng 김일성) are subjected to what amounts to a show trial, before they lose their party membership. The official minutes are notable for containing one of the only official North Korean descriptions of the alleged plot by certain military members of the Yanan Faction to overthrow the Kim Il Sung government in a military coup.

The purpose of the Party Conference within Marxist-Leninist parties is discussed, the background to the Conference and developments in the communist world are also described. The delegate roster is then briefly analysed, interesting and significant statistics are explained with broader reference to North Korean history—the context and what it can tell us about the structure of power in the Korean Workers Party back then. Following this, the show trial by conference is detailed. The trial by conference is split into two parts, the first dealing with their economic crimes and the second with their political crimes. This article discusses both sets of allegations in light of the actual economic pathologies of Soviet-type economies and the political nature of the Kim Il-sungist system.

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Introduction

In March 1958, five years after the end of the Korean War, Korean Worker's Party (KWP) delegates met in a theatre in Pyongyang for what was to be one of the final chapters in an ongoing struggle for the soul of the party and country. The First Party Conference of Representatives of the Korean Worker's Party is an event that is largely forgotten in discussions of North Korean history within Korean language scholarship in South Korea, in official North Korean historical narratives and within Western scholarship.[2] This is largely because little evidence as to what actually took place there was in the public domain—that is, before the discovery of the official minutes of the Conference by Fyodor Tertitskiy in the private collection of a former Soviet diplomat.[3]

The minutes are a remarkable source, unclassified and seemingly in open circulation in the late 1950s. Much of the proceedings are taken up with the alleged economic sabotage of 'factionalists'—discussed further below. Moreover, sensational allegations about a plot within the military to overthrow the state are made. As will be discussed further below, some 'factionalists' in attendance are given the chance to confess their crimes, with one of them refusing to do so. This might be one of the last times that a high-ranking North Korean 'political criminal' is shown openly in defiance of the Party and state.

The leader of the Party and the state, Kim Il Sung, had been waging an internal struggle against 'factions', elements within the party that opposed his policies and grip on power. His major opponents in this struggle—Koreans from the Soviet Union and China—had tried to force him to loosen his growing grip on power, cult of personality, and economic policies that favoured heavy industry over consumer goods. The actual existence of 'factionalism' as opposed to groups of common origin was disputed at the time and has been disputed subsequently by some historians.[4] Nonetheless, different groups from varied places appeared to have formed networks within the (North) Korean Workers Party, and probably came into existence soon after northern Korea came under Soviet military control in late 1945.[5] Kim Il Sung, a former Korean independence fighter and guerrilla commander based in Northeast China before 1940, had begun to move against some of these groups in the elite from different backgrounds as early as 1948.[6] However, it was not until the end of the Korean War in July 1953 that Kim Il Sung began to systematically purge the elite of potential rivals.

The Conference was an event that occurred in a highly significant year: 1958. The Conference finalized the purge of Kim Il Sung's major factional rivals, who had previously sought to make him curtail his growing cult of personality, institute collective leadership, and reorient economic policy in favour of consumer goods production.[7] The year 1958 saw the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from the North around the time of the Conference, the start of the Chollima mass labour mobilization movement in North Korean industry, and perhaps most significantly for the world today, the signing of a Soviet-North Korean atomic energy cooperation agreement.[8]

The Conference

Background: Factional Warfare

There is some controversy over whether factions actually existed in the Korean Workers Party of the 1940s and 1950s. The term 'faction' does not merely connote a 'group', but has a very specific, negative connotation in the Marxist-Leninist political lexicon. Factions had been banned from the Russian Bolshevik Party in 1921, and Stalin would defined any organized opposition to his policies and/or leadership as factionalism.[9] This political concept was inherited by the North Koreans in the 1940s, and hence the term 'faction' has distinctly negative overtones in North Korean political discourse.

However, while the term 'faction' in the North Korean context may be problematic and may be used to denigrate the character of Kim Il Sung's opponents, there is no doubt that there were distinct if not always unified groups within the leadership of the KWP until the late 1950s. These groups were partially defined by where they had spent the pre-1945 period, and where they had become communists. For convenience they will be referred hereafter as 'factions', but the term is not meant as one of abuse, and where needed, the questions regarding the cohesiveness of some factions will be noted.

There were four major factions in the KWP as of 1953. The domestic faction of communists who had been active in Korea during the Japanese colonial period (1910–45). This faction had largely been purged from the top leadership by the mid-1950s, with the trial of Pak Hŏn-yŏng in 1955 marking the end of this faction as an element within the party elite. Other members of this faction include O Ki-sŏp, who was in attendance at the conference where he is finally expelled from the Party. The domestic faction can be divided into several sub-groups, Koreans from the northern half of the peninsula like O Ki-sŏp and those from the southern half like Pak Hŏn-yŏng. Hence, the concept of 'domestic faction' as a cohesive

group is indeed questionable.[10] Nonetheless, the sub-groups of this perhaps less than cohesive faction appear to have disappeared from elite North Korean politics by the late 1950s.

By contrast, the 'Soviet faction' of Koreans who had returned from the Soviet Union post-1945 and who had had experience working in the CPSU and/or Soviet government prior to 1945 were clearly a bloc to some extent.[11] Among its most influential members was Pak Ŭi-wan, ex-vice premier, and attendee at the Conference. By this time, many of its other high-profile members were either purged or had found exile in the Soviet Union.[12] That said, a few survived the purge of the 1950s, including Nam Il, a former soldier in the Soviet Army during the Second World War, and Pang Hak-sae, Kim Il Sung's spy chief.

The third group were returnees from China. The so-called 'Yanan faction' was made up of Koreans who had spent time in Yanan as members of the Chinese Communist Party before 1945, returning to the Korean peninsula after liberation. Unlike the domestic and Soviet factions, they also had military units that were to form an important part of the North Korean People's Army. Some of their number were also to become high-level military leaders.[13] Among them was the former Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (nominal head of state), Kim Tu-bong, who was at the Conference.

Kim Il Sung's faction of ex-guerilla fighters from Manchuria who would ultimately emerge as dominant force in North Korean political life by the late 1950s, and create a state reflecting their own ideological preferences, experiences and mentality.[14] Some were present at the conference including Kim Il, Ch'oe Kwang and Ch'oe Yong-gŏn.

These factions seemingly existed in North Korean political life from the mid-1940s onwards. However, factional intrigues did not boil over into open confrontations on matters of policy and power until the mid-1950s. Indeed, it was not until the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 that serious moves began to either unseat Kim Il Sung, or at least radically change the policies that the party and state pursued under his leadership.[15] Before that, as stated above, there had been a significant purge of the Domestic Faction, and a small number members of other factions had also been purged, including Hŏ Ka-i, previously the most influential member of the Soviet Faction.[16]

In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, the new leader of the USSR, denounced Stalin's cult of personality in a closed session of the 20th Congress and began the process of destalinization that spread to the rest of the Socialist bloc. Kim Il Sung prized many aspects of the Stalinist system, including its leadership principle centred on the cult of personality, and an economic model that emphasized heavy industrial

production and autarky (socialism in one country). Thus, he sought to resist reformism at home. His factional opponents sought the reverse: to ease him out of power. Such moves culminated in the August Plenum of 1956 in which internal party opposition figures sought to force Kim Il Sung to change track. The principal figures behind this move include Pak Ch'ang-ok (vice premier), Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (also a vice premier), and Yun Kong-hŭm (Commerce Minister), as well as Pak Ŭi-wan. They were outnumbered and outmanoeuvred, and bar the speedy intervention of Soviet and Chinese party officials several weeks later in September 1956, they would likely have disappeared from public view completely. Some of the Yanan faction escaped to China soon after the August Plenum, believing (likely correctly) that they would be purged and face persecution.[17]

The intervention joint Sino-Soviet intervention of September 1956 brought a temporary reprieve, though their leadership positions were not fully restored.[18] However by around August or September of the following year, the purge of the elite had begun again in earnest. Gradually the 'ringleaders' were demoted and eventually forced out of any positions of power, before finally being arrested in late 1957, except for those who had managed to escape to China or the Soviet Union back in 1956.[19] Thus, the fate of factional opponents to Kim was largely sealed by September of 1956. North Korea's fraternal allies intervened in September 1956, but did not seek to remove Kim, nor did they succeed in fully restoring his rivals to power.[20]

The conference's significance is as a public event that finalized purges that began in 1956 and began again in 1957. It was a public forum for the shaming and expulsion of senior rivals to Kim Il Sung, and also where new accusations against Yanan Koreans in the military were made—justifying additional purges of the military.[21] Moreover, the conference convoked at the very same time as Chinese military forces (who had fought in the Korean War) had begun to withdrawn from North Korea.[22] It is telling that at the very same time as Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) were withdrawn, the purge of factional rivals, and Yanan Korean military cadres was finalized.

Purpose and Antecedents

The Korean Worker's Party in the 1950s was a Marxist-Leninist party that had been created under Soviet tutelage in the late 1940s.[23] The Party Congress was the supreme decision making organ of the party, supposed to meet every five years to elect the party's major decision-making body, the Central Committee (CC).[24] The Party Conference was a lesser gathering, optional, that could be held between Party Congresses when needed. Under Lenin, Conferences were held frequently,

and Richard Sakwa notes in his study of Soviet politics that they "provided a forum for debate and the discussion of policy options, although their precise powers with respect to electing the CC were unclear."[25] As Graeme Gill notes in his study of Soviet political language and regime legitimacy, Party Congresses and Conferences were important forums "where leading figures gave speeches designed in part to provide guidance to those on lower administrative levels."[26] Thus, both Party Congresses and Conferences had symbolic and practical functions, though the Conference's functions were far less clear.

Several peculiarities to the 1958 Conference are worth noting here before discussing what actually happened there. First, according to Kim Hak-jun, as of 1958, the Korean Worker's Party bylaws contained no provisions pertaining to Party Conferences; hence, this was "an anomalous event."[27] Second, the Party Conference format had not been employed in the Soviet Union—upon which most of North Korea's political institutional forms were modelled—since 1941. Indeed, as Sakwa notes, they had "died out completely under Stalin following the eighteenth [Conference] in 1941".[28]

This raises an interesting question: where might Kim Il Sung have gotten the idea of holding a Conference in order to purge the party? It could be that he just thought to revive an old CPSU institution, but perhaps it is more likely that he drew inspiration from prior events in Mao's China. A factional struggle known as the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair and the purges that resulted was been finally resolved with the First National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in March 1955. The first National Conference CCP was in many ways a prototype for the KWP Conference that met three years (almost to the day) later. The resolution of factional issues was discussed by Deng Xiaoping in his report to the conference, and was accompanied by an unrelated report delivered by Chen Yun on the progress of the First Five Year plan. Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were the leaders of an alleged factional plot to depose Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi (number 2 and 3 in the party apparatus at the time). They were formally expelled from the CCP and those influenced by them engaged in self-criticism at the Conference.[29] It seems then, that Kim Il Sung may have emulated Mao's use of the Party Conference format, given the fact that such events were no longer held in the Soviet Union and no such event was even mentioned in the KWP by-laws at the time. Thus, it appears that this 'anomalous event' as Kim Hak-jun termed it, may in fact have been a borrowing from an immediate Chinese antecedent.

Existing Research and the North Korean View

As noted above, the first Conference of the KWP has received little coverage in existing historical studies of North Korea. Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, back in 1972, identify March 1958 as the month in which factional purges spread to the military, with the purge of Chang P'yŏng-san and other Yanan Koreans from the upper echelons of the army.[30] They also state that 'Kim forces launched an "anti-sectarian" struggle from below … being climaxed by the First Conference', but they do not elaborate further on this point.[31] More recently, Balázs Szalontai uses declassified Hungarian documents to identify the Conference as being the venue in which such purges began.[32] Andrei Lankov's study of declassified Soviet diplomatic documents dealing with the period indicates that Soviet diplomats were made aware of much of what occurred at the Conference, including Yanan Korean Yang-gye's speech, and the humiliation of Kim Tu-bong (former Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and prominent Yanan Korean). Connections with the factional purges of the military seemingly are also referenced, though indirectly.[33] While at the same time, as Lankov notes, North Korean media at the time did not accord the Conference as much attention as such events were given.[34]

More recent scholarship has shed some further light on the context of the conference. As already noted above, the conference was took place during an important time in North Korean history. Shen and Xia note that conference purged Kim Tu-bong, and the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the North combined with rapidly improving relations with Beijing and Moscow, even as repression inside the DPRK was reaching a high point, and economic autarky becoming a more pronounced policy position.[35] Indeed, James Person notes that Kim Il Sung delivered a speech on economic independence at the conference, and that this signalled a significant shift in regime economic policy toward autarky due to a reduction of economic aid from the socialist bloc.[36] Here, Person is clearly more focused on the economic matters, as this is what his Soviet documentary sources reflect. However, as the minutes below show, the conference was actually concerned more with politics.

Given the event's significance: the final expulsion of high-level members of rival groups in the top leadership, it is surprising how little coverage of actual events there was. *Rodong Sinmun*, the KWP Central Committee's official newspaper, and the country's newspaper of record, included a simple announcement that Conference was beginning on March 3rd.[37] The following day, Ri Jong-ok's (head of the State Planning Committee) report to the Conference on the First Five Year Plan (1957–1961) was printed in full, along with a brief summary of events.[38] On March 5th, there was further editorial coverage, photographs and pictorials of

economic plans, described as a 'great vision.'[39] The March 6th edition included Pak Kŭm-chŏl's report on party disciple entitled 'On further strengthening Party unity and solidarity.'[40] *Rodong Sinmun* covered the broad outline of what is discussed at the Conference, Kim Il Sung's speech on the final day was not printed, nor were any of the speeches of delegates.[41]

While, as will become clear below, the Conference was principally concerned with finalizing the purge of anti-Kim factions from the KWP, *Rodong Sinmun* focused on the Five Year Plan and the need to strengthen party discipline and popular education. While the latter can be seen as a corollary of disunity within the party at lower levels, it does not necessarily directly relate to factional intrigues at the apex of power—which was actually the main subject of the Conference.

The Delegates

Delegates met in the Pyongyang National Art Theatre (now called the Moranbong Theatre) from 3rd March to 6th March 1958. The minutes of the Conference offer a wealth of statistical information on the social and political background of the delegates. The most important statistic of all is the number of party members: 1,181,094, as of the Conference, and 1,075 delegates represent them.[42] This statistic agrees with Soviet diplomatic documents from later in 1958 cited by Lankov, indicating that total party membership was 1,181,095 as of July 1st 1958.[43] It also implies that there may have been a freeze in membership while issues of Party discipline were being 'dealt with'. Moreover, given that population of North Korea in two years later is estimated to have been less than 11 million, these numbers imply that over 10% of North Korea's population were party members in 1958.[44] This also means that party membership had risen by over 400,000 from 725,762 in 1948—a 62% increase.[45]

At the Third Party Congress of the KWP held two years before in 1956, there had been a mere 916 delegates in attendance, while party membership had reportedly only risen by 16,149 from levels given at the Third Party Congress. This indicates that each delegate at the conference represented fewer party members. Conversely, the Conference was four days long, whereas the Third Party Congress was a week long.[46] In these aspects, the North Korean Party Conference differs from its putative Chinese prototype in that the Chinese conference was attended by a mere 257 delegates, yet these delegates met for a total of eight days.[47] Indeed, as will become clear below, it appears as if the North Korean Party Conference of 1958 was supposed to be a full-scale gathering of party representatives convoked for a specific purpose in mind: to denounce factionalists and finalize their expulsion from the party. This gives rise to the question: who were these delegates?

The minutes of the KWP Conference indicate that over 50% of delegates were either party functionaries (around 38%), or state officials (nearly 15%).[48] This in a country where only 14% of the labour force was considered white-collar in 1960, full-time cadres from the party and state were certainly massively overrepresented.[49] Another interesting statistic is the number delegates with "experience of 'struggling against either Japanese colonial rule or against the South Korean government following liberation" (22.5%). The anti-Japanese guerrilla 'tradition' that was to play central role of North Korea's later history is in evidence here. The vast majority 'entered the Party' after 1945 but before the formation of the KWP in 1949 (61.5%), while only 6.7% of delegates had been members of recognized predecessor organizations before liberation. Hence, the delegates were a group principally comprised of Party members who joined the North Korean communist movement around the time or after Kim Il Sung became its paramount leader, with a further 27.2% having joined after 1949.[50] Furthermore, the vast majority were over 30 (97%), with most being in their thirties (50.5%). Most delegates (57.3%) only had a primary school education.[51] In the latter regard, the educational level of the delegates was comparable to Kim Il Sung's own.[52] Delegates in their thirties would have been in their teens during the Second World War, living under Japanese colonial rule, where enrolment rates at primary school were still under 50% and post-primary education enrolment rates were far lower.[53]

The conference was presided over by Kim Il Sung, Ch'oe Yong-gŏn, Pak Chŏng-ae, Kim Il, Pak Kŭm-chŏl, Kim Ch'ang-man, Nam Il and Chŏng Il-ryong.[54] It is interesting to note that of these eight only three survived the next round of factional purges in 1967. Pak Chŏng-ae, Pak Kŭm-chŏl and Kim Ch'ang-man were all relieved of their positions in 1967–68.[55] While Nam Il died in suspicious circumstances in 1976, Chŏng Il-ryong also lost his posts in late 1971.[56]

The Conference also saw the election of eleven new full CC members Ri Chu-yŏn, Ch'oe Chŏl-hwan, Ch'oe Gwang, Ch'oe Yong-jin, Kim T'ae-gŭn, Chŏng Du-hwan, Pak Ch'ang-sik, Sŏ Chŏl, Pak Gwang-hee, Pak Yong-guk, Kim Ch'ang-bong.[57] These new members of the CC had hitherto believed to be added in 1961, at the Fourth Party Congress of the KWP.[58]

The Minutes indicate that 38 delegates (including Kim Il Sung himself) spoke at the Conference. Of those, the identities of four delegates could not be confirmed using existing reference sources. Of the remaining 33 delegates, four had already been purged from top leadership positions—Kim Tu-bong, O Ki-sŏp, Pak Ŭi-wan, and Yang Gye. Of the rest, 24 were full or candidate members of the CC, two appear to have been model workers, two were provincial party secretaries, and two were technical specialists/technocrats (one in public health, another in transport).[59] The

presence of Kim Hwae-il, a model worker and the putative initiator of the first labour mobilization movement in North Korea back in 1948, is also notable.[60]

Thus, over 60% of speakers were members of the top elite, being members of the CC, a high number indeed. The Conference was clearly an event to show unity of purpose amongst those who ran the country at the time. It was also an occasion in which former top members of the elite—Kim Tu-bong, Pak Ŭi-wan, O Ki-sŏp and Yang Kye—were to confirm the conspiracies that they were allegedly implicated in and confess their wrongdoing.

The Economy and Factionalism

The majority of the conference's content was structured around the reports of two individuals—Ri Jong-ok and Pak Kŭm-chŏl. Ri, head of the State Planning Committee, first delivered a long report about the First Five Year Plan (1957–1961).[61] The report itself contains little in the way of new information relating to the first five-year plan that has been covered in depth already elsewhere.[62] However, this report was followed by a full 23 speeches, ostensibly on economic matters. For instance, problems with retail prices and product quality are touched upon,[63] resistance to innovation amongst sections of party workers and the bureaucracy are raised,[64] and the failure to achieve targets set by the state planning agency are also mentioned.[65] A perennial issue in planned economies known as 'sectionalism', in which enterprises under different ministries are reluctant to trade and cooperate with one another, is also mentioned several times.[66] Yet, as noted above, this conference's principal concern was not the finer points of planning coherence, norm setting for particular industries, or incentive issues.

Indeed, in the main, the speeches given tended to follow a similar pattern: praise for the party, its leadership and the excellent economic plan, before a lengthy denunciation of factionalists and their economic activities (other activities are mentioned by a few speakers). Speakers were as fulsome in their censure for factionalists as they were in their praise for party and leadership. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-ok, their nefarious 'associates', and 'lackeys' were accused of being both incompetent and cunning, nepotistic and excessively reliant on outsiders. They were accused of sabotaging, or otherwise seriously hindering production in major industries including construction, coal mining, transport, public health, retail and distribution, fisheries, and finance. However, the level of detail involved in these accusations seemingly speaks to the fact that these were not all merely insults and abuses but some at least were indicative of actual issues that probably existed in industry at the time—being symptoms of the underlying pathologies in command economy.[67]

This was a time of seismic economic changes in North Korea. The first five year plan heralded a big push to construct socialism at home, agriculture had come under state control with 96% of farm families being under direct of the state.[68] Similarly, the retail sector was also completely nationalized in 1958. Both these changes were very important: North Korea was a predominately rural society in the late 1950s, and the wholesale/retail sector was crucial in supplying consumer goods and food to urban and rural areas. These changes were discussed at length in Ri Jong-ok's report, which stressed the importance of improving the variety of consumer products, and the productivity of the rural sector, among other issues.[69]

The retail sector had been managed over by Yun Kong-hŭm up until the August Incident.[70] Thus, problems the sector faced with allocation and incentives, particularly issues with low quality and lack of supply were attributed to Yun, who became a convenient scapegoat. Yun was blamed for the decline in the food supply, textiles, and other consumables. Accusations of 'wastage' and 'greed' in the industry, 'illegal' debt write-offs for retailers (presumably private), served as convenient excuses for food shortages and other goods shortages in the country in 1954–5—alleged to be deliberate acts of sabotage.[71]

The consequences of Yun's treachery served as justification for a total state takeover of the retail sector. Yun allegedly left the countryside without necessary provisions and allowed unscrupulous merchants to take advantage of the situation.[72] Such activities appeared to be redolent of private sector merchants in the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy, the so-called Nepmen. Kim Il Sung made the same decision as Stalin before him when faced with private profit in the retail and distribution sector: wholesale nationalisation.[73] Interestingly, there were also references to resistance amongst certain richer farmers to the collectivization drive, though this was not blamed on factionalists.[74] The agricultural question—specifically the speed of collectivisation caused significant trouble—had been a key issue in facing the country prior to the August Incident. A famine occurred in 1955, and Yun appears to have become a convenient scapegoat for Kim Il Sung to explain away issues caused by overly rapid collectivization and policy decisions that he had made which further aggravated food supply issues.[75]

At the same time, other economic sectors where factionalists had been 'found' were singled out for criticism. For instance, 'high quantity and low quality' production is associated with factionalists by speaker Cho Tong-sŏp.[76] Cho was head of the Ryongsŏng Machine Works Factory Party Committee (in Hŭngnam, South Hamgyŏng) and a Vice-chair of the Central Committee. These accusations are similarly painted as being part of a pattern of deliberate sabotage on the part of factionalists, who allegedly engaged in a wide variety of seemingly unrelated and sometimes even contradictory actions in order to bring the state and economy

to ruin. It should be noted that the accusations Cho made against factionalists could have been made in any Stalinist economic setting toward any manager or worker behaving according to the incentive structures of Soviet-type economies. Simply put, people involved in production prioritized quantity over quality because quantity was associated with success in Kim Il Sung's North Korea just as it was in Stalin's Soviet Union.[77] Such problems did not disappear with the purges of the 1950s, but factionalism was a convenient excuse for the massive economic problems the country faced in the wake of the Korean War and as a result of the hyper-Stalinist line that Kim Il Sung had decided to pursue.

Pak Ŭi-wan, ex-vice premier, and Kim Tu-bong were both seemingly in attendance for the entirety of the conference. Pak, a Soviet Korean, and Kim, a Yanan Korean, were both prominent members of their respective factions, and are accused of a number of economy-related crimes and misdemeanours. Neither was initially implicated in the events of the August Plenum, however.[78] Pak was accused by Kim Yu-p'il (an official or worker from a Steel Works in North Hamgyŏng) of never coming to see the facility and disrupting construction there.[79] Later on in proceedings, Kim Ŭng-sang (candidate member of the CC) accused Pak of behaving like a colonial era 'foreman' at construction sites, threatening subordinates, changing plans arbitrarily, and ignoring 'creative opinions.'[80]

Similarly, Kim Tu-bong was painted as being thoroughly uninterested in economic affairs by Kim Yu-p'il, having never visited the latter's facility.[81] Yet again, such accusations within the economic sphere can actually be seen as a product of the basic facts of the political system and its domination over economic processes, as well as its general organizational dynamics. As Paul Gregory has described at length, Soviet-type economies relied on 'nested dictatorship' in which officials behaved as 'mini-dictators' within their own jurisdiction.[82] Whether or not the accusations were actually true, disregard and a haughty arrogance toward subordinates would certainly be in keeping with institutional context of the North Korean system at the time.

At the same time, whilst factionalists were subject to a repeated barrage of criticism and abuse from speakers, economic issues are not just blamed on factionalists alone. The famed South Korean Marxist historian, Paek Nam-un delivered a speech, ostensibly in response to Ri Jong-ok's report on the First Five Year Plan, in which Ri criticises some scientists for their lack of interest in productive concerns.[83] In the process, he touches on a core debate under actually existing socialism, the place of the intellectual, the 'expert' and 'red', i.e. the extent to which technical expertise or ideological purity was more important in economic matters.[84] Another speaker stated that the country's scientific community had been thrown into disarray by factionalists, with titles, degrees and positions being

handed out to those willing to defame party and state.[85] The latter may point to a level of disinterest amongst those in the scientific profession to matters political.

The Military, Party Factions, and Alleged Plans to Stage a Coup d'état

Following the conclusion of discussions about Ri Jong-ok's report on the Five Year plan, Pak Kŭm-chŏl, who was subsequently embroiled in another purge in the late 1960s, delivered a report on party discipline—mainly discussing why the factionalists were purged and what is to be done now.

Pak's report set the stage for what came next. He catalogued the alleged ideological deviations and abuses of the factionalists, stating that they were willing to conspire with all manner of 'hostile elements', intending to 'incite protest and violence.'[86] He even alleged that they 'organized' their own 'action groups' within some work places and other institutions in the capital, 'action mini-groups' in certain regions, and a superior 'action committee' to directly plot protests, violence and terrorism.[87] Similar accusations were made by Hyŏn Mu-gwang (South Hamgyŏng Party Committee chairman), who accused factionalists of going back to their home provinces to organize against the party after the August Plenum in 1956.[88]

Pak was followed by Kim T'ae-gŭn, a candidate member of the CC, who disclosed sensational allegations of a plot in the military, the details of which seemingly were made public for the first time at the conference.[89] The fact that no speaker before Kim refers to the plot is quite interesting, and it appears that the allegations had been concocted well after the August 1956 Plenum in order to justify a purge of the military top echelons—which did include members of the Yanan faction. Indeed, as Kim Nam-sik (an official in the KWP at the time) conveyed to Lee Chong-sik, the allegations appear to have been manufactured in order to justify a purge.[90] Chang P'yŏng-san, commander of the Fourth Corp of the Korean People's Army was alleged to have spread the 'anti-party idea' that "a people's army cannot be called considered the Party's army, the People's Army was an army on the fatherland's frontline, and therefore cannot be led by the Party".[91] In other words, Chang was alleged to have wanted to separate the military from the Party—the height of heresy in Marxist-Leninist states where the Party controls all institutions.

More unbelievably, it was further alleged that Kim Ung-I, an associate of Chang, bought a Japanese mansion to spread bourgeois ideology.[92] Another noteworthy allegation is that Ri Ik-sŏng, former head of the Officer Training School, had been a member of Chang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Army (defeated adversary of the Chinese communists), received military training from Nazi 'German advisors'

and had tried bring 'such training methods' to the 'People's Army' to turn it into a 'bourgeois army'.[93] This latter allegation seemingly is designed to create distance between the Chinese communists and their comrades-in-arms from the 1930s in the Yanan faction.

These claims of ideological heresy and long-standing treachery are followed by the accusations that they collaborated with factionalists in the KWP in order 'overthrow the government' and even having plans in place 'to welcome the American and Syngman Rhee armies' in order to 'unify the country within three days' of the 'party and government's overthrow'.[94] None of the military men allegedly involved in this coup attempt spoke or appeared to be in attendance, and proposals are made to expel them from the Party and have the matter dealt with by a military tribunal.[95] It is interesting to note that while other factionalists are accused of conspiring to create a 'neutral state', and to wreck the economy through a combination of malice and incompetence, the allegations leveled against Chang and other Yanan faction members of the military elite were more serious. Effectively, they were accused of directly plotting to bring about the complete destruction of the Party and state. These allegations were distinct from those leveled against civilian Party factionalists.

Kim T'ae-gŭn and other speakers after him also made a number of other, interesting allegations that have never been referenced before in existing scholarship on the factional purge of the 1950s. It is well known how joint delegation of Anastas Mikoyan, representing the Soviet Union, and Peng Dehuai, representing the People's Republic of China, intervened in September 1956 to the immediate purge of factionalists.[96] What is not known is how the North Korean leadership sought to explain such events. Kim accused factionalists of attempting to sow discord between the 'fraternal parties'.[97] Indeed, even as Soviet Union is thanked for its help in reconstructing North Korea after the Korean War, Pak Ŭi-wan is smeared for using a foreign language at the September Plenum (when Mikoyan and Peng Duhuai are in attendance)—Pak was a speaker of Russian.[98]

Indeed, at the conference, foreign culture was often presented in a negative light, with Pak Ŭi-wan, Kim Tu-bong and other factionalists also accused of liking Japanese culture—a smear in a country that had been a colony of Japan up until 1945.[99] Similarly, author Han Sŏl-ya condemned South Korea for its contaminated, 'Yankee culture'.[100] Yet, Yanan Korean connections to the Chinese Communist Party go unmentioned. Instead, their supposed connections with fascists (German advisors) and Chang Kai-shek appear to be one made with political correctness in mind, Kim Tu-bong, along with Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik are denounced for having associated with the Blue Shirts Society (a crypto-Fascist movement in China under Chang Kai-shek) for part of the 1930s.[101]

The Factionalists Speak

As the Moscow trials of the 1930s demonstrate, it would not be a show trial without the accused being given the chance to humbly confess their crimes. Unlike the trials of Yi Sŭng-yŏp in 1953,[102] and Pak Hŏn-yŏng, however, this was a party event rather than being a judicial affair.[103] Why Kim Il Sung dispensed with Stalinist custom is not clear, but he may have been imitating CCP precedents—self-criticism was delivered at the CCP National Conference of 1955 related to the Gao Gang Affair. However, this is where the similarity ends as the CCP Conference was not accompanied by mass expulsions of more minor members of alleged factions.[104] The First Party Conference of the KWP also seems to be one of the very last times, or perhaps the very last time that the words of alleged traitors were published in open access publications inside North Korea.

Yang Kye, a relatively insignificant member of the Yanan faction is the first factionalist who speaks at the conference. Yang Kye's speech reprises many of the accusations already made by other speakers, but also gives a backstory to August Plenum. He described how he had, from very early on, nurtured 'factional ideas', and especially after coming to Pyongyang to work, he became embroiled in factional intrigues, dividing cadres into those from 'Yanan or Taihang Mountain', 'the Soviet Union' and 'domestically', and slandering other factions.[105] In other words, the factional groups now known to historians were used at the time.

Yang Kye also mentioned that Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik claimed to have met with representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In Yang's account, Ch'oe told him that Soviets and Chinese were displeased to see that the KWP was not following the decisions of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU (i.e. destalinization).[106] Of course, this is all framed within language of self-criticism, and Yang Kye repeatedly attacked the factionalists he once is alleged to have followed. He also directly implicates Kim Tu-bong and O Ki-sŏp, stating that they were supportive of the efforts of factionalists to depose Kim Il Sung and start a rebellion.[107] The latter point is significant because Soviet documents do not indicate that either was directly involved in events leading up to the August Plenum.[108]

Yang's speech was followed by a number of additional speeches that denounced the factionalists. Some of the accusations are sexual in nature, others personal, but they add to a tide of abuse directed against factionalists. It is in such an atmosphere that Kim Tu-bong is told, at last, he may speak.[109] He began in a self-flagellating fashion, apologizing for not properly apologizing at a previous event, and then stated that he had no right to have held 'lofty positions', and that he was not well versed in Marxism-Leninism.[110] Speakers demanding to know about his 'anti-party anti-revolution' conspiracy soon interrupt him.[111] His accusers demanded to know

when and how he had plotted with Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, and when they were intending to declare the DPRK a neutral state. Kim responded in a rather rambling, incoherent fashion, admitting that he was guilty of having undertaken 'anti-party' activities', but not 'counter-revolutionary' ones.[112] Whether it was hostile atmosphere or his advanced years (he was 71 at the time), Kim was not able to conjure the response the audience wanted, and he was quickly told to get off the stage.[113]

Pak Ŭi-wan followed Kim with a speech that is similarly short. Pak begins by stating his gratitude to the Party for the 'love' it has given him and its efforts to 'educate' it him, he also admitted that he has not properly heeded demands for self-criticism. Yet, he proceeds to deny any knowledge of the intentions of those behind the August Plenum of 1956, saying he just believed the words of one of them (Kim Sŭng-hwa) and did what he was told. He said that he was the first to practice self-criticism, and that his lack of ideological consciousness was at the root of the nepotism and flunkeyism (seemingly a reference to the Soviet Union) that had fuelled his factionalism.[114]

Pak pleaded for forgiveness, but under cross-examination from other delegates, pointedly refused to admit that he had been involved in a conspiracy with other factionalists, and that he had not known that they were 'counter-revolutionaries' when he had collaborated with them.[115] He was then told to get off the stage, having refused to admit to many of the supposed crimes of the factionalists. Given the highly scripted nature of the rest of the event, it is remarkable that both Kim Tu-bong and Pak did not appear to have prepared remarks. They didn't appear to have been instructed what to say, nor yet had confessions coerced out of them. Perhaps defiance, partial or full, rather than penitence was what was expected of them before they were to be purged. But this does not explain why Yang Kye's confession is so tightly scripted by comparison.

They were followed by O Ki-sŏp. O is the one member of the domestic faction who is accused of factionalism and is in attendance. As with Pak Ŭi-wan, he declares he knew nothing of what was to happen at the August Plenum of 1956, but interestingly confesses to meeting with domestic faction members and offering them encouragement while being too frightened to act himself.[116] Kim Il Sung directly intervenes when O says that while he had not actively opposed the Party or Kim Il Sung, he had opposed the Organization Department of the Party. Kim wants to know who O planned to replace the current office holder with, and cross examination ends soon after.[117]

O was treated differently to Kim Tu-bong and Pak Ŭi-wan, who were summarily expelled from the proceedings when they resumed.[118] Kim Il Sung then gave a speech. He denounced the factionalists, including O, Pak and Kim Tu-bong, listing their many crimes, and asserting that:

> there is no evidence as yet that Kim Tu-bong, Pak Ŭi-wan and O Ki-sŏp participated in the counter-revolutionary uprising conspiracy. [But] Kim and Pak said let's overthrow the Party, and chase away the Party's Organizational Department. In other words, they were the same as factionalists. O Ki-sŏp didn't show his hand, but behind the scenes he acted like a thieving dog until he was discovered.[119]

Kim ended by saying that under the socialist principles of distribution, each shall be paid as much as they have earned, and that the conference shall decide what should be done with them. They are then expelled, along with all the other alleged factionalists in the next session, which ends with fresh elections to major central party organs.[120]

Conclusion

The Korean Worker's Party in 1958 was in the midst of a convulsive purge of its top leadership. Kim Il Sung and the KWP faced a country that remained poor, and backward by world standards. The First Conference of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) was an event that sealed the fate of leaders who sought closer relations with North Korea's erstwhile benefactors, China and the Soviet Union.

It was a highly important event in the history of the KWP and the North Korean state. It confirmed the growing economic and political isolation of North Korea, the unquestioned leadership of Kim Il Sung, with the final destruction of intra-party opposition, while also cementing a set of policies that would impoverish the North Korean people in the coming decades.

In 1953, the KWP had a relatively diverse leadership, which contained a range of views and preferences regarding the pursuit of both foreign and domestic policy. However, by March 1958, Kim Il Sung was in a position to create a monolithic elite of Manchurian Guerrillas and apparatchiks (economic and administrative technocrats) whose primary characteristic was their loyalty to his personage and his policy preferences. As has above, it is the First Party Conference to which we must look to see the final step in the process of purges that led to this point.

Notes

1. pward89@hotmail.com.
2. Kim Hak-jun, *North Korea's Fifty Year history* [북한의 50년사; Pukhanŭi 50nyŏnsa] (Seoul: Donga Press, 1995), p. 193.
3. The author would like to thank Fyodor for being so generous as to provide him with a copy of the minutes, as well as innumerable suggestions on the topic of this article.
4. James F. Person, "North Korea in 1956: reconsidering the August Plenum and the Sino-Soviet joint intervention," *Cold War History* (2018), pp. 16, 21.

5. On the emergence of factions see: Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960* (C. Hurst & Co.: London, 2002), pp. 77–109. For a dissenting view regarding the existence of factions: James F. Person, 'New Evidence on North Korea in 1956', *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (2006) 16, pp. 447–527.
6. For instance, see the case of O Ki-sŏp in 1948 see: Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I, The movement*, pp. 252–3.
7. Person, "North Korea in 1956: reconsidering the August Plenum and the Sino-Soviet joint intervention,", pp. 3–7.
8. On the latter, see: James Frederick Person, "Solidarity and Self-Reliance: The Antimonies of North Korean Foreign Policy and Juche Thought, 1953–1967," PhD Dissertation (George Washington University), p. 135.
9. Erik van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joesph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth Century Revolutionary Patriotism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2002), pp. 131–4.
10. The domestic faction has yet to receive book length treatment in English. On the domestic faction's activities in southern Korea see: Kim Nam-sik, *Investigation of the South Korean Communist Party* [남로당연구; Namrodangyŏngu] (Seoul: Tolbaegae, 1984).
11. On the Soviet faction, see the early work of Chong-Sik Lee and Ki-Wan Oh, 'The Russian Faction in North Korea, *Asian Survey* (8) 1967, pp. 270–288. Also see the more recent: Andrei N. Lankov, 'Kim Il Sung's Campaign against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of Chuch'e', *Korean Studies* (23) 1999, pp. 43–67.
12. Andrei Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956* (University of Hawai'i Press: Honolulu, 2005), p. 94.
13. On the Yanan Faction see: Byung Il Chung, 'The Role of Yeonanpa influencing on the National Construction of North Korea (sic)' [북한국가건설에 미친 연안파의 역할; Pukhangukkagŏnsŏlae Mich'in Yonanpaui Yŏkhal], *Korean Political Science Review* [한국정치학회보; Hangukjŏngch'ihakhwaebo] 46 (2012), pp. 145–167.
14. On Kim Il Sung's faction and the state that emerged under their rule see: Adrian Buzo, *The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea* (Boulder: Westland Press, 1999).
15. On this see: Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956*, pp. 93–113. Also see: Balázs Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964* (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 2005).
16. On the case of Hŏ Ka-I see: Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, pp. 136–153.
17. The escape and subsequent fates of some members of the Yanan faction is discussed in a path breaking recent study: Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, *A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung and Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 120–126.
18. Person, "North Korea in 1956: reconsidering the August Plenum and the Sino-Soviet joint intervention," pp. 14–17.
19. Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, pp. 143–174.
20. Person, "North Korea in 1956: reconsidering the August Plenum and the Sino-Soviet joint intervention," p. 1.
21. Sŏ Tong-man, The Formation of the North Korean Socialist System, 1945–1961 [북조선 사회주의 체제 성립사, 1945–1961; Pukchosŏn sahoejuŭi ch'eje sŏngnipsa, 1945–1961] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005), p. 775.
22. On withdrawal of Chinese forces and agreement surrounding it, see: Shen and Xia, *A Misunderstood Friendship*, pp. 112–119.
23. On the Soviet military government in North Korea see: Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, and also: Erik van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Berg, 1989).

24. On the role of Party Congresses see: Richard Sakwa, *Soviet Politics: In Perspective, 2nd Edition* (Oxon: Routledge, 1998), p. 93.
25. Sakwa, *Soviet Politics*, p. 93.
26. Graeme Gill, *Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 8.
27. Kim Hak-jun, *North Korea's Fifty Year history* [Pukhanŭi 50nyŏnsa] (Seoul: Donga Press, 1995), p. 193.
28. Sakwa, *Soviet Politics*, p. 93.
29. Frederick C Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–65* (Oxon: Routledge, 1993), pp. 142–3.
30. Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I, The movement*, p. 497.
31. Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I, The movement*, p. 515.
32. Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*, pp. 119–120.
33. Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, pp. 165–169.
34. Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, p. 167.
35. Shen and Xia, *A Misunderstood Friendship*, p. 130. On improving foreign relations coinciding with greater domestic repression also see: Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*, pp. 113–135.
36. Person, "Solidarity and Self-Reliance," pp. 150–1.
37. *Rodong Sinmun*, March 3rd 1958.
38. *Rodong Sinmun*, March 4th 1958.
39. *Rodong Sinmun*, March 5th 1958.
40. *Rodong Sinmun*, March 6th 1958.
41. See *Rodong Sinmun*, March 7th 1956.
42. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party* [조선로동당제1차대표자회의록; Chosŏnrodongdangjae1chadaepyojahwaehwaeŭirok]*: 1958.3.3–1958.3.6* (Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party: 1958), p. 119.
43. Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, pp. 153–4.
44. On population see: Nicolas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, *The Population of North Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of Asian Studies, 1992) pp. 28–32.
45. Ministry of National Unification, *2009 North Korea Handbook* [2009년 북한개조; 2009 nyŏnPukhan Kaejo] (Korea Institute for National Unification: Seoul, 2009) p. 48.
46. Nam-Sik Kim, 'North Korea's Power Structure and Foreign Relations: an Analysis of the Sixth Congress of the KWP', *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (2) 1982, p. 128.
47. 'National Conference [全国代表会议; Quánguódàibiǎohuìyì] 21st–31st March 1955', *News of the Communist Party of China* [中国共产党新闻; Zhōngguógòngchǎndǎngxīnwén] *(People's Daily)*, http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/151935/176588/176595/10555564.html, retrieved 27th December 2015.
48. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 120.
49. Eberstadt and Banister, *The Population of North Korea*, p. 83.
50. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 121.
51. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 121.
52. Kim Il Sung may or may not have finished middle school while living in Northeast China, but that seems to be the full extent of his formal education. On Kim Il Sung's education see: Dae-Sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (Columbia University Press: New York, 1988) pp. 3–8.
53. On Japanese colonial education in Korea policy see: Seong-cheol Oh and Ki-seok Kim, 'Expansion of Elementary Schooling under Colonialism: Top Down or Bottom up?' in Hong Yung Lee, Yong-Chool Ha & Clark W. Sorensen eds., *Colonial Rule & Social Change in Korea: 1910–1945* (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 2013), pp. 121–131.
54. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 3.

55. On the purge of the 'Kapsan faction' in 1967 see: Jae-cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009) pp. 37–40.
56. *North Korea who's who* [북한인명사전; Pukhaninmyŏngsajŏn] 1990 (Joongang Daily Publishers: Seoul, 1990), p. 352.
57. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 499.
58. Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part II, The society* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 1350–1381.
59. For relevant biographical data see: *North Korea who's who*, p. 13, p. 23, p. 48, p. 95, p. 99–100, p. 119, p. 127, p. 147, p. 170, p. 171, p. 180, p. 186, p. 189, p. 207, p. 223, p. 270, p. 279, p. 305, p. 310, p. 318, pp. 345–6, p. 373, p. 410, p. 414, p. 415, p. 420 pp. 429–30, p. 432.
60. On this movement see: Sŏ Tong-man, *The Formation of the North Korean Socialist System*, p. 200.
61. *Minutes from the First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 3–49.
62. Indeed, the plan seems to have become largely non-operational from mid-1958, as mass mobilizations of workers in the new Ch'ollima Movement supplanted centrally set norms. See: Buzo, *The Guerilla Dynasty*, pp. l 62–3. For an alternative perspective on economic performance in this period see: Hy-Sang lee, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress* (Westport: Praeger, 2001) pp. 23–44.
63. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 90–1, p. 264, p. 278. The final reference is interesting because it deals with exports, and the speaker refers to the displeasure of India with North Korea's substandard export quality.
64. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 168–170.
65. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 150.
66. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 173, p. 261. For a discussion of 'sectionalism' in the Soviet economy see: Stephen Fortescue, 'The Primary Party organizations of branch ministries', in Peter J. Potichnyj ed. *The Soviet Union: Party and Society* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988) pp. 26–7; Paul R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004), pp. 173–177.
67. For instance, Ri Chŏn-ho (at the time, a candidate member of the CC), the second delegate to deliver a response to Ri Jong-ok's speech, detailed the presence of a certain individual by the name of Ryu Chun-un (seemingly Yanan faction) at the Coal Industry Ministry. Ryu's major 'anti-party act' was considering the 'Dig Fast Movement' to be of 'secondary importance'. See: *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 84–5.
68. Hy-Sang lee, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress*, pp. 35–6.
69. See: *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 25–32; pp. 40–44.
70. Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, p. 123. Yun was actually the first to give a speech denouncing Kim Il Sung at that very plenum.
71. For references in the minutes see: *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 211–12.
72. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 215. Similar accusations are also made later by Hyŏn Mu-gwang (South Hamgyŏng People's Committee Chairman), see: *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 332.
73. On merchants in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, see: Alan M. Ball, *Russia's Last Capitalists: The Nepmen, 1921–1929* (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1990).
74. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 229, 335.
75. On this famine, see: Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Krushchev Era*, p. 62–65.
76. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 168.
77. On this phenomenon see: Janos Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 184.
78. Andrei Lankov, Personal Communication (5th February 2018).
79. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 98.

80. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 204.
81. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 103.
82. Paul Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives* (University of Cambridge: New York, 2004), p. 247.
83. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 273.
84. On the initial debate and its consequences in the Soviet Union see: Greogory Guroff, 'The Red-Expert Debate: Continuities in the State-Entrepreneur Tension', in Gregory Guroff, Fred V. Carstensen eds., *Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1983), pp. 201–222.
85. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 362.
86. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 304.
87. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 304.
88. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 331–2.
89. Balazs Szalontai refers to the plot in the military, but not how it was revealed at the conference nor the details of the alleged plot. See: Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Krushchev Era*, p. 120.
90. Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part I, The movement*, pp. 497–8.
91. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 319.
92. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 321.
93. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 321.
94. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 322.
95. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 323.
96. For recent research on the topic see: Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*, pp. 136–42.
97. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 319.
98. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 419.
99. For negative references to Japan see: *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 145 and p. 321.
100. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 160.
101. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 285, p. 397.
102. A full scale show trial of a member of the domestic faction who had allegedly spied for the Americans while also heading the occupation government in Seoul when the North Korean Army occupied it in 1950.
103. See, Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, pp. 93–99, on the trial of Pak Hŏn-yŏng.
104. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, pp. 129–131.
105. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 336.
106. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 340.
107. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 340–1.
108. See: Lankov, *Crisis in North Korea*.
109. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 420.
110. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 420–1.
111. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 421.
112. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 421–3.
113. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 423.
114. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, pp. 424–5.
115. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 427.
116. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 437–8.
117. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 439–40.
118. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 441.
119. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 465.
120. *First Conference of the Korean Workers Party*, p. 491–504.

Clothing, Food and Dwelling: Western Views of Korean Life in the Early Nineteenth Century

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Abstract

Despite Chosŏn Korea having been nicknamed the 'Hermit Kingdom' by the American William Elliot Griffis in 1882, Englishmen had already been there in the early half of the nineteenth century. This paper considers three journeys by westerners to the Korean peninsula in 1816, 1832 and 1845, utilizing these explorers' travel diaries to analyze lifestyles in Chosŏn, including clothing, food, and dwelling style. The paper considers westerners' lively views on the lifestyles of citizens of Chosŏn. Although these narratives from westerners on Chosŏn are tinged with orientalism or racist bias, they still have a great deal of value for historians today who seek to understand everyday life and the social structure of nineteenth-century Chosŏn. This paper sheds light on these useful historical perspectives for the observation of Chosŏn lifestyles in contrast to the high politics of the court, or great power rivalries in East Asia.

Keywords: Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn, Perceptions, Clothing, Food, Dwelling

Introduction

Much research on westerners' early encounters with Korea has tended to focus on its theological or political characteristics, paying little attention to daily life.[2] Everyday life in Chosŏn has been gradually discussed since the 1990s, influenced

by the German *Alltagsgeschichte* and French *Annales* schools of thought within Korean academia.[3] Although there are some specific studies on clothing, food and dwelling styles, they were mainly based on Chosŏn's historical texts and English language academia is still in the process of introducing more Korean language historical works.[4] Only a few studies have appeared that examine the more complex cultural aspects of early westerners experience in Korea.[5] Utilizing G.E. Zhaoguang's concept of "Imaginary Foreign Land,"[6] this paper tries to introduce the observation of daily life in Chosŏn in the early nineteenth century from the perspective of westerners eyes. The paper does so not simply to recall simple life in Chosŏn, but also to discover value and belief systems, such as caste system, popular trends, and village life.

Despite the opening of Chosŏn's ports in the late 19th century, several groups of westerners had already been to Chosŏn and experienced life there directly in the first half of the 19th century. This paper will utilize two primary sets of sources, six voyage diaries written by these westerners to the Korean peninsula in 1816, 1832, and 1845, as well as an English periodical called *The Chinese Repository* (henceforth *CR*), published in Canton (Guangzhou), from 1832 to 1851. Sometimes, these westerners' narratives may also combine personal preferences and opinions. This phenomenon belongs to what Mary Louise Pratt defined as "transculturation" or "contact zone," where voyage diaries may involve conditions of orientalism, racial superiority, early imperialism and colonialism as western "civilization and enlightenment" met Chosŏn society.[7] Although more recently Hyaeweol Choi[8] has used the concept of "contact zones" to illustrate gender and mission encounter in the lives of Korean 'new women' during the period of Japanese colonization; this term is also appropriate to discuss the early western entrances to the Korean peninsula even before the opening of the nation's ports. More precisely places such as Port Hamilton or Komundo 거문도[9] and Jeju island[10] where westerners had interacted with the Koreans could also be called 'contact zones'. Meanwhile, transculturation in process when westerners taught Koreans to manufacture wine and observed authentic Korean cultures and customs. With this intellectual framework in mind, the paper intends to shed light on the discourses within the narratives provided by the voyage diaries and periodical material and to depict the authentic everyday life of Chosŏn.

The West Encounters Chosŏn Korea

Since the early 17th century, Britain had more systematically begun to seek commercial exploration and development in the outside world. British foreign policies were also made to fit these economic needs. The British East India

Company (BEIC) was established in London in 1600 as an efficient vehicle to seek potential markets, sell products and to collect more materials. Two British voyages listed in this paper were connected with this company. In 1816, at the request of the BEIC, the British government sent Lord William Amherst to Beijing to promote intercourse with China. In 1832 the British East India Company intended to certify the possibility of trade with China or the opening of any ports there, sending an exploration team under the leadership of Hugh Hamilton Lindsay (son of the past Chairman of the company Hugh Primrose Lindsay).

Overall, there were three voyages in 1816, 1832 and 1845, which constitute the most influential voyages from the West to the Korean peninsula in the early 19th century.[11] There were six records published based on these voyages, illustrating the early images of Korea in combination with articles published in *CR*, an English language periodical published in Canton from 1832 to 1851. The primary purpose of *CR* was to provide Protestant missionaries working in Asia with knowledge of China. Despite the focus on China, other Asian areas were also illustrated, including neighboring countries such as Korea, and this paper will also utilize these contents.

First, to promote commerce between China and Britain, on February 9, 1816, a British embassy was sent to China under the Right Honorable Lord William Amherst, setting off from the Solent in England aboard the frigate HMS Alceste, captained by Murray Maxwell, C.B. and entering the Yellow Sea on August 11th. During the period when the embassy paid a visit to Peking, Captains Murry Maxwell and Basil Hall had the chance to lead HMS Alceste and Lyra respectively to examine surrounding seas. They landed in Korea on September 1, 1816, and left after ten days. The primary purpose of this voyage to the coast of Korea was evidently to gain as much information as possible to pave the way for subsequent voyages.[12]

Following these pioneering footsteps, during another voyage aiming for northern China in a ship named after Lord Amherst, the crew also visited the Korean peninsula and stayed there for one month in 1832. According to the plans of the British East India Company, the expedition was initially intended to ascertain the possibility of functional intercourse between China and Britain. Besides the Chinese coast, those of Korea, Japan and the Loo-chew (Ryukyu) islands were also to be considered. Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, the East India Company's Secretary in Canton, was entrusted with this mission and employed Rev. Charles Gutzlaff, a Prussian born missionary, as an interpreter. After the voyage, Lindsay submitted his report to the East India Company while Gutzlaff published his *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China*. Within this account, the second voyage includes the visit to the Korean peninsula from July 17 to August 17 1832. "It was true that

they had never had any intercourse with foreign nations except the Mantchou Tartars, Chinese, and Japanese," Gutzlaff wrote, "but we came hither for the purpose of bringing on such intercourse for the mutual benefit of both nations."[13] The purpose was repeated more formally and politely in the letter to the King of Chosŏn, in the 32nd year of Sunjo's reign. This letter was also mentioned in the court records of Chosŏn on July 21, in the 32nd year of his reign Sunjo Sillok (True Records of the Reign of King Sunjo).[14]

In addition to developing interactions with Korea, another aim of the voyage was to engage in religious evangelism and proselytization. Those involved failed in their first objective. However, they made much more progress with regards to knowledge of the geography of the Korean peninsula and provided geographic information for westerners' arrival in the peninsula in the late 19th century. Concerning the second goal, they were unable to establish any protestant organization, however, they succeeded in distributing the Bible in the country.[15] After the voyage to Korea, western missionaries confirmed that Korea was accessible to Christianity.

For the third time, after the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, England sent the HMS Samarang to conduct more detailed observations of countries passed on voyages between Britain and China. Admiral Edward Belcher captained the expedition and landed on the Korean peninsula at present-day Udo (Cow Island) off Quelpart (Jeju) on June 25 1845 and later visited Jeju Island and nearby islands departing on July 31st.[16] These 40 days provided an excellent chance to conduct a precise survey of Korea. Therefore, this voyage could also be viewed as a surveying expedition or a scientific voyage.

Meanwhile, the government also tried to utilize HMS Samarang to obtain a report from Admiral Sir Edward Belcher, who had scientific and surveying experience and who gladly gave his services to promote the contribution made by the voyage to the field of hydrology and hydrological knowledge: "Sir Edward is firm of opinion that it would tend more to the general interests of navigation if such testimonial stood upon a position where its benefit would be generally useful to the navigation of the China Seas, as well as to the Straits."[17] On the expedition with Admiral Belcher, the English naturalist and physician Arthur Adams served as Assistant Surgeon, providing elaborate illustrations of Korean physical and human geography through his careful observations. Therefore, this voyage has even been characterized as scientifically important in the field of natural history.

Although all three voyages to Korea shared the same goal to gain further information on the Korean peninsula, they differed with regard to their original objectives, characteristics of the records produced, and correspondent results. Based on documents from these voyages, this paper tries to analyze westerners'

recognition of Chosŏn's culture especially clothing, food, and dwelling. Though there are fundamental cultural and political aspects shared across the globe, different nations can still represent unique features. Through this analysis, the paper encounters the delicate illustrations and differing opinions of the westerners.

Appearance and Clothing

When entering a foreign land, apart from natural views, the natives' appearance and their customs of dress stand out. Located in Asia, Korean people must have something in common with the other Asian nations but still have unique features and customs as Koreans. The descriptions of their appearance are thought to be objective according to what these westerners had seen.

In the 1818 voyage, Korean people were illustrated to have a wild or even savage appearance, demonstrating westerners' relatively negative initial impressions of Koreans. Basil Hall's description illustrates this point well:

> The dress of these people is a loose white robe, cloth shoes, and a few wear the broad hats; by most the hair is tied in a high conical knot on the top of the head, but by others, it is allowed to fly loose, so as to give them a wild appearance. Some confine the short hair by a small gauze band with a star on one side, forming, along with the top knot, rather a becoming head-dress. Their beards and whiskers which had never been cut, and their fans and long tobacco-pipes, and their strange language and manners, gave a grotesque air to the whole group, which it is impossible to describe.[18]

Judging from their casual dress styles, Basil Hall was more likely to have met some ordinary Korean residents because he recorded that their hair might be styled loosely or their beards may have never been cut. There is no wonder Hall's first impression was that Korean's appearance was genuinely savage. This stubborn poor impression had not changed even by Charles Gutzlaff's voyage diary from 1832, namely that Koreans were not clean or tidy enough.[19]

In the 1845 voyage, westerners' observations of the appearance of Koreans and their costumes are closer to the social norms of Chosŏn. Edward Belcher concentrated on the Chosŏn natives' beards, hairstyle, hats, clothes. There were even several pictures of Chosŏn natives drawn in the diary, including a Korean chief with a notable hat and long flowing beard while another picture illustrates a group of Koreans with flowing beards as well.[20]

Belcher's companion, Arthur Adams, proved that ethnic Koreans resembled members of tribes in areas of northern Asia, known at the time as Tartary, in personal appearance especially their cheek-bones, eyes, nose, and beard.



Picture 1 "Korean Chief"



Picture 2 "Group of Koreans"

> In personal appearance, they resemble the natives of Siberia and Tartary. Like most Mongolians they have a tawny skin, prominent cheek-bones, some obliquity of the eyes; a rather prominent nose, thick at its base, and wide at the nostrils; strong, well-developed jaws, and long, lank, straight, black hair; but like some tribes of northern Asia, their beard is tolerably thick, and their eyebrows bushy. Their bearing bolder, their Tartar-like features more prominent and striking, and their beards and mustaches being frequently long and flowing.[21]

Belcher's statement on the similarity of the people of Chosŏn's physical appearance in comparison to people from North Asia and Tartary was held in common with the editors of *CR*. Repeatedly, the *CR* stated that citizens of Chosŏn resembled East Asians in manners, characteristics and customs especially in comparison with the Chinese and Japanese. Despite being only familiar with a second-hand illustration of its citizens, Samuel Williams still made an explicit comparison with Koreans when describing the appearance of Japanese people, saying that Japanese and Koreans looked the same so far as their short necks, snub-noses, high cheek-bones and inferior stature were concerned.[22] Unconsciously, this evaluation exposes an orientalist strand in the westerners' opinions. Later in James MacDonald's narratives, he said again that a Korean man's eyes resembled those of a Japanese man.[23]

During the 1840s the *CR* continued to assert that Koreans were of a Tartar origin, resembling Chinese in manners, customs, arts, sciences, religions, characters, costumes and even hairstyle.[24] Adams, in 1845, gave a representative illustration of delicately tied Korean hairstyles, stating that hairstyles in Chosŏn imitated the fashion of Han Chinese, another connection to the East Asian culture. Interestingly, Adams even recognized the different hairstyle of married men and unmarried boys. The differences among girls were not mentioned here. However, similarly to boys, there was also a difference in whether they tied their hair upwards in the middle:

> One of the most striking peculiarities which all who have seen them have noticed is the method of confining the hair of the head in a delicate network, beautifully formed of a fine material resembling Coir, and of a glossy black color. The hair is all drawn upwards towards the crown of the head is tied at the summit in a neat and rather graceful topknot, without the help however of pins, as at Loo-Cho. The young unmarried men and boys, however, have the hair parted in the middle, gathered behind, and descending in two long plaited tails, that hang down the back somewhat in the fashion of those of the sons of Han. Frequently a white band of bark or leaf is worn across the forehead, to restrain the loose and straggling hairs.[25]

Concerning this comment on citizens of Chosŏn similarity to Chinese citizens, the *CR* editor stated that: "there are, in the habits of the Koreans, resemblances to the former Ming dynasty, is doubtless true; but we can hardly receive the

unqualified affirmation, that 'they preserve the ancient costumes of China,' wholly unchanged."[26] From this we could conclude that the editors of *CR* must have gained knowledge from previous publications focused on Korea, and tried to provide a more accurate perspective, in particular that there must have some changes of clothing styles in Chosŏn following introduction of those styles from China. In other words, more reasonably, Korea inherited some traditions from the Ming Dynasty while they did also develop their own creative features.

Dress Exposes Social Classes

Not only had westerners described the people of Chosŏn in detail but they had also noticed differences between them in status and identity. Chosŏn people strictly followed social and class traditions of uniform dress, which were composed of at least four levels. This class stratification has been true across Chosŏn's history; the four classes were the *Yangban* (aristocracy), *Jungin* (bureaucratic middle people), *Sangmin* (common people), and *Cheonin* (base people).

From drawings shown previously, the Yangban as the superior class wore notable clothes and were served by some 'aesthete' attendants.[27] Similarly, Adams also stated that the upper class, Chosŏn Yangban or chiefs were attractive in their elegant decorations on hats and crown.

> The Mandarins, or chiefs of the better class, wear long gowns or mantles, with loose hanging sleeves, having red or green cuffs … Their hats are of enormous size, with very broad brims, and are of a slight and slender texture, being ingeniously made of a network of bamboo, stained black. The crown is very peculiar, high, and conical, and two or three peacock's feathers appended to a carved ivory ball on the pointed apex, hang gracefully over the capacious brim. The hats of the Mandarins are usually furnished with strings of large amber beads, to fasten them under the chin … The soldiers wear a plaited string from the crown of their hats, with a quantity of red horse-hair depending from it at the hind part of the rim.[28]

The various objects used to furnish hats such as bamboo, amber beads, peacock's feathers, red horse-hair all represent a kind of nobility and luxury. The upper class (probably *Yangban*) could fully show their superiority by wearing hats of enormous-size attached with luxurious, expensive ornaments, a grandiose set of material values accepted in the upper class. They also wore elegant Chinese silks.[29] Although in the broad social environment the government of Chosŏn advocated industry and thrift, its upper class emitted an air of extravagance.

Inferior to the upper class, second-class officers (probably *Jungin*) were robust, powerful men including the soldiers and some civilians. They usually wore coarse tunics, loose trousers, and straw sandals with a hat, and appeared a little dirty.

> The second-class officers are robust powerful men, ranging between the height of five feet seven and nine. Their dress is coarse, and their manners in character with their subordinate situations. The soldiers are of the Tartar feature and build, sturdy compact men, of broader features, and probably averaging five feet six to eight. Their dress consists of the simple bluish coarse grass-cloth tunic, confined at the waist with very loose unbleached trousers, reaching to the knee, and straw sandals. The hat is generally of a dirty brown felt.[30]

The lower class, probably *Sangmin*, would appear almost as sturdy fishermen while the lowest class—*Cheonin* refers to laborers. Women were also considered to belong to this lowest class and even had to do heavy, physical work.[31] Europeans were surprised to know that Chosŏn's powerful men could have the strength to lift much heavier things, especially given the short stature of their bodies. To release the heavy stress from farming, Chosŏn men turned to tobacco pipes. Westerners thus discovered that Koreans were great smokers, always carrying in their hands a long-stemmed pipe, with a diminutive brass bowl, which they filled or emptied at brief intervals.[32] However, when it came to their manners, exempting the upper, superior class, Koreans gave a poor impression of having filthy personal hygiene and habits.[33] It is thus possible to judge the enormous gap between aristocratic and lower class in Chosŏn society.

Overall, the people of Chosŏn were more like other East Asians especially those of what was then known as Tartary (Mongolia, Xinjiang etc), when it came to their personal appearance with short necks, snub-noses, high cheek-bones, and small stature. Their clothes and costumes, especially officials' crowns, hats, and beards, differed in status from the superior Yangban class, the second of powerful men to the lowest laboring class or even females. Except for the upper class's proper manners and nobility, other classes tended to be wild, dirty and filthy in westerners' eyes. These illustrations may have had some truth in them at the time so far as the appearance and dress of some Koreans were concerned, given that Chosŏn suffered from poverty in rural areas. There is no denying however that compared to their perceived advanced home civilizations, westerners may have exhibited prejudice at their first sight of this very foreign nation and could not appreciate its beauty.

Chosŏn Females: The Lowest Laboring Class

Despite limited descriptions of women in these narratives, there is still a need to consider the image of the female figure in Chosŏn to see what kind of roles they played in society. From Basil Hall's point of view, Korean women were somewhat rough and stout while their clothes, robe, petticoat, and hairstyle, were complex.

> They [women] looked stout, were fairer in complexion than the men, and were dressed in a long white robe, loose and open in front, with a petticoat of the same color reaching a little below the knees, their hair was tied in a large knot behind; a small piece of white cloth was thrown loosely over the head to protect them from the rays of the sun. Some women were engaged in husking rice in a mortar with a wooden beater; these had no dress above the waist. In a square flat place near the village a number of women and children were employed winnowing corn by pouring it from a height so that the husks blew away.[34]

Females' tough image, loose dress, and bareheaded hairstyle were suitable for engaging in farming and explained why westerners stated that women also belonged to the lowest laboring class. Hall even compared women's clothes with those of slaves, marking and asserting the inferior status of females again.[35] Moreover, rural women were reported to be bareheaded, their hair tied in a knot at the top without ornament, giving a real sense of the appearance of agricultural people in Chosŏn society.

At the same time, Hall discovered a unique dressing style among Chosŏn females, a short upper dress with an unconnected petticoat. The short upper dress was typical not only in the case of lower-class women of Chosŏn, but also for elegant aristocratic ladies and very different from Chinese ladies' long dresses. However, it would also be possible to see the differences in superiority of materials and in design of dress to judge the class identities of Korean women.

What is ironic and sad given all of this, is that Korean men were apparently indifferent to females' great efforts. Korean females were rarely seen, and whenever found, they were always working, winnowing grain, taking their children to their own work or even running away from observers. As Lindsay described, Korean women:

> are generally robust, and I should say are treated with very little consideration by their partners, as almost every day we saw the women employed in various kinds of labor in front of the village, while numerous groups of men were sauntering about in various directions, and reclining on mats, never assisted them in their work, and rarely spoke to them, excepting to drive them into village whenever one of our boats approached the shore.[36]

While women were working hard, their partners were wandering nearby and failing to assist them in heavy laboring work, evidently exposing the unbalanced patriarchal family system of Chosŏn to the westerners. Although half a century had gone by between voyages, the condescending image of Korean females as far as westerners were concerned remained. It was suggested that: "The females we saw were very ugly, very dirty, and much more degraded in appearance than the men."[37] There was apparently a very serious social and class cleavage between male and female.

When Frenchmen walked on the shore of Korea in 1851, females, as laborers, were also seen plowing up the low ground for rice transplantation. Whenever foreigners showed up, men would shout for their women to stop and hide.[38] Given all of this evidence, westerners' perspective was that Chosŏn women were required to be obedient to their male partners, secluded from the outside world and concentrate only on those things they were supposed to do.

Due to a lack of strength to engage in agricultural work, older women could no longer engage in farming work. Hall visited an innocent and homely old lady, consistent with a conventional image of casual and disinterested elderly people in Korea.[39] She was described as traditional or 'homely', but almost every resident of Chosŏn was supposed to reside in their home village throughout their life. They may have never been to anywhere else except the small village in which they were born. This intense commitment to the hometown could be attributed to the influence of Confucianism, and this ideology had confined Chosŏn females to their husband's demands mentally and the farming land physically throughout their life.

Overall, the image of a woman of Chosŏn was not beautiful or elegant, but instead they were described as relatively robust and stout. Women were not noticed but whenever met, they were always farming while caring for their babies. It appeared that in comparison with beautiful European women Koreans dressed in a lowly fashion, like slaves, leaving a negative impression on westerners in the early 19th century. Equally, males paid no attention to their partners' hard work but sought to simply enjoy themselves. According to their narratives, westerners realized Chosŏn was a feudal, patriarchal society where women were almost considered to belong to the lowest laboring class with no status at all. As passing travelers they were unable to again access to the women of the superior, aristocratic or royal class. Certainly, they did not get the chance to appreciate the beauty of Korean women but left with a poor impression of Chosŏn females.

Lifestyle and Eating Habits

Due to geographical differences, areas in the interior of Korea and at the coast conducted farming or fishing differently, and the eating habits of their residents differed. Every explorer stayed in and observed only a few villages. Therefore, their descriptions were limited to what they witnessed and sometimes the description of one maybe the opposite to the other. However it is certain that the two forms of agrarian civilization were representative of the Neo-Confucian nation where commerce was restricted. Farming and fishing will be introduced along with the products, eating habits and manners in the following section.

Farming Civilization

Charles Gutzlaff and his companions witnessed farming civilization in 1832 Godaedo (now in South Chungcheongnam-do), on the north-west coast of Korea. They commented that the vegetation was much superior to China because Chosŏn people could cultivate everywhere regardless of the barrenness of the land. Nevertheless, they still could not feed their inhabitants. "In point of vegetation, the coast of Corea is far superior to that of China, where barren rocks often preclude any attempt at cultivation; but here, where the land is fertile, the inhabitants do not plough the ground."[40]

By contrast, it was a pity that residents left the fertile land alone, which was supposed to be used to relieve the food shortage problem. Gutzlaff noted the prevalence of hunger:

> On the whole, the food of its people seems to be very scanty; they eat everything and swallow it voraciously. It is most lamentable that so fertile a soil in so temperate a climate, which might maintain its thousands, now scarcely subsists a few hundreds.[41]

In 1845, food problems were confirmed again in Edward Belcher's records; however, he blamed the scarcity on the poor quality of the soil. The agricultural activity Belcher witnessed is completely confined to the fields along the coastline of Jeju island, therefore, his account is widely different from Gutzlaff's assessments of the fertility of the Godaedo soil.[42] Belcher's view of Jeju's agricultural situation was as follows:

The productions of the island do not appear to be at all equal to the needs of the population, and are in very small variety; Rice, Wheat, Barley, Sweet Potatoes, large Russian Radish, Maize, and small garden produce, comprise all that we noticed, either in the grounds under cultivation, or amongst the people. This does not appear the result of any deficiency in a land fit for cultivation, but rather in the very poor nature of the soil.[43]

In addition to Belcher's assessment of agricultural cultivation on the island he suggested that hoes and spades had been the only hand implements introduced from China. Last but not least, Belcher explained that Jeju was once the site of one of Chosŏn's penal settlements, further accounting for the underdeveloped state of agricultural cultivation. These condemned people would be removed as soon as the term of their punishment expired. So no individual was willing to make the effort to improve the barren soil, and neither would his descendants do it.[44] Even worse, these agricultural workers needed to submit the majority of their harvest to the local government; overexploitation of their labor subdued farmers' motivations and worsened the food shortage. Therefore when it came to agricultural civilization, as far as the westerners were concerned, Chosŏn appeared far from advanced.

Although Belcher and Gutzlaff had been to different villages at different times, both concluded that Chosŏn's agricultural products were insufficient for its domestic needs. Gutzlaff at one point praised the Korean harvest even in barren soil.[45] Nevertheless, agricultural implements such as hoes and spades found in 1845 exposed its under-developed approach. In other words, in this period in the middle of the 19th century, barren soil in the hills and old, inefficient agricultural tools and technology had worsened Korea's food supply issues.

As mentioned above, farming in Korea harvested a variety of rice, wheat, barley, sweet potato, sizeable Russian radish, maize, bean which had become staple foods in Chosŏn but other fruits were not found there. In a month's stay on the Korean peninsula, Charles Gutzlaff did not find any orchard or garden. Occasionally, he discovered peach trees and grapes growing wild. Gutzlaff was astonished that inhabitants of Chosŏn did not plant these useful trees let alone produce wine from their fruit. Chosŏn residents were said to be ignorant of wine, though they occasionally ate grapes, which were somewhat sour. Gutzlaff described how farmers in Korea cultivated excellent grapes and made a pleasant beverage of the juice of them.[46] Since there were some Yangban who had drunk the wine on board ships, they could not believe that sweet wine cannot be extracted from sour grapes. Besides this, Gutzlaff and his colleagues taught Chosŏn citizens not only the method of producing wine but also how to plant potatoes. When the westerners went outside to plant potatoes, they also wrote down the directions for Chosŏn residents to follow to ensure success. This was the primary introduction of potatoes from the south, and later on, potatoes were planted frequently, becoming a significant food for Koreans to survive food scarcity and starvation.[47] During Belcher's visit to Korea in 1845, he also left a few seeds of various melons, cucumbers, orange, shaddock, Chinese plum, pumpkin, mustard, cress, and lettuce.[48] These plants also became early agricultural and plant imports.

Commonly Seen Fish

At the same time as farming the land, inhabitants of Chosŏn were able to enjoy fish by utilizing their natural advantages given as peninsula's extensive coastlines to develop their fishing and fishing capabilities. Dried fish frequently appeared on the menus that the westerners were served. Gutzlaff and his companions once were treated with dried salt fish and fermented liquor. Chosŏn people, lacking religious sensibilities themselves, did not understand that the Indian Lascars employed as crews on the British ships were unable to taste the things offered them due to religious prohibitions and restrictions. During Belcher's stay in Korea, the Chosŏn residents tried to invite the staff of the HMS Samarang to land and

prepared some food in case the westerners declined their invitation, for them to take back. The contents were fish, vegetables, pickles, rice, and sake, in white metal and porcelain vessels. Fish frequently appeared as commonly received gifts from the Chosŏn people, confirming the ease of access to them and the great social value to them of products from the sea. Indeed, there is a large variety of fish along the East Sea. Even Adams, as a geographer, was unable to complete and conclude his account of the contents of Korea's seas as thousands of fish and various species were observed.

Later in James MacDonald's record, fish as a main dish is recorded together with other various foods. The host ordered a meal for French guests, consisting of boiled rice, dried fish, slices of beef, vegetables, seaweed, and a species of sea slug, accompanied by Samshoo (A Chinese liquor) and a beverage which tasted like cider.[49] From all these previous records, we can imagine how fish played a vital role in the daily life of Chosŏn. There was of course a massive gap between the food options of upper-class *Yangban* and people of lower classes. Aristocrats and scholarly bureaucrats were able to have a splendid dinner while others would starve due to the food shortage.

Aside from the food served at meal times, fishing-nets and fish were spread to dry on the ground in most houses. When Hall entered one deserted house, he found heaps of corn and straw, rice in wooden vessels, but fish were the most prevalent food items. "Cooking utensils were lying about, and a number of fishing lines coiled neatly in baskets, and split fish spread out to dry on the top of little corn ricks on one side of the court."[50] Gutzlaff also went to a temple with dried fish laid on the ground.[51]

During the westerners' stay in Chosŏn, they experienced meal customs. According to Lindsay, the tasty and delicious Korean cuisine may have gained some reputation in the West, and they even knew how to enjoy it.

> The customs of the Koreans at their meals, it appears, are similar to the Japanese; each guest has a separate little table of about a foot high before him, the chopsticks used are like the Chinese, but they carry a small knife at their girdle to cut their meat with. Most of the dishes, though cold, proved so palatable, that we ended by making a very hearty repast, greatly to the delight of the chiefs.[52]

This detailed illustration exhibited three central customs of a Chosŏn meal. Similar to inhabitants of Japan or China, people of Chosŏn used a separate table and chopsticks, which were also accounted for in James MacDonald's record.

> The dish was served up on small tables of about fifteen inches in height, convenient enough for the posture of the natives. The rice was served up in bowls made of metal, apparently a mixture of brass, with small flat dishes of

> common earthenware. Uniquely, the chopsticks were composed of the same metal and flat in shape.[53]

Even to this day Koreans still keep the habit of using metal utensils. Surprisingly, they shared the same habit of using a small knife to cut the meat, different from Mongolia tradition by using the hands. Another feature is that the most dishes were cold and palatable, earning the westerners' praise. These small dishes must have been Korean side dishes (known as Banchan 반찬), prepared in advance. If the types of side dishes are various and delicate, then the whole cuisine could have been enjoyable for the western visitors.

Overall, as explorers' observations on Chosŏn society and culture developed, it tended to become more and more complete, including some details such as the farming civilization and eating habits in comparison with other Asian countries. Some even indicated Chosŏn's slight development such as in housing conditions, fishing, and shipbuilding in the first half of the 19th century. Moreover, with the further communications between the West and Chosŏn, there were some cultural exchanges taking place simultaneously. For example, while trying to grasp the Korean alphabet, the westerners taught Chosŏn residents several English expressions. From the foreigners, Chosŏn learnt about potato planting, wine producing and acquired the seeds of some western vegetables. However, westerners' generous behaviors may have also derived from missionaries' ambitions to spread the Christian gospel.

Dwelling

Not consisting of a separate category, housing-related comments were scattered throughout the explorers' writings. Exploring and experiencing Koreans homes and household practices was made difficult as the Chosŏn government had restrictions on communications between residents and foreigners. Westerners could not enter Korean villages let alone have a tour of individual houses. Westerners were also reluctant to interrupt natives' normal lives and declined some dinner invitations. At that time, to grasp lifestyles in Chosŏn was not the main focus of the visitors. Instead, geographical information seemed to be more valuable to them. Luckily, along with their expedition records which provides this information, they had recorded their daily activities which involved some descriptions of the living conditions of Chosŏn people.

Due to its insufficiency and poverty, housing in Chosŏn left a poor first impression on the western visitors. According to their recollections, they had formed an image of Chosŏn villages as dirty and muddy and scattered throughout the fields, with reeds and straw covered roofs. Hall's account describes as much:

> The village consists of forty houses rudely constructed of reeds plastered with mud, the roofs are of all shapes, and badly thatched with reeds and straw, tided down by straw ropes. These huts are not disposed in streets, but are scattered about without order, and without any neatness, or cleanliness, and the spaces between them are occupied by piles of dirt and pools of muddy water. The valley in which this comfortless village is situated is, however pretty enough, though not wooded.[54]

According to Lindsay, we know that the Chosŏn village they visited had a wattle fence twelve feet high, but no other houses nearby.[55] As a result, the westerners did not get the chance to see the structure and building style of these houses. Without access, Gutzlaff still tried to give some descriptions of their outlook.[56] However, after his observation, he gave an extremely miserable judgment: "Every house is surrounded with a fence of dry bamboo: these cottages are generally built very compact and in squares, having small lanes between the squares. Such are the dreary abodes where the Koreans pass their life amidst filth and poverty." Compact and square structures and dreary abodes may have indicated the poor development conditions in the agricultural society of late Chosŏn.

However, there is a high possibility that compactly built cottages would be more convenient and efficient in an agricultural society. Especially in the case of inland villages, by living closer, residents in the same cottage could help each other or harvest together or to fight against natural disasters as was the case according to the rules of some villages such as *Gye*, *Dure*, *Pumasi*.[57] Similarly, *Hyeopho sari* refers to the practice and tradition of some inferior laborers having lived in landowners' houses in order to provide their physical strength. This practice formed the basic living conditions for laborers in many places, a third of counties in Chosŏn.[58] Those laborers' houses of no more than three rooms, were built as extensions to their large landowners' houses. Although their houses may have been a little smaller than the owners' houses, it did not mean that they felt unsatisfied with life. Instead, compact living conditions could be attributed to the Confucian collective culture of Chosŏn.

Since Gutzlaff did not witness these social forms of organization, he could not view the collective building styles positively. Instead, he proposed that Koreans were suffering from filth and poverty without actually having had any contact with the natives. Probably, as a westerner from a culture in which the individual and individual property had prime importance, it would be hard for him to understand the collective culture of living in such compact communities.

Enjoyable Living Environment, or an "Eden"

Even Hall's poor impression was ameliorated by another accidental visit to an uninhabited house. Although the kitchen was still dark and uncomfortable in his eyes, the delicate decorations and elegantly carved furniture did earn Hall's praise, "There were three neat small pieces of furniture on one of the shelves, the use of which we could not discover; they were made of wood, elegantly carved and varnished, with a round top about a foot in diameter, and four legs a foot and a half long."[59] Besides this his previous images of poorly thatched roofs in Korean houses was changed into a well-constructed one. Hall also noticed the design of the window made of slender bars of wood, covered by a thin semi-transparent paper; practical as well as delicate.

More meaningfully, he paid attention to the veranda, emphasizing the unique feature of traditional Korean houses. This ingeniously designed room for relaxation could also be seen as representing an architecture and opportunity for leisure for residents of Chosŏn, which meant they also had the enthusiasm to enjoy life on the stage of the veranda. "Most of the houses had a sort of raised veranda under the eaves, about a foot or more above the ground, extending from the door on either hand to the end of the house; these places were neatly leveled, and must afford a cool seat."[60]

Gutzlaff and his company, while they were out on some excursions, visited several deserted buildings, shaped like ovens which turned out to be part of the infrastructure of the Chosŏn traditional heating system. Gutzlaff gave a detailed description of this traditional Korean heating system, "The kitchen was a separate building adjoining the house. To heat the room in winter, they had a large hole under the floor, by burning a proper quantity of wood in which, the whole apartment was kept warm."[61] This description refers to the traditional Korean floor heating system, Ondol 온돌,[62] which was remarkably different from what the travelers were used to and perhaps technologically more advanced than western styles.

Belcher and Adams again provided some supporting information that the people of Chosŏn may have lived a relatively peaceful and harmonious life. Regarding external landscapes, Korean houses were built around beautiful and picturesque mountains or rivers. Therefore, Adams illustrated as follows:

> The houses of the wealthy members of the population are delightfully situated, being frequently embosomed in groves of umbrageous trees with running rivulets beside them, and all around and towering up behind, gently swelling hills covered with verdure, and with herds of oxen grazing; and when placed near the sea-side, there is generally a fishing-wear close at hand.[63]

When it comes to their internal layout, houses could be divided into several different functions. Sitting room and a sleeping apartment were similar to the western style while "a shed for culinary purposes, including large earthen vessels for holding rice and water," is the Korean style and still can be seen in some traditional Korean hamlets and houses nowadays. Belcher explained that "Probably from less exposure, their (house in Korea) complexions are clearer, but their features are more elongated; they are of a larger mold and approach nearer the European, attaining the height of five feet eight to ten."[64]

There are several possible explanations for the picturesque views around these villages. Indeed, located around the coast, the villages' extraordinarily rich apartments were guaranteed to be full of shady trees and various flowers. Secondly, geomancy was important to ancient Asian culture and landscape architecture,[65] and may have been unknown to westerners. Geomantic themes have always been particularly important to Korean culture through concepts such as the Paektutaegan and the frameworks of Sanshin and Sinson worship.[66] Energetic and durable plants like bamboo served as necessary decoration and the structuring of cottages around a square was also important square. Thirdly, villages with a running river and swelling hills surrounding may at this time have met geomantic needs while the convenient location also provided residents the fish and fruits to be obtained from nature directly.

Such positive views and aspects were neglected or denied by the westerners. Instead, they viewed this scenery as a kind of "wilderness." According to Gutzlaff, he showed concern for Chosŏn people, afraid they might mistake the wild environment as an Eden. This provided a further excuse for more missionaries to bring the Christian gospel to civilize this area, stating:

> "Exclusion" may have kept them [Chosŏn] from the adoption of foreign customs but has not meliorated their poor condition. Walking over these fertile islands, beholding the most beautiful flowers everywhere growing wild, and the vine creeping among weeds and bushes, we accuse 'the lord of nature,' man, of shameful neglect; for he could have changed this wilderness into an Eden. Let the gospel penetrate into these regions, and as far as accepted in truth, misery will cease.[67]

These narratives explained the underlying reasons for spreading the gospel in this nation. Regardless of the physical conditions, Gutzlaff tried to illustrate the Korean peninsula as a wildland in need of the Christian message either to rescue poverty-stricken residents or to wake the rich from their Eden, reminding us of westerners' initial missionary purposes for visiting Korea. Besides, it is also consistent with how westerners persuaded Chosŏn to trade because only by

commercial interaction with the more civilized Great Britain could the nation escape poverty and gain the benefits of trade.

It is hard to draw conclusions on the details of Korean housing from the perspectives of these westerners' given their presumptions and prejudices and the few houses they actually visited. If faced with a deserted house, the visitors would think that Chosŏn residents were suffering from poor living standards while if encountering some other environmentally friendly houses, some visitors saw them as delightful, and some even viewed them as a kind of wilderness without civilization. However, from an external reader's perspective we know that the living conditions of Koreans were not as enjoyable or comfortable as westerners at that time. However, at least residents seemed to enjoy life judging from their elegant furniture, delicate decorations, enjoyable veranda, well-inserted heating system and other designs, different from the westerners' miserable descriptions or misunderstanding of compactly built villages.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the mental images western visitors drew of the culture of Chosŏn based on consideration of six voyage diaries, and an English periodical *The Chinese Repository 1832–1851*. Meanwhile, this paper has sought to objectively evaluate some early misunderstandings shown in westerners' opinions of Korean culture due to factors such as limited communications, cultural differences, and individual emotions.

The first part of the paper addresses the visitor's views of Chosŏn's appearance and clothing, and westerners came to know Korea's strict class-consciousness through consideration of their dress, and the difficult image and position of females in Chosŏn. The second part deals with Korean food harvested from the nation's two main economic activities-agriculture and fishery. Accordingly, foreigners received easy access to Chosŏn citizens' favorite dish, fish and discovered some local table manners. Cultural exchanges were accomplished through these communications, for example, westerners even offered Chosŏn citizens western seeds and taught them how to plant potatoes which became an important and necessary food for Koreans to survive starvation and food shortage. Part Three exhibits westerners' perceptions developed during these encounters of Chosŏn's dwelling and domestic culture. By combining these records from almost 30 years apart, it is perhaps surprising to witness some improvements in living conditions such as the newly-inserted heating system, and veranda. Because of the primacy of individualism in western civilization, western visitors had formed a prejudice

against the compactly built cottages. However, Koreans at the time tended to live harmoniously in village communities.

The influences behind the early explorers' impressions on Chosŏn still require further discussion through historical contexualization. As there are some studies on the images of Chosŏn society portrayed in western literature following the opening of its ports, this paper seeks to fill the gap from the earlier moment to make connections between the two periods in the future. Furthermore, how much these visits of westerners affected contemporary views of Korea in the West is hard to say. There are many festivals and memorial museums such as Gutzlaff's museum in Godaedo built to record these early modern transcultural communications between the West and Korea. With a similar ambition as these exhibitions, this paper tries to highlight the value of these early 19th century voyage diaries in exhibiting Korea to the West.

Notes

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2. A few representative studies include, Donald N. Clark. *Missionary Photography in Korea: Encountering the West Through Christianity* (Seoul: Seoul Selection. 2009); Choi JaiKeun. *The origin of the Roman Catholic Church in Korea: an examination of popular and governmental responses to Catholic missions in the late Chosôn dynasty* (Pennsylvania: Hermit Kingdom Press, 2006); Park Chungshin, *Protestantism and Politics in Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); Kim Wonmo. "19 Segi Hanyeong Hanghae Munhwagyoryuwa Joseonui Haegeumjeongchaek (19세기 한영항해문화교류와 조선의 해금정책 The Maritime-Cultural Interchanges Between Korea and Britain and The Korean Isolation Policy in the 19th Century)". *Journal of Korean Cultural History* (21), 2004.6: 947–993. David Chung, *Syncretism: The Religious Context of Christian Beginnings in Korea*, ed. Kang-nam Oh (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).
3. U Insu. "Joseonsidae saenghwalsa yeonguui hyeonhwanggwa gwaje," (조선시대 생활사 연구의 현황과 과제 Present Situations and Project on Research on History of Chosŏn Everyday Life) *Yeoksa Gyoyuk Nunjip* (1999: 23, 24), 826; Gwak Chaseop. "'Saereoun Yeoksahak'ui Ipjangeseo Beon Saenghwalsaui Gaenyeomgwa Banghyang," (새로운 역사학'의 입장에서 본 생활사의 개념과 방향 Concepts and Directions of History of Everyday life from a New Historical Perspective *Yeoksawa Geongge* (2002: 45), 167–169. There is a growing list of research on the Korean peoples' everyday lives since the emergence of microhistory or everyday life history in Korean academia since the 1990s. Dankook University Academy of East Asian Studies. *Boksik·Eumsik·Jugeo Munhwa Gwanryeon Jaryojib* (한국 문화 자료 총서 Cultural Collections on Clothing, Food, Housing) (Seoul: Minsokwon, 2010); Hanguk Gomunseo Hakhoe (Korean Academic Association of Old Documents). *Joseon Sidae Saenghwalsa 1·2·3* (한국고문서학회. 조선시대 생활사 History of Chosŏn's everyday life), Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 1996·2000·2006). The third book of this series is *Uisikju, Sal-aitneun Joseon-ui Pung-gyeon* (의식주, 살아있는 조선의 풍경 *Clothes, Food, Houses, Chosŏn's lifestyles*) and has published a collection of papers

on the history of everyday life; Hanguk Yeoksa Yeonguhoe (Korean Historical Research). *Joseonsidae saramdeuroen Oeotteohge Salateulkka 1·2* (조선시대 사람들은 어떻게 살았을까 1.2 How Did Josoen People live1·2) (Cheongnyeonsa, 1996[2005]); Hanguk Saenghwalsa Pakmulgwan. *Hanguk Saenghwalsa Pakmulgwan1–12* (한국생활사박물, 1–12 Museum of Korean daily life history1–12) (Sagyejeol, 2000–2004).

4. Michael D. Shin's *Everyday Life in Chosŏn-Era Korea: Economy and Society* (Boston: Brill, 2014) answers some basic questions on life in Chosŏn Korea (1392–1910). In the second part of this book on society, some themes such as the lives of the peasants, food culture, houses out of royal palaces are included. See also Shin Myungho. translated by Timothy V. Atkinson. *Chosŏn royal court culture: ceremonial and daily life* (Korea: Dolbegae Publishers, 2004).
5. There is some representative research on the westerners' perceptions of Chosŏn society in various aspects. Kim Hakjun. *Seoyangrindeuli Gwanchalhan Hugi Joseon* (서양인들의 관찰한 후기 조선 Late Chosŏn Observed by Westerners) (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 2010); Grayson, James Huntley. "Basil Hall's Account of a Voyage of Discovery: The Value of a British Naval Officer's Account of Travels in the Seas of Eastern Asia in 1816," *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*. Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007; Grace Koh. "British Perceptions of Chosŏn Korea as Reflected in Travel Literature of the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century," *The Review of Korean Studies*, 9 (4), 103–133. 2006; Boulesteix. *Chakhan migaeren dongyangae hyonja* (착한 미개인 동양의 현자 Kind Barbarian—the Oriental Sage) (Chongnyonsa. 2001). Boulesteix made the most use of French materials to illustrate all the 800 histories of western perceptions on Korea from the first source in the 13th century till present-day time. Hyaeweol Chol. *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea New Women, Old Ways* (University of California Press, 2009); Silva, David J. "Western Attitudes toward the Korean Language: An Overview of Late 19th and Early 20th Century Mission Literature." *Korean Studies* 26.2: 270–286, 2003.
6. Ge Zhaoguang. *Xiangxiang Yiyu* (想象异域 Imaginary Foreign Land), Zhonghua Shuju, 2014. See also Vladimir Tikhonov. *Modern Korea and Its Others: Perceptions of the Neighbouring Countries and Korean Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2015).
7. Pratt, Mary Louise. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992[2008]), 8. She defines the terms "transculturation" or "contact zone" to refer to the space where colonial encounters came contact with local people, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict. This term treats not only the relations among colonizers and colonized, but also travelers and 'travelees,' in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, and often within radically asymmetrical relations of power. See also Choi Hyaeweol. *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea New Women, Old Ways* (University of California Press, 2009), 16–7.
8. Chol Hyaeweol. *Gender and Mission Encounters in Korea New Women, Old Ways* (University of California Press, 2009), 16–7.
9. Komundo 거문도 was surveyed by Sir Robert Belcher and the HMS Samarang in 1845 and was later briefly colonized by the British in 1885 in an event known as the Port Hamilton Incident in order to counter Russian naval power at Vladivostok. The British linked Port Hamilton to Shanghai via the undersea telegraph cable and to this date ten British sailors are buried on the island which was abandoned by the Royal Navy after only two years. Coy, Julian, The British Occupation of Korea, 1885–1887. Dissertation, SOAS, 2010.
10. Jeju was known to Europeans as Quelpart, The island had first been accidentally visited by the Dutch Captain Hendrick Hamel when en-route to the Dutch East India Company trading post in Japan at Dejima (off the coast from contemporary Nagasaki), his ship the *De Sperwer* (Sparrowhawk) was shipwrecked in 1653 on Jeju. The arrival of the ship and its European crew was highly problematic for both local and national authorities in Chosŏn and although they were allowed to live freely, Korean law at the time forbade foreigners who had arrived from leaving. Hamel spent some 13 years in Korea before escaping to

Japan and the finally returned to the Netherlands in 1670, where his book on his Korean experiences had already been published. Ledyard, Gari, *The Dutch Come to Korea*. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society (Korea Branch), 1971.

11. Before 1816, Captain William Robert Broughton, Royal Navy, was the first Briton who had visited the Korean peninsula in 1797. Broughton led *HMS Providence* towards the north of Sakhalin and then turned south, intending to explore the coast of "Tartary" and Korea. On 14 October 1797, Broughton reached Pusan and had the first contacts with local inhabitants. He noted something evidently visible, such as the rocky nature of the land and local's dress and clothing. Broughton, in 1804, published his account of the voyage as "A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean … Performed in His Majesty's Sloop Providence, and her tender, in the years 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798". Broughton's voyage was known to Captain Hall and his colleagues who in 1816 sailed to the west coast of Korea and to the southern islands. Both Hall and Mcleod recited several times elements from Broughton's book in their voyage diaries, for example, see Hall 1818, 167; Mcleod 1818, 45. Due to limited contacts with locals in Broughton's voyage, this paper does not choose it as a key text for its analysis. For more research on Broughton, see James Hoare. "Captain Broughton, HMS *Providence* (and her tender) and his voyage to the Pacific 1794–8," *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* Vol. 7, 2000, 49–60.
12. See Macleod. *Narrative of a Voyage in His Majesty's Late Ship Alceste, to the Yellow Sea, Along the Coast of Corea to the Island of Lewchew*. London: John Murray, Albemarles Street, 1818, 52. "Here a number of observations were taken, and surveys made, to ascertain the exact geographical position of the land and the qualities of the anchorage; and distinguishing names were, of course, given to remarkable spots, which might serve on future occasions as leading marks."
13. Gutzlaff. *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China*, Seoul: Kyungin Munhwasa (1834) 2000, 350.
14. Lindsay H.H. *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China in the Ship Lord Amherst*, Seoul: Kyungin Munhwasa, (1834) 2000, 217.
15. The Bibles distributed were Chinese language translations and the Bible was not translated into Korean until much later in the 19th century. Similarly a book focused on the Christian conception of God called *Dialogues between Two Friends* was also published in Chinese and printed frequently and spread to Korea. See also, Bridgman, "Literary Notices." In *The Chinese Repository*, Vol. 2 (May 1833), 46.
16. Edward Belcher used the word "Quelpart" to represent the present-day Jeju Island. Historically, Jeju Island has many different names including Quelpart, Quelparte or Quelpaert Island. It was Hendrick Hamel who first coined it Quelpart when shipwrecked on its coast in 1653. Because this island looked similar in the shape of a galiot, a slang word for such ships, Jeju Island got the name of Quelpart. See also Hall R. Burnett, "Quelpart Island and Its People," *Geographical Review* Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan, 1926), 60.
17. "Navigation of the Chinese Sea," *The Chinese Repository*, Vol. 18 (February 1846), 103.
18. Hall [1818] 2000, 11.
19. Gutzlaff 1818, 345. "We met with many individuals whose skin was regularly incrusted with dirt; many had not washed themselves for months, and were covered with vermin, which they did not hesitate to catch and to dispatch in our presence."
20. Belcher [1847] 2000, 353–7. The two original illustrations are named "Korean Chief" and "Group of Koreans".
21. Adams [1847] 2000, 444–5.
22. See Samuel 1837, 360. "In their (Japanese) oblong, sunken, and angular eyes, they were like the Chinese; but their short necks, snub-noses, high cheek-bones and inferior stature, approximate rather to the Koreans, Kuriles, and northern branches, than to the sons of Han. Many of them have heavy beards, and the majority were large-limbed men."

23. MacDonald 1851, 502. “He was a man of middle stature, olive complexion, features somewhat sharp but interesting, and his eyes resembled the Japanese more than the Chinese. His look was intelligent and penetrating. His hands and feet were small.”
24. Dickinson 1840, 575.
25. Adams [1847] 2000, 445.
26. Dickinson 1840, 575.
27. See Belcher [1847] 2000, 349. “The people themselves appear to be composed of several races; the superior class is entirely distinct, of the small Tartar mould, and very beautifully formed. Although active, and from their general dress, liable to constant exposure, they still exhibit great effeminacy when at ease, being invariably attended by a species of page, carrying boots, slippers, fan, &c.; but these again are far more effeminate than their masters; pale, slovenly, and disgusting, with loose wavy hair, creating almost a doubt as to their sex. These are invariably the military chiefs and their attendants.”
28. Adams, [1847] 2000, 459.
29. See Lindsay [1834] 2000, 245. “The envoy was named Woo Tajin, a man about forty, elegantly dressed in Chinese silks.”
30. Belcher [1847] 2000, 349.
31. See Belcher [1847] 2000, 349. “Of their women none were noticed but those belonging to the laboring class, excepting an occasional inquisitive portion of face, which merely enabled one to assert that they appear fair … They are small, very short legged, particularly from the knee to the heel, with an apparent tendency to heaviness about the feet and ankles, and withal disgusting.”
32. Belcher [1847] 2000, 447.
33. Belcher [1847] 2000, 349. “Their manners, excluding the superior class, differ from any nation with whom I have held communication: they are filthy in person and habit.”
34. Hall [1818] 2000, 45.
35. Hall [1818] 2000, 45. “The dress of the women very much resembles that of a slave of Macao, a short upper dress, with a petticoat unconnected in addition to that, bareheaded, the hair tied in a knot at the top without ornament.”
36. Lindsay [1834] 2000, 242–3.
37. Adams [1847] 2000, 444.
38. MacDonald 1851, 503.
39. Hall [1834] 2000, 54. “The women, seated on a pile of stones, in the middle of the village, took no notice of us as we passed; and indeed, she was herself so very homely, as to occupy but little of our attention.”
40. Gutzlaff. [1834] 2000, 337. In most nineteenth-century English literature, Korea was written as “Corea” although Korea also appeared. This thesis will adopt the original word used in the primary text.
41. Gutzlaff [1834] 2000, 344.
42. The landscapes of Jeju Island and Godaedo would be the main the attributors for the fertility of soil. The volcanic topography with plenty of stones and wind limited the rice production in Jeju Island. Another reason for the different assessment is due to some cultural aspects mentioned in the following contents. Since Jeju Island was used as a site for one of Chosŏn’s penal settlements, people there may not have lived their long and were inattentive so far as land management was concerned.
43. Belcher [1847] 2000, 348.
44. Belcher [1847] 2000, 351.
45. Ibid.
46. Gutzlaff [1834] 2000, 343.
47. This was also recorded in Kim Canghan (김창한金昌漢)’s anthology *Wonjeobo* (원저보圓藷譜), saying that Gutzlaff brought potato seeds to Jeonbug’s local residents and taught

them how to cultivate. See also Yang Jinseok, 2006, 215; Hyun Mook Cho et al., 2003, 841. Both papers mentioned two hypotheses on the Korean origins of potatoes while one is the above-mentioned southern origin and another is the importation of them from Manchuria predicted to be in 1824. However, it is not clear which one became the earliest introduction of potatoes in Jeonbug areas. At least judging from Gutzlaff's record, it can be presumed that potatoes were relatively new to Jeonbug residents and had not been widely cultivated yet until 1832.

48. Belcher [1847] 2000, 345.
49. James 1851, 503.
50. Hall [1818] 2000, 46.
51. See also Gutzlaff, [1834] 2000, 342. "It consisted of one small apartment hung around with paper, and salt fish in the middle."
52. Lindsay [1834] 2000, 238.
53. James MacDonald's record 1851, 503.
54. Hall [1818] 2000, 5.
55. Lindsay [1834] 2000, 228.
56. Gutzlaff [1834] 2000, 345.
57. *Gye* means 계 in Korean and is a village-based contract where the villagers had to follow to work together to gain the most benefits. *Dure* refers to village communitarian mutual aid organization and is written as 두레 in Korean. *Pumasi* 품앗이 refers to contemporary labor exchange. All the three are different but the same regarding their functions. *Hyeopho sari* writes as 협호(夾戶)살이.
58. Im Hakseong 2006, 272.
59. Hall [1818] 2000, 47.
60. Ibid.
61. Gutzlaff [1818] 2000, 345.
62. Ondol is not so different from the Kang used in Northern China with which some foreigners would be aware of. Therefore, Gutzlaff may not have considered it as Ondol but a traditional heating system different from the West.
63. Adams [1847] 2000, 452.
64. Belcher [1847] 2000, 350.
65. The Philosophy of Chinese Fengshui is an ancient landscape technique combined with tech and art, while Fengshui theory deeply influence the building of ancient shanshui cities. See also Yang Liu. *Fengshui Sixiang Yu Gudai Shanshui Chengshi Yingjian Yanjiu (*风水思想与古代山水城市营建研究 *The Research of Fengshui Theory and the Building of Ancient Shangshui Cities.)* China: Chongqing University PhD Dissertation, 2005.
66. David Mason's (1999) *Spirit of the Mountains* (Hollym, Seoul), is a good account of the importance of geomancy to Korean cultural development, both in the historical and contemporary period. The concept of *Paektu taegan* 백두대간 which is important to Mason's work is the idea that Korea is a network of scared mountain ranges and peaks along which ki energy flows as sort of life force which brings power and abundance to the peninsula. Shrine keepers, house holders and citizens can harness that auspicious energy by paying homage to and worshipping ancestral and mountain spirits and by arranging their property in ways which mirror these energy flows.
67. Gutzlaff [1834] 2000, 346.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Translating Korean Poetry: History, Practice, and Theory

BROTHER ANTHONY OF TAIZÉ

There are various ways in which it is possible to talk about 'Translating Korean Poetry', it might be best to combine several in this paper. First, I will evoke some of the earliest pioneers in the field and then put on record some of the main stages in my own career as a translator. Next, something more theoretical and general can be added, before ending by offering a translation of one poem.

To begin with, I will survey the early history of the translation and publication of Korean poetry into English. The first English translations of Korean poems to be 'published' were those made by James Scarth Gale and either included in issues of the monthly *Korea Magazine*, which he edited from 1917 to 1919, or inserted into his *History*, which was printed in monthly installments in the review *Korea Mission Field* in the late 1920s. These were not at all widely distributed magazines, and it is safe to say that the poems remained completely unnoticed in the world beyond Korea. James Scarth Gale was born in Canada in 1863; he left Canada for Korea in 1888. His models and references in English poetry were, inevitably, 'Victorian', and the style of his poetry translations shows this. He was, however, a very remarkable scholar; his interest in and ability to translate the Classical Chinese poetry written in Korea was certainly far above that of any other foreign missionary of his time. Gale left Korea, retired to Bath (UK) in 1927, and died there in 1937. He left a very large corpus of unpublished translations, which have only now begun to be published thanks to Professor Ross King of UBC and his colleagues. In his lifetime Gale could only find publishers for translations of

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literary prose. *The Cloud Dream of the Nine* and *Korean Folk Tales* were published overseas, but no poetry was published.

Neither the name Joan Grigsby nor the title *The Orchid Door* will be familiar to many readers, yet official lists of published volumes of English translations of Korean poetry usually begin with her name and that title. *The Orchid Door* was published in 1935 in Kobe. It was bound in traditional Japanese style: the pages were printed on thin paper on one side only and folded. *The Orchid Door: Ancient Korean Poems Collected and done into English verse by Joan S. Grigsby* contains English versions of more than 50 Korean poems originally composed in Classical Chinese, almost all of which were written in the Goryeo and Early Joseon periods, as well as a selection of anonymous Gisaeng poems.

Joan Grigsby was born in Scotland as Joan Rundall, and under that name she wrote and published two volumes of rather fanciful 'Celtic revival' poems: *Songs of the Grey Country* (1916) and *Peatsmoke* (1919), both published in London. Born in 1891, Joan Rundall married Arthur Grigsby in 1912. In about 1921, they moved to Canada, and in 1924 they arrived in Japan, where Arthur worked as an accountant for Ford Motors. Early in 1929 they moved to Seoul where they stayed until late in 1930. Instead of returning to England, they moved to Vancouver, where Joan Grigsby died of cancer in 1937 and her husband took charge of the Vancouver Art Gallery. Joan Grigsby wrote poetry and a collection of her own poems, mostly about Japan but with a few about Korea, *Lanterns by the Lake* (1929), was printed in Japan by J.L. Thompson (in Kobe) but co-published by a London publisher, Routledge Kegan Paul. That was followed by *The Orchid Door* (1935), printed and published in Japan by the same J.L. Thompson, mainly thanks to the help of the American artist Lilian May Miller. *The Orchid Door* was essentially a private publication, without commercial distribution, since Routledge Kegan Paul, who had published *Lanterns by the Lake*, seem not to have been interested in taking any more such titles. They also turned down James Gale's translations of Yi Gyu-Bo at the same time.

As the mysterious wording of the title, "Collected and done into English verse," implies, Joan Grigsby was not the original translator of the poems from Korean originals. She certainly knew no Classical Chinese and had only very little spoken Korean; the source of almost all the poems she reworked was the translations of Korean poetry that the Canadian missionary James Scarth Gale had published previously, as indicated above. Clearly, Joan Grigsby did not like the style Gale had used and decided to 'improve' the poems freely. Gale left Korea shortly before the Grigsbys arrived.

Gale, then, was the first true translator of Korean poetry into English, but he could never find a publisher for any of his translations, and none were

issued except as revised by Joan Grigsby. We have to look elsewhere for the first published volume of translated Korean poetry. That is a roneotyped collection entitled *Songs from Korea* by Y.T. Pyun, in an old-style tied-thread binding, dated 1936, which begins with 102 translated 'old songs' and then continues with a substantial set of Pyun's own poems in English. The same book was later republished in a more modern-style printed edition in Seoul in 1948. Pyun Yung-Tai was born in 1892, died in 1969, and served as Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea (1951–1953) throughout most of the Korean War before becoming Prime Minister from June 28, 1954, until July 31, 1955. In 1946 he also published *Tales from Korea*, equally roneotyped, and in 1954 he published *Korea My Country*, a collection of his speeches and articles since 1945. Y.T. Pyun was educated in Korea and Manchuria. He returned to Korea in 1916 to teach high school English and became an English professor at Korea University following the end of the Japanese occupation. He ran against Park Chung-Hee in the 1963 presidential elections, bankrupting himself and ruining his health in the process. He is thus the first Korean to translate older Korean poetry into English, and so far the only literary translator to have served as Prime Minister of Korea. During the Japanese period, Lee In-Su (1916–1950) was the first Korean known to have studied English literature at the University of London. He translated a variety of poems by modern Korean writers but did not publish them.

The first published volume containing English translations of works by a modern, living Korean poet was the volume *Before Love Fades Away* (1957), containing poems by Cho Byung-Wha. This was soon followed by *Selected Poems of Kim So Wol* (1959), both volumes being translated by Dong-sung Kim (1890–1969) and published in Korea. Kim was a Korean comic artist, translator, journalist, and politician. He left for America in 1908 and studied journalism at Ohio State University. It was in America that Kim became deeply invested in comics and the medium's significance and value. Kim returned to Korea in 1919 and was a founding member of the *Donga-Ilbo*. In his later years, he became involved in politics and was the Minister of Culture in South Korea's first government in 1948.

Peter Hyun published *Voices of the Dawn: A Selection of Korean Poetry from the Sixth Century to the Present Day* with John Murray (London) in 1960, the first western publication of translated Korean poetry. In 1964, Kevin O'Rourke published *Anthology of Korean Poetry: From the Earliest Era to the Present* with John Day of New York. From the start of the 1970s, translating became a slightly more popular activity, with Jaihyun Kim and Edward W. Poitras joining the other pioneering figures among the early translators of modern Korean literature in the 1970s and 80s. At the same time, Kim Jong-Gil, inspired by the example of

his Korea University mentor Lee In-Su, began to publish individual translations of Korean poems in various magazines but he never published a full collection.

I arrived in Korea in May 1980 and found myself living in French at home with other brothers of our community, and in English everywhere else, since I knew no Korean. I even taught Basic French to Korean students using English. I enrolled in the Yonsei Korean-language programme in the summer of 1980 and began learning Korean. In 1984, I began to teach Chaucer and Shakespeare and general English Literature in the English Department of Sogang University, using English as the classroom language, and I continued to do so for the next twenty years. My English style improved considerably, largely thanks to Jane Austen and Seamus Heaney, as well as Hamlet and the Wife of Bath, John Donne, and Milton.

One day in about 1988 I said to a Korean colleague that, since I was teaching Koreans about British literature, I would at least like to learn a little about Korean poetry. My colleague suggested that I should start to read and translate poems by the poet Ku Sang, some of whose works she had herself tried to translate when they were together in Hawai'i. He was Catholic and spiritual, and his poems were written in a very simple, almost childish manner. He was therefore rather looked down on by the literary establishment, who reckoned that good poetry ought to be difficult and mannered. I began to produce translations on a typewriter after various hand-written drafts. It is hard now to realize what it was like to have to re-type an entire page when one word was found to be wrong (or mis-spelled).

One day, I noticed in an issue of the *Times Literary Supplement* a little advertisement for Forest Books, London, 'publishers of poetry in translation'. Brenda Walker founded Forest Books after numerous publishers had rejected her translations of Romanian poetry ('it won't sell') and she, being resolute, decided to do her own publishing. She quickly encountered other translators of 'obscure' languages (Bengali, Hungarian, Irish, and now Korean) with the same difficulty, and by the time she called it a day and retired, she had published 100 volumes, including two of my Ku Sang collections, one by Kim Kwang-Kyu, and one by So Jong-Ju. It was thanks to her that I became a published translator of Korean poetry.

The next decisive early moment was when Kim Young-Moo, a friend who was teaching in the English Department of Seoul National University, showed me a volume of poems by Kim Kwang-Kyu he had just edited, selected from the poet's first three collections. Kim Kwang-Kyu was celebrated among dissidents for his gently satirical poems that targeted the dictators and other social evils. Again, here was a poet who chose to write in a straight-forward style, like the German satirists he had begun to translate into Korean—Heine, Brecht, and Gunther Eich. I was happy to find European-style satiric humor in Korea, and I moved on from

Ku Sang, who was also in some ways a satirist, as I began to translate Kim Kwang-Kyu's poems. One day I mentioned that a student had been talking about a Korean poet who read poems at anti-government demonstrations, and 'You mean Ko Un!', Kim Young-Moo cried; 'Yes, of course, you must translate Ko Un', and thus the first translations of Ko Un's poetry to be published in the West, 'The Sound of my Waves', saw the light of day in 1991.

Meanwhile I was being urged by a conservative colleague in Sogang to translate Seo Jeong-Ju, the most highly approved official poet in Korea, nominated every year by the pro-government Korean PEN for the Nobel Prize. He had never once dissented from anything that had been said or done by any of the powers-that-be. As I translated his work, which was so very highly regarded in Korea, I could not help feeling that no matter how hard I tried, my English translations would never produce a similar level of adulation. A translator can produce translations but he cannot single-handedly re-create a reputation. Koreans often seem convinced that a good translation will automatically provoke the same response overseas as the original has in Korea. I saw that it could not be so. Seo Jeong-Ju's earlier poems, those most admired, were ornate, sensuous lyrics depending for their effect on the choice of vocabulary and imagery, as well as their originality, being rooted in a strongly oral lyric tradition without any parallel in English, explained in part by the poet's origins in the south-western Jeolla region, in Gochang, home to many famous *p'ansori* singers. It amused me to be struggling to translate at the same time the leading dissident spokesman, Ko Un, and this politically most conservative poet, both born in the same region, yet so very different.

The most important moment in those years, however, was a technical one, the moment when I switched from a typewriter to a computer and floppy disks. To be able to change a word over and over again, trying various possibilities freely without having to retype the whole page, brought a freedom without which I cannot now imagine translating. WordPerfect later gave way to MS Word, but one other major computerized blessing only came later, on the day when the online Naver Korean-English dictionary was complete enough to make it unnecessary to pick up a thick paper dictionary and flick through hundreds of pages every ten seconds. Such are the building blocks of a translator's career, much more than the moments when some brilliant solution to a particular crux flashes into mind.

Undoubtedly the most significant choice I made, unconsciously, at the very start, was to translate large numbers of poems by each of 'my poets', either whole collections or at least a wide selection, in order to give non-Koreans an insight into his (or her) work as a whole, in all its variety. The publication of a few carefully polished masterpieces did not, I felt, offer the possibility of representing adequately a Korean poet's entire work. Almost all of Ku Sang's poems

at the start, almost all of the poems of Cheon Sang-Byeong, and ten volumes of work by Ko Un are one result. The complete works of Kim Young-Nang and the complete first four volumes of Seo Jeong-Ju's *opus*, as well as Shin Gyeong-Nim's first collection, 'Farmers' Dance', and a selection of poems by Mah Jong-Gi are others. More recently I have published substantial selections of poetry by popular, easily accessible poets such as Jeong Ho-Seung and Do Jong-Hwan, as well as collections or selections from the work of Lee Si-Young, Kim Soo-Bok, Ko Hyeong-Ryeol, Kim Jong-Gil, Oh Sae-Young, to say nothing of Lee Seong-Bok and Shim Bo-Seon in close collaboration with my colleague Chung Eun-Gwi. At the same time, I must be blamed for failing to observe a balance in my choice of poets. Kim Seung-Hee is still the only female name in my list of book-length publications, with one other, the senior writer Yoo An-Jin, waiting for a publisher to show interest.

As a translator, I am obliged to negotiate the perilous crossing between faithfulness and readability. The source of my greatest concern is my limited knowledge of Korean, a language which is often challenging, even for people who are virtually bilingual. I have always tried to find Korean collaborators who will help me avoid at least the worst errors. I make the initial draft and then ask for corrections. In some cases, mainly when working with Professor Chung Eun-Gwi, the original first draft is made by her, and then I am able to produce a final English version with the assurance that I know what the Korean means. I hope always that my final versions will be both accurate and readable, but I do not readily accept modern western ideas of 'creative translation' in which the exact sense of the Korean text is considered more a problem than a duty.

Now, let us turn to some more general, more or less theoretical thoughts about the role of the translator of poetry. First, a simple question requires an answer: What is a poem? Surely everyone knows a poem when they see one, yet it seems very difficult if not impossible to provide an adequate general definition. Each verbal artifact called 'a poem' is always, inevitably, perfectly unique. Any given poem is by definition quite unlike any other, being composed of different words arranged in different patterns, yielding different sounds, resulting in different rhythms and different meanings, performing different literary and social functions. A poem is recognized as such, usually, simply by being designated as a poem by its composing poet or by its publisher. A poem may be long or short, its lines broken as 'verse' or presented as prose, and using any of the world's existing languages, or none. Each of the poems written by any given poet will be different from all the rest, and critics or students usually have to struggle hard to identify common features allowing them to make general statements about a poet's work. They are often reduced to grouping poems by theme or to viewing the poems in

the chronological order of their composition, in the hope of revealing some kind of progress, evolution, pattern, or decline, whether thematic or structural.

The one essential feature common to every poem ever written is that it aspires to possess and provide its reader with the experience of the property or quality known as 'poetry'. A poem entirely devoid of any aspiration to poetry (whatever that word might mean) could hardly be termed a 'poem'. It would merely be a collection of verbal debris. What, then, is 'poetry'? We might quote the opening lines of Octavio Paz's *The Bow and the Lyre* (1955):

> Poetry is knowledge, salvation, power, abandonment. An operation capable of changing the world, poetic activity is revolutionary by nature; a spiritual exercise, it is a means of interior liberation. Poetry reveals this world; it creates another. Bread of the chosen; accursed food. It isolates; it unites. Invitation to the journey; return to the homeland. Inspiration, respiration, muscular exercise. Prayer to the void, dialogue with absence: tedium, anguish, and despair nourish it. Prayer, litany, epiphany, presence. Exorcism, conjuration, magic. Sublimation, compensation, condensation of the unconscious. Historic expression of races, nations, classes … and much more.

'Poetry', then, is not simply a general term for a literary genre embracing all the poems of the world or of a particular historic moment ('Elizabethan poetry'), but a vital quality that is perceived to be present in (or absent from) each individual poem, and which is also recognized within other works of art, such as paintings, sculpture, buildings, music, and perhaps even individual people. However, the issue is complex, since probably no one poem exists that is universally recognized as possessing 'poetry', as being 'truly poetic'. The discernment of the poetry of a poem is entirely subjective, it seems. Poems are 'works', things made. 'Poetry' manifests itself through the work, but not through every poem-work and not to every reader. Works which in times past were felt to have intense poetic power are often now found lacking, trite or artificial, obscure and antiquated. Fixed forms of meter that were formerly necessary for the poetry of a poem to be felt are now considered obstacles.

Put briefly, in its essence, poetry is the breath by which a poem comes alive. 'A poem must live … Better a live sparrow than a stuffed eagle', as Edward FitzGerald once wrote. However, one person's 'great poem', felt to be alive and vibrant with poetry, is perfectly capable of being another person's 'bad poem', lying there lifeless and inert. The poetry residing in a poem, we might suspect, is impossible to define and also clearly defies translation, explanation or paraphrase (that is indeed the meaning of Frost's phrase about 'poetry is what is lost in translation') and that is also surely the reason why we try to translate it. Some people might claim that we translate poems because we have nothing better to do, but we prefer

to think that we do it as a service to humanity, attempting to build fragile bridges across the gulfs that separate language from language, culture from culture, mind from mind. If we did not think that what we call the 'poetry' of a poem had a very considerable intrinsic toughness, so that it can somehow survive the trauma of translation, we would surely not make the effort to translate poems as poems. A prose translation of the literal meaning of the words would be sufficient. They would not be very poetic.

Perhaps the first quality of a good poem could be termed its 'power' or 'intensity', rather than its beauty. 'Beauty' in poetry is a highly debatable quality, especially today. The famous short quote 'No poetry after Auschwitz' by Theodor Adorno includes the affirmation that writing poetry is today a 'barbaric' activity, as well as an impossible one (*nach Auschwitz ein Gedicht zu schreiben, ist barbarisch, und das frißt auch die Erkenntnis an, die ausspricht, warum es unmöglich ward, heute Gedichte zu schreiben*). That 'barbaric' word is certainly aimed at too facile a notion of aesthetic 'beauty' in the poem, but it still seems to leave open the possibility of writing 'barbaric' poetry for a barbaric age. Meaning, too, has changed its meaning since the old systematic certainties faded from view. Poems that show no awareness of *skepsis* have little hope of speaking to the present time.

The 'art for art's sake' view of poetry, which has long been attacked in Korea in the name of social criticism and relevance, can only stand today if the poet's 'art' is an art of focus, of concentration, of compression, of intensity of expression, and of compassion in the presence of ongoing catastrophe. Today's poetry, if it is not written for an uninformed juvenile or incorrigibly sentimental audience, must begin with an awareness of loss of coherence, loss of assured meaning. The impact of the kind of poetry today's world seems to demand should go in the direction of pain, shock, challenge, grief, revolt, rejection, revolution, transformation, not an effete romantic swoon before some pallid, harmonious loveliness wrongly called 'Beauty'. Much Korean poetry is marred by facile sentimentality.

The 'beautiful language' perceived in older poems, those of Keats for example, might be one aspect of their continuing popularity, but no poet can write in that way today, except as parody and pastiche, as kitsch. In a world of lies dressed up as False Truth, 'meaning' is still the poet's great vocation, but today's true meaning is an awareness that there is no certain meaning, or as Paz already wrote in 1955, 'the poem is a mask that hides the void'. Yet a 'shock of meaning' is still what a worthwhile poem is called to produce and it is that shock that we would want our translations to produce too, as one vital aspect of the poems we translate.

The poetry of each poem, then, is its unique essential value, and it is that poem that we are called to transform and reproduce in another language, producing a different poem (which is yet the same poem) to be read in a totally different

place and culture. 'A poem should not mean but be' wrote Archibald MacLeish, in a very splendid poem. Yet words can mean different things in different places, there are backgrounds and contexts that play a vital role in one nation's literature, which are completely unrecognized and unfamiliar beyond its frontiers. Modern South Korean poetry is deeply marked by modern South Korean history and social evolutions, while the works produced in North Korea, using the same language, have completely different presuppositions and contexts. What a poem 'is' in its original being might not be at all what its translation 'is' in another language and context.

One word comes to mind which is closely related to the 'poetry' discussed so far: 'musicality'. But the 'music' of a poem is usually assumed to inhere in its sounds and rhythms when read aloud, in a 'musical' quality of its language as such. But how can we transmit the music of a Korean poem in an English rendering? The languages have so little in common. Here we come close to the topic of 'how to translate the Korean-ness of Korean poetry', with the question of whether the English translation of a Korean poem can ever transmit anything resembling or evoking the music (or the 'poetry') of its original. There is, we might assume, no way in which that can happen directly, because the two languages have such very different qualities of sound and rhythm and discourse. The more a Korean poem is prized for its music, the less it will be possible to translate it convincingly 'as it is'. It will just have to surrender, allow itself to be undressed, stripped to the bone, then refashioned into a completely different English poem, in terms of its music though not, if possible, in terms of the sense of the words. The 'poetry' might largely have to fend for itself. The music of a poem is related to its emotional impact. The Korean poems that Koreans love most tend to be on the poignant, elegiac side. Irony is often lacking. British readers love humour; Koreans prefer melancholy.

A translated poem has to come alive in its own right, by its own qualities. It owes little beyond the fact of existing to the qualities of the original poem it seeks to transmit and represent. The sense of rhythm and sound values that make the translator select one word rather than another (and there are always multiple possible ways of expressing anything in English) is perhaps something innate and intuitive rather than learned and systematic, though familiarity with the sounds and patterns of poetry written in English must surely help. The quality of a translated poem depends heavily on the translator's sensitivity. Yet an over-sensitive translator may be paralyzed by the impossibility of rendering an original into a foreign tongue 'completely and without loss'. 'Every last nuance' is an unrealistic goal; there is no perfect translation.

The opposite of that excess of respect is the act of appropriation by which a translator (especially one who is also a published poet) sometimes claims the right (in the name of creativity) to produce a 'version' of a foreign poem which is very far removed, not only from the form and sounds, but from the direct sense of the original, and which cannot convincingly pass the examination of reverse-translation. Questions already arise when a translator consciously and deliberately seeks to give a translated poem an additional perfusion, a dab of 'poetry' behind the ears, over and beyond what emerges naturally in the course of translating sensitively. This is what is done in 'translation workshops', where the participants are provided with a 'literal' prose rendering or a skeletal outline version of an original poem written in a tongue unknown to them, and invited to 'turn it into an English poem'. We usually call that 'domestication'.

Some translators try to augment the poetic quality of their versions by employing words and turns of phrase, linguistic codes, which are characteristic of very specific kinds of English, usually regional dialects, or parodies of poetic styles. Is it right or wrong to make a translated Korean poem speak with a distinctively Irish or Californian or Australian dialect? Does that really bring about an increase of poetry? It will certainly hide the fact that Korean poetry is not the same as western poetry, that the models (the canon) as well as the history and social psychology to which Korean poets are referring are different, and perhaps the expectations of Korean readers, too. But could we ever find a way of making a Korean poem 'sound Korean' in English? Perhaps we should not want to. What we should hope is that any poem we have translated will be found, at least by 'fit readers', to possess 'poetry' in its own right, as a true poem should, and also be found, by Korean readers, to have retained something of the qualities they admired in the original.

To end, here is a recently translated poem by the poet Sin Yong-Mok, revised in dialogue with him. It is the first time that I have worked so intensely with a poet.

Community

May I use the dead person's name? Since he's dead,
may I take his name? Since I gained one more name today
the number of my names keeps increasing, soon I'll have
all death's register.

Might I be called Heaven and Hell?

Over there
where the man's name is being erased from the lips of the
woman being soaked in rain, prayers also have lost
their way and like the petals being washed away on
the floor, now they are being carried a few steps stuck
to your shoes …

I will reply to every falling petal.

If at last, the collector of death,
sorrow,
even after searching all through the sodden village, is
unable to find a welcome so comes to me requesting
sleep,
a kettle of cold water
and one dry towel,
I can ask, with a voice climbing up the body's creaking
stairs:
What more do you need?

But probably I will ask nothing,
fearing it might want something
like a chorus of flowers resonating then stopping in a
garden, in the vestibule's black umbrella
above shoulders … like raindrops
drip, drip,

Low eaves, window panes, stretched out hands

Above them

As it takes oblivion's pulse
then
says: I want to see him … want to see him …
it might cry.
Then I'll indicate far off extinguished time and hand over
his name like a lamp
in a completely empty register.

I fear I'll probably remain alone. Floating like the sound
of a flushing cistern in an empty room lent without the
owner knowing

Soul of water known as cloud, bringing into reality the
thunder and lightning growing inside my body

In order to steal your name.

Come to think of it, death seems to have planted eyes
in me, the stone that took away your name is being
rained on.
Ears have been added, like rain reading your name above
a stone.
Blending Heaven and Hell, am I allowed to be soaked?
Over there,
all the petals tapping on death, like the red lips of that
woman leaving the garden, are praying for me …
and here too

If life is possible, just as rain stops and rainbows emerge
only when summoned,
if love is possible,
may I give my name to the dead person? May I call a
person by my name, once they're dead?

Translations by Brother Anthony

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Book Reviews

Robert Oppenheim, *An Asian Frontier: American Anthropology and Korea, 1882–1945*

2016, The University of Nebraska, 448 pages, ISBN 0803285612

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The anthropology of Korea is entering what could be a golden era, fueled by a growth in the number and quality of graduates from Korean anthropology departments, a field site (south of the DMZ) accommodating to curious researchers, and a realization that Korea is not China nor is it Japan and, therefore, deserves the ethnographic treatment afforded its neighbors. As a result, we are lucky to have a growing corpus of anthropological scholarship on traditional practices (Janelli and Janelli 1982; Chun 1984; Sorensen 1988), transnational Korea (Kim 2010; Bell 2016), modernity and Korea (Moon 2005; Park 2012) and even North Korea (Fahy 2015, Bell 2018a).

Robert Oppenheim's *An Asian Frontier* is a back-to-beginnings narrative of what has emerged in recent years. Across seven chapters, an introduction and conclusion Oppenheim discusses the relationship of 19th and early 20th century American anthropologists to Korea as an idea materialized in objects such as pottery; as a space of converging geopolitical interests, and as a site where European ideologies of race, culture, and nationalism unraveled at the feet of Japanese empire building. *An Asian Frontier* critically evaluates the exchange of objects and ideas between a Korean Empire on the verge of extinction and American collectors, many of whom regarded the country as a repository of fast disappearing 'Oriental' traditions.

A number of theoretical threads connect the early chapters of *An Asian Frontier* to Oppenheim's (2008) first book, *Kyongju Things: Assembling Place*, and to broader anthropological research on the transnational movement of 'things' (Cf. Miller 2008). The first and second chapters, for example, bring to relief the circulation of objects and attendant collecting networks that emerged in the late 19th century, as Korea fell within the interests of the expanding U.S. 'naval frontier' in which diplomacy and intellectual exploration intersected (Oppenheim 26).

Chapter one is a nod to Foucauldian (2008) understandings of how information and ideas are collected, sorted, and subsumed into regimes of power and knowledge. The second chapter subsequently encourages the reader to imagine the anthropological networks and contiguous politics of taste that developed out of gift giving between the Korean elite and U.S. diplomats. Throughout these early chapters, Oppenheim's archival material brings to life the dynamics of desire and power that contributed to building transnational economies of value reaching from the tombs of the Koryo nobility to the Smithsonian museum in Washington D.C.

The third chapter illustrates the complexities of museum collecting as Korean artifacts—both gifted and looted—brought Korea the world, specifically to the 1893 Chicago World's Fair. In highlighting the agency of the Korean government in shaping how Korea was presented to the West at the time, this chapter is likely to be of interest to the scholar of South Korean soft power as it is globally projected today through Korean education programs, K-pop, and Korean manufacturing.

From raided tombs, burgeoning US diplomatic collections of Korean items, and broader struggles of power and representation the book shifts focus to the individual ethnographers, collectors, and curators who constituted the U.S.'s intellectual relationship with Korea as it fell under Japanese influence. Specifically, chapter 4–7 chart the experiences of early American anthropologists of Korea such as Stewart Culin, Frederick Starr, and Aleš Hrdlicka and how these pioneers of ethnographic practice and thought (yes, Franz Boas features, too) understood Korea through shifting lenses of evolution, culture, and race.

Being an anthropologist and one of only a handful of foreigners to have survived the challenges of Seoul National University's anthropology graduate program, I have a particular fondness for the discipline as it relates to the two Koreas. As such, it was a relief that Oppenheim acknowledged the role played by Koreans as both mediators and curators of knowledge on Korea as it was collected, displayed, and theorized. But I was left with two questions: who is *An Asian Frontier* written for and what does it contribute to our understanding of Korea or to anthropology as a discipline? *An Asian Frontier* at times feels as though it could have been two books: the first three chapters presenting a Maussian (2002) understanding of economies of exchange in the creation of long-distance relationships, contextualized, in this case, within a Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge. In contrast, the chapters that follow discuss particular personalities of early U.S. anthropology as a platform for delineating the development of American anthropology's understanding of Korea. This text is unlikely to be of interest to undergraduates, given the specific nature of its contents. But it is the 'post-tenure' (Oppenheim 2016, 23) feeling of this book that ensures it will appeal to more

seasoned anthropologists of the Koreas. Here is a book written out of passion for a place, for a discipline, and for a particular relationship that contributed to the contemporary anthropology of Korea.

This book is an exposition of the broader intellectual and cultural engagement of Western imperialist powers with the 'other'. In sum, through showing how difference was constructed, categorized and represented in relation to notions of white supremacy *An Asian Frontier* is the story of anthropology and its often complex, sometimes troubling relationship to the people who fall within the gaze of the ethnographer. Oppenheim has written a fascinating account of the early days of anthropological engagement with what was, at the time in the U.S, a largely unknown part of the world.

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Yi T'aejun (translated by Janet Poole), *Dust and Other Stories*

2018, Columbia University Press, 264 pages, ISBN 9780231185813

Ji-Eun Lee, Associate Professor of Korean Language and Literature, Washington University in St. Louis

Dust and Other Stories is Janet Poole's second translation of literary works by Yi T'aejun (1904–?), Korea's premier modernist writer who was beloved by his contemporaries and by generations of Koreans since. Circumstances post 1945 helped obscure Yi's work and aspects of his life. He chose to move to Pyongyang after 1945, and his fate disappeared in the complicated political struggle in North Korea. In South Korea, his work, along with that of many other writers who for differing reasons chose North Korea over the South, was banned and remained unavailable until 1988. In terms of substance, Yi T'aejun was known (incorrectly in some senses) as a "stylist," who strove to refine Korean written language to the status of a new, modern, full-fledged literary language as the tightening grip of Japan's Colonial regime removed Korean language from official and public use. His subjects embodied Korean identity: people, artifacts, and other things Korean that, viewed from a life lived mostly under the Colonial regime, he saw as disappearing before his eyes. As Janet Poole's cogent introduction explains, other Colonial intellectuals shared and were motivated by a sense of nostalgia, but that characteristic became a signature of Yi T'aejun's works. As Poole says, "The Nostalgia for a past (…) is one way of registering Yi's disquiet with his present, but also forms the creative impulse for imagining alternative fictional worlds." (xx)

As to literary fate, works by Yi T'aejun have fared better than many others in terms of their availability in English translation. Much credit for this visibility goes to Janet Poole's dedication to translating Yi's work into English, and to her monograph *When the Future Disappears: The Modernist Imagination in Late Colonial Korea* (2014, Columbia UP), a sophisticated in-depth study of Yi T'aejun. Poole's first translation of Yi's work, published as *Eastern Sentiments* (Columbia University Press, 2013), featured a selection of Yi's short essays that expressed his various musings on Korean culture through artifacts and customs, and in the process revealed Yi's profound sense of nostalgia. Translations of several of Yi's short stories have also been included in anthologies, including "Before and After Liberation", in *On the Eve of the Uprising and Other Stories from Colonial Korea* (Park and Gatrall trans. Cornell East Asia Seiries, 2010); "Crows", in *Modern Korean Fiction: An Anthology* (Fulton and Kwon edit., Columbia UP, 2005); and "An Idiot's Delight", in *A Ready-Made Life: Early Masters of Korean Fiction* (Fulton and Kim edit. and Trans., University of Hawaii Press, 1998).

The twelve stories translated in *Dust* range from "Omongnyŏ", Yi's first published work from 1925, to the title story "Dust" (1950), one of Yi's last short stories known to us. The collection thus comprises a first and long overdue comprehensive introduction to Yi T'aejun's short-stories, the very genre Yi considered as the pinnacle of literary artistry. The selection includes two stories from the two dozen Yi published between 1925 and 1935, which Janet Poole calls "sketches"; seven stories written between 1935 and 1945, considered to be the height of his literary career; and three stories from after Korea's liberation in 1945 and before the Korean War started in June of 1950. The collection thus achieves its stated goals: "to introduce some of his best fiction" and "to present work from across his entire known career" (xxiii). It includes Yi's iconic comical characters ("Mr. Son, of Great Wealth"), disillusion and conflicted inner psyches of semi-autographical narrators ("The Frozen River P'ae", "Before and After Liberation"), the cityscape of a modernizing Seoul ("The Rainy Season"), domestic life among middle-class Seoulites ("A Tale of Rabbits"), an illicit romantic encounter on a trip to an ancient capital ("Evening Sun"), and the profound sense of loss and nostalgia ("Unconditioned"), which together represent the flavor and range of Yi T'aejun's work as well as a collection of a dozen stories possibly can. The final, autobiographical story "Dust" seems to anticipate contemporary North Korean fiction in its presentation of North Korean society and system as superior, and offers a clue about Yi's choice to head North in the mounting chaos between liberation from Japan and division of Korea into North and South. At the same time, the prophetic ending clarifies Yi's own commitment to a literature free "from the propagandistic desires of the wartime state or the capitalist market" (xxiii)

The field of Modern Korean literature is particularly vibrant regarding works, authors, and literary debates from the Japanese Colonial period (1910–1945), with many new monographs in English added in recent years including work by Janet Poole noted above. This richness of interest and scholarship reflects more than just the categorical importance of the era as the crucible of Modern Korean literature. While macro issues such as language, identity, nationalism, and colonial modernity do constitute a critical socio-historical backdrop to understanding the period, various literary trends such as realism, naturalism, modernism, socialist realism, decadent, and avant-garde all co-existed, and their interactions and debates yielded further literary and ideological complexities. This rich, emergent complexity, in turn, provides abundantly fertile ground for research and teaching today. Given the elegance and exquisite readability of Janet Poole's translation, coupled with her concise, informative, and deeply insightful introduction, this collection of stories will surely become a foundational text in college courses on Korean literature. Indeed, with the mastery of Yi's originals rendered so beautifully, *Dust and Other Stories* will reward any reader who picks it up.

Suk-young Kim, *K-Pop Live: Fans, Idols, and Multimedia Performance*

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Suk-young's Kim's 2018 publication, *K-Pop Live: Fans, Idols, and Multimedia Performance* consists of an introduction, conclusion, and five chapters, with 208 pages of body text. Despite the large amount of theory woven in, the writing is clear, tightly edited, and approachable with minimal jargon. It is a highly-focused, ethnographically-informed monograph asking what 'liveness' is in an era—and in a genre—where music is mostly consumed through digital media. I believe the book is most useful for anyone concerned with issues of live popular music and mediatization in a digital age (no need for a focus on Korea). This spring is my second semester assigning the book as a required reading in a large lecture on Korean popular music. Overall in comparing this book with the other two single author books on K-pop by John Lie (2015) and Michael Fuhr (2016), Kim's book is more readable, accurate, and rooted in original research, yet the tight focus makes it less useful for understanding the entire phenomenon of K-pop. It should only be used in the K-pop classroom by instructors who will use lecture and other readings to supply basic K-pop information.

Kim explains that K-pop has "thrived predominantly online" (p. 2), but that her book is a "theoretical investigation of 'liveness' as a technological, ideological, and affective mode" (p. 3). In an ever-more media-saturated world, Kim explores K-pop to understand the role of liveness in music and performance, because even something as live as a concert is heavily mediatized. At concerts Kim discovers that giant TV screens project the only image clearly visible from most seats in a stadium, images that include pre-recorded clips, broadcast "as a catalyst for shaping the impressions of a live interaction in the here and now" (p. 5). K-pop strives for liveness, seeing in it authenticity and intimacy with the audience, but has also surrendered to the overwhelming "usage of portable electronic gadgets as a primary mode of production and consumption of K-pop" (p. 11). Kim tracks the industry's sometimes contradictory efforts to simulate, capture, and mediatize liveness through the book.

In the first chapter Kim tackles the history of K-pop, focusing on the 1990s. Her discussion of the *Teletubbies Generation*, the audience who grew up with new media-viewing patterns popularized through shows like the *Teletubbies* and how K-pop media follows this recipe is insightful. Kim explains that the "three major

aspects of the *Teletubbies Generation*—a portable screen as an organic part of the ideal body, a repetitive viewing pattern, and the element of watching others react to visual materials—profoundly define K-pop fandom" (p. 34). In this chapter Kim also outlines some of the factors that contributed to K-pop achieving its current position, including the rise of private broadcasters in Korea, the shift from album to digital single, and the ways that K-pop adapted to the digital economy, to digital platforms, and to new transportable technologies like the MP3 and the storage of music on smart phones.

In the second chapter Kim addresses the shift from live performances on television to live performances through social media. In the chapter she discusses how TV-viewing is supplemented by simultaneous interaction through smart phone or computer as part of voting, interacting with stars during broadcasts, or discussing content with other viewers in real time—creating a feeling of liveness which surrounds the media emanating from the screen. Kim focuses on particular programs such as *Music Core* (where stars perform their latest releases and audiences vote on the winners) and *After School Club* (where stars interact with representative fans chosen to ask questions during the broadcast). Kim's insights on how authenticity is tied to liveness, driving programs like *Music Core* to add the complexity of ticketing and audiences, real-time broadcasting and real-time voting is then further extended into the courting of international fans through *After School Club*. The chapter addresses how the fans perform in service of the idols through their tweets, their voting, their actual appearance in Google Hangouts to converse with the idols and so on. This brings up the K-pop media makers' "decoupling of 'live' from often related notions of 'spontaneous' or 'unrehearsed'" (p. 86).

In the third chapter Kim analyzes the simulated liveness in two K-pop videos—"Who You?" by GD of Big Bang and "Twinkle" by the SNSD sub-unit TaeTiSeo. "Twinkle," Kim asserts, simulates liveness by literally showing a story of performers arriving, preparing, and taking to the stage. The video, which references Broadway shows, taps into the current Korean obsession with musical theatre—K-pop idols frequently take to the stage in Seoul. "Who You?" on the other hand is almost performance art, with footage shot with, of, and by 1,000 lucky GD fans in combination with the professional videography. The live presence of the fans, and their involvement in the shoot, is clear even to final moments of the video as the attendees names scroll across the screen.

The fourth chapter deals with hologram performances, one way that K-pop companies are trying to extend the concert attendance experience. Kim highlights two performances, Klive (YG Entertainment) and SM Entertainment's hologram musical *School Oz* (since replaced with a recording of an EXO concert). The

chapter outlines how the performances are presented, touches on how the South Korean government is trying to taking advantage of K-pop, and uses these shows to illustrate the ways that fans embark on pilgrimages to K-pop shrines, such as SM Town. My favorite part of the chapter was when Kim explained that the holographic bodies are "not a radical departure" from the 2D aesthetic from graphic novels and animation that K-pop idols are striving for (p. 156). She continues, "human bodies in manga and anime are identical to human bodies while live human bodies of idols constantly approximate the impossible standards of 2-D bodies" (ibid.). Tackling this topic may have been obvious, considering Kim's focus, but I have my doubts that liveness is simulated well enough for all but the most die-hard fan, as I too have watched a hologram performance with a much smaller audience at the end than the beginning.

The fifth chapter addresses actual live concerts. Kim uses Big Bang's MADE tour as the focus, but quickly reveals that in the giant stadium she fondly remembered her clear view in the hologram concert. Projected images used liberally by the quintet ultimately "rescue[d] the live from its imperfection" (p. 174), causing Kim to ask if the digital images were a break for costume changes, or if the digital images were the show, with the real singers appearing just to prove their own existence (ibid.). Is the concert becoming a fan meeting? For the second half of the chapter the focus shifts to KCON LA 2015 and 2017, where Kim investigates the corporatization of selling K-pop, selling Korea, and even selling self.

In the conclusion we find Kim in Paris, witnessing K-pop's burgeoning success in the European market, and the way the South Korean government has hitched its dreams of soft power to the idols. In fact, the KCON Paris, from Kim's description, disappoints fans as governmental control and agenda robbed fans of the amount of contact and performance time by artists they had traveled to see. Instead South Korean government "free-riding on the K-pop bandwagon" (p. 204) introduced disgraced president Park Geun-hye to fans uninterested in anyone but idol stars. Kim wistfully acknowledges that K-pop moves and changes so fast even her book will become outdated but liveness will not, for it is "at once a commercial commodity, a mode of ongoing lifestyle consumption, a teleological destination of technological advancement, a means of social connection, and even the affective evidence of life itself" (p. 205). Skimming passages and my margin notes for the review I arrive at the final vignette and read it as tears fill my eyes again. This book is rich, deep, challenging, evocative and hard to summarize. Just read it.

Cheehyung Harrison Kim, *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961*

2018, Columbia University Press, 261 pages, ISBN 9780231185301

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Marx and the Theorization of North Korea

This book aims to provide a theoretically framed evaluation of the state's formulation of citizens as workers in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (colloquially known as North Korea), focusing on the period between the end of the three year-long Korean War and ending before what the author argues was the start of Kim Il Sung's 'unassailable' consolidation of authority in the 1960s. The book's main theme is that the underlying dynamic of DPRK development should be understood as a variant of capitalism because it is constituted by an identical process of industrialization to that which operates in countries like the United States. The argument is framed by Karl Marx's writing on political economy and draws on contemporary theorists of modernity including Michael Burawoy, Kojin Karatani, Henri Lefebvre and, writing specifically about Korea, Hyun Ok Park.

The book is more successful when it explains meaning and relevance of the theories employed, as it attempts in the discussion of Lacan and Žižek's interpretation of the concept of 'repetition' (pp. 102–103). It falters when conceptual unpacking and logical, demonstrated argumentation is foregone and replaced by sporadic quotes and assertions, perhaps best exemplified by the use of the Lefebvrian notion of the 'everyday'. The concept of the everyday has been embraced by a number of authors writing about North Korea (Suzy Kim, Park) and is potentially rich with analytical purchase. Here, however, it works more as a conversational generality than a meaningful conceptual device.

This book should be commended as a serious attempt to engage with a relevant theoretical corpus to understand North Korea's post-Korean War economic, political and societal development. There is still today a dearth of theoretically informed, rigorous analysis of North Korea state and society, so the ambition and scope of this book is exciting and timely. The promise of the book is unfulfilled, however, because of the absence of sufficient critical exposition and analysis of the conceptual frameworks deployed, the opacity of the narrative style, and because of serious and consequential empirical errors.

Ambition, Structure and Sources

The ambition of the book is to persuade the reader of the explanatory power of four key claims (p. 2). The first is that in North Korea work, specifically industrial

work, assumed political, economic, organizational, ideological and ethical significance as a mechanism of control by the ruling class, exactly as it does in capitalist countries. The second is that work is repeated every day and therefore conveys ideological messages through 'everydayness'. The third is that people responded to calls to work in a diverse manner and that the state constantly had to negotiate to achieve its aims. The fourth is that post-Korean War North Korea may be called 'state socialist' but should in fact be understood as capitalist by virtue of its wholehearted adoption of industrialization as the *modus operandi* of state and societal operation. The chapter structure is not directly contiguous to the four key claims. Chapter one discusses 'the historical concept of work'; chapter two, 'work as state practice'; chapters three and four the 'everyday life of work' evaluated through political, literary and cultural references; and chapter five provides a study of North Korea's now famous Vinalon industry. The book draws on Korean language materials from the DPRK and the Republic of Korea as well as literature written in the English language. Not all readers will be able to consult the Korean language sources directly, but large amounts of North Korean material are translated into English, including the 47 volumes of Kim Il Sung's writings—which are cited in the bibliography only in the Korean language version.

Theoretical Matters

For a readership that might not be familiar with Marx's contribution to the study of political economy, it's probably useful to summarize why the work is, theoretically, paradigm changing. Marx's core conceptual innovation was to decisively break with the Liberal 'labor theories of value' of Adam Smith and David Ricardo that focus on *exchange* relations as a source of value and to introduce what Marx called a 'theory of value' based on *production* relations. [These days Marx's theory is often referred to as the 'labor theory of value', although he did not use the phrase to describe his own work, and Ricardo's work is generally forgotten].

Marx's theory of value is founded in the observation that in all of human history, labor, in the sense of physical activity, is fundamental to how human beings reproduce themselves and their social organization. (From here on all references to Marx are from Marx, *Capital*, Volumes I, II and III.) Of itself, this is a rather banal finding, which Marx dismisses as something that every child can understand. What is theoretically significant, he argues, is *the way* that human beings organize labor socially, in what he called 'modes of production'. Production for Marx is not limited to the sphere of the workplace but is an expansive concept that includes the re-production of the family and community. Modes of production are systems of social relations that are organized around relations of oppression

and domination. By far the majority of Marx's copious writing focused on the mode of production of his time, which he argued should be understood as embodying historically specific social relations that he termed capitalist.

Marx argued that the capitalist mode of production was novel in that for the first time in human history workers do not have direct access to land or tools (the means of production) and therefore must actively seek employment for wages by those who own the means of production. If they do not secure waged employment the worker and their dependents will literally die. The system is therefore built on compulsion (the worker cannot opt out as they will die) even through the waged worker has the appearance of being 'free' in that they can theoretically choose not to work.

Marx explains this peculiar system through a conceptual innovation that distinguishes the universal category of work or 'labor' from the individual's 'capacity to work', which he terms 'labor power'. This distinction is crucial as for Marx it is labor power, not labor, that is bought when the capitalist employs the 'free laborer' as a waged worker and conversely, ipso facto, when the worker sells their labor power to the owner of capital in return for wages. The trick at the heart of the system is that the owner buys the worker's labor-power for a specific length of time, but the worker's wage does not return to the worker the entire value created by their labor-power during the time they are contracted to work. This is because wages only embody what Marx calls the 'socially necessary time' sufficient to allow the worker to buy food, clothing, housing, such that they can survive. The value created by labor power expended beyond the 'socially necessary time' to allow the worker to survive accrues to the owner as what Marx 'surplus value'.

There is an inbuilt antagonism within the working of the system. The owners of capital (which is *only* created from profit accrued from the expropriation of surplus value from the worker) are always pitted against the waged workers (the direct producers of capital) who constantly try to secure the return of the expropriated 'surplus value'. This is the basis of class struggle that Marx argues is a fundamental excrescence of the way capitalist societies are constituted.

Now this is a very truncated account of Marx's conceptual apparatus and misses out important ideas, but I hope it is sufficient to show that Marx's conceptual framework is as far from free-floating as is possible to be. And, like all conceptual frameworks, the primary aim is not to provide a *description* of empirical data but instead a worked-out model that can be used to *explain* empirical data. Capitalist modes of production are empirically differentiated—German corporate capitalism differs from the US-UK neoliberal approach for example—but the system itself is constituted by common characteristics.

Marx says little about what future non-capitalist societies might look like and how they might be understood, although he intimates that Communist societies would be based on the emancipation of humanity. This emancipation manifestly did and does not exist in any of the actually existing socialist states, including North Korea. Yet the DPRK, until the marketization of the post 1990s, was also devoid of what Marx understood as the key features of the capitalist mode of production, including free labor, private property, a functioning money form in the capitalist sense and, as Ellen Wood has so convincingly argued, the ostensible separation of the economic from the political sphere that is characteristic of capitalist systems (Wood). The puzzle that forms the rationale for Kim's book then is a familiar one for Marxian theory. If 'actually existing socialist states' including the Soviet Union and those created after the Second World War were not Communist, how could they be understood without abandoning Marxian theory altogether?

Sociologists Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh provide what is still today a benchmark study of North Korean theory and practice in contradistinction to capitalist societies *and* the Soviet Union that is rigorous, theoretically sophisticated and empirically founded (conducting over two months of field work in-country) (Brun and Hersh). Their work is not acknowledged or cited in this book. North Korea's state ideologists also engaged with the problem of how to understand the difference between capitalist societies and North Korea and they directly engaged with Marxian political economy to do so. They argued that the law of value operates 'in substance' in socialist societies in the field of "production and exchange of consumer goods" but only "in form … in the domain of production and circulation of the means of production" (Compilation Committee, pp. 268–273). There are many ways in which North Korea's theoretical formulations can be challenged but the point is they exist and, again, these appear unknown to the author, despite the book's access to North Korean material.

Kim resolves the puzzle by claiming that North Korea's economic development strategy was that of industrialization, which can be treated as synonymous with capitalist development, such that North Korea must therefore be understood as capitalist. Kim references Werner's argument that the system of social organization in the People's Republic of China had much in common with Fordism as a social system as it developed in the United States (p. 68). Werner, however, proceeds through careful expository argumentation that acknowledges theoretical debate over whether or not Marxian concepts designed to understand the dynamics of capitalist social relations can be transposed to analyzing actually existing socialism. Werner's conclusions are much more qualified than Kim infers, partly because Werner carefully delineates the scope of analysis to the cities and excludes rural China from the analysis (Werner, 2012).

Kim's strategy is a bit question-begging as we are then faced with the problem of theorizing industrialization, otherwise we end up, as is sometime the case in the book, with a reified, ahistorical concept that is analytically unhelpful. We also then have to face the problem of using concepts designed specifically to think about one sort of socio-economic entity (capitalist mode of production as understood by Marx) to explain another (North Korea) in which it is not immediately obvious as to how those concepts would apply. The book's response is to proceed via a series of broad generalities that sometimes bear such little resemblance to the theoretical and historical frameworks from which they are extracted that I am reminded of Humpty Dumpty telling Alice that 'When *I* use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'

In a stylistically representative sentence, the author opines that "Various practices of North Korea's regime of production were carried out in everyday space, including calculations for industrial efficiency, mass movements for productivity, and housing that reproduced the conditions of labor" (p. 119). The uninitiated might assume a specialist vocabulary which they are somehow not erudite enough to understand. In fact, these assertions reflect conceptual confusion and are factually misleading. The very necessity of mass mobilization was a sign that the North Korean economic strategy could not increase productivity. Mass mobilization produced outputs (*products*) but, absent technology and machinery, *productivity*, i.e. the rate of output per unit of input, could not be increased. This is important as the failure to increase industrial productivity provided the core policy problem for each of the Kim regimes down to and including today's government. As for housing reproducing the 'condition of labor', I assume this means that North Korean state provides homes for workers but how this demonstrates that North Korea is capitalist is not explained by the author. Given that in capitalist social relations, the only source of the worker's subsistence (including housing) is the wage relation, we would need to see some carefully theorized justification for a claim that state-provided public goods support the contention that North Korea is best understood as a capitalist mode of production.

The Empirical Errors

The two most egregious empirical errors are (i) the repeated assertion that all North Korean farmers have been waged workers since 1958 (e.g. pp. 2, 18, 49, 71, 92, 95) and (ii) that the North Korean state was and perhaps still is ruled by a triumvirate of equally important state, Party and trade unions. The first of these is the one that matters the most as it is an attempt to shore up the central thesis; if the entire population was 'industrialized', because industrialism means capitalism,

ipso facto, North Korea's socialism can be understood in its fundamentals as just the same as capitalism in say the United States or Germany.

In fact, cooperative farmers have never been waged workers. Each cooperative farm receives an annual income that is largely dependent on annual production achievements. Cooperative farms are not entitled to central state support as farm income is meant to pay for all farm expenses from machinery and fertilizers through to clinics and schools. Cooperative *farming families* receive a share of farm income annually calculated according to number in the family, gender, age, farm occupation and work-team work-points accrued.

The 3000 or so cooperative farms are hugely important as they produce all the country's staple foods, like rice and maize and are home to about 30 per cent of the DPRK's 25 million population. The term 'cooperative farm' is also a bit of a misnomer; these 'farms' usually comprise large geographical areas and are effectively rural administrative units for the agricultural and non-agricultural population of those areas. Cooperative farms are established on discrete and distinctive legal, administrative and political foundations. The confusion in Kim's book probably comes from an elision of the cooperative farms with the state farms. These 500–1000 state farms perform specialist functions ranging from specialist research to county level monocrop fruit production. State farming employees are waged workers, but they form only a minority of the agricultural work force.

We know that the legal and political status of cooperative farmers was considered substantively different from waged workers because Kim Il Sung complained frequently and bitterly, right up to and including the year of his death in 1994, that it remained an urgent task to resolve the 'rural question'. The ideology of cooperative farmers, who Kim called "selfish … conservative … [and] obstinate' had been 'difficult to transform' and the task remained to 'assimilate them with the working-class" (Kim, p. 285). For Kim this meant transforming cooperative property into 'all people's' i.e. state-owned property (Kim, pp. 276–303). Today, with the dominance of marketized dynamics in the DPRK, we see the strengthening of property rights for all forms of cooperatives, not their diminution.

When Kim Il Sung was bemoaning the cooperative farmers as insufficiently socialist, he was building on Marxist understandings of the economics and politics of property relations as both theoretically explanatory of how societies function and consequential in practice in providing policy guidance. If cooperative farms were transformed into state owned agricultural enterprises, this would have meant that cooperative farmers would be uncoupled from the land and each other as the basis of their subsistence and instead would be directly dependent on the state for wages, food and all the necessities of living. If the millions of cooperative farmers, who despite state predations still had some measure of control over their

own way of living, were transformed into wage-workers they would indeed be much more dependent on the state and much more amenable to state demands.

The second error is the repeated inference that trade unions had an organizationally and conceptually important status in North Korea. In fact there is no evidence whatsoever, and certainly none presented in this book, to support the claim that trade unions ever had a meaningful input into and impact on North Korean politics, economics and society. This misconception leads to the factually inaccurate and misleading claim, unsupported by argumentation or citation, that a 'troika system of party, union, and enterprise management' (pps. 98, 200) jointly managed industrial production. This was never the case in North Korea or anywhere else in the Communist bloc (including the fairly liberal Yugoslavia). In the DPRK ideological firmament trade unions were understood as politically 'peripheral' institutions because they included non-party members and did not have an independent status vis-a-vis the Party. In the workplace, they were subordinated to the Party and reported directly to the enterprise Party Committee. Their function and status was exactly the same as other mass organizations, most importantly the youth organization. It was not of representation but of disciplinary surveillance and ideological education, especially of their non-party members.

More Research

I applaud the ambition of this book. The book's use of Marxist political economy is potentially extraordinarily fruitful for understanding North Korea's development trajectory but how this is done is important and not at all a matter of scholastic pedantry. In the famine years, the differing opportunities open to non-waged cooperative farmers compared to workers that were entirely dependent on wages were consequential in shaping what were literally life and death outcomes. Giorgio Agamben, perhaps the most over-quoted and under-read philosopher since Marx, argues that we need to understand 'bare life,' the terms of basic physical existence, of real human beings. To do that, we need rigorous conceptualization, persuasive theorization, and unimpeachable empirical accuracy.

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Justin Hastings, *A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy*

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In the sulfurous wake of the DPRK's nuclear and missile tests through 2017, an interlocking grid of sanctions were levied on North Korea by the United Nations, the United States, South Korea and Japan. The Trump administration undertook a "pressure campaign" against North Korea that was by turns belligerent, pleading, and almost vengeful, pushing for ever-tighter sanctions. Even the Chinese government seemed to cooperate at key moments, slashing overall trade with North Korea and only selectively deflecting foreign pressure on Pyongyang. Amid these geopolitical tremors and economic storms, North Korea's trade balances have taken a hit, but its "sanctions busting" activity has seemingly not relented; Kim Jong-un appears to have rather deep pockets when it comes to an endless array of prestige projects.

In Washington, D.C., both the U.S. Congress and the Executive branch for a time aligned around a common view that sanctions enforcement and restrictions on North Korean trade would, as Adam Szubin of the US Treasury put it at a 2018 hearing, 'wrestle them [the North Korean government] to the negotiating table,' if not collapse the regime altogether. In parallel to American government action and US Treasury sanctions, US, British, and Canadian research groups and think tanks like the Center for Defense Analysis (C4ADS) have done their part to leverage disparate data sets like shipping ledgers, satellite data, defector testimonies, and Chinese corporate and customs bureau websites. These scholars then map out how North Korea has been able to maintain what the UN Panel of Experts would consider illicit imports and exports. Thus, even if Kim Jong Un does turn up with a new Mercedes Benz from time to time, the mission of squeezing the court economy and holding the DPRK to an array of international standards continues.

Several areas of scholarly inquiry fall in the general orbit of sanctions, or investigate North Korea's generally illicit means of avoiding those sanctions. A growing base of empirical research and awareness with respect to the importance of North Korea's Chinese business connections is demonstrated in work by scholars like

John S. Park. When it comes to the role played by marketization in North Korea's past, present, and future, Hazel Smith and Kevin Gray have written a great deal of useful work, while Andrei Lankov has looked at the newly moneyed North Korean elite and their role as political stabilizers rather than rogue and even anti-regime elements working to undermine the state's authority. Nicholas Levi and Remco Breuker have looked at North Korea's overseas labor force within the matrix of international law, and a large number of scholars are focused on the cross-border trade along the Sino-North Korean frontier. While work on sanctions enforcement is therefore a crowded field, North Korean marketization and seaborne trade are in need of more critical examination and fixation to the sanctions debate.

Justin Hastings, in his terse and densely documented new book *A Most Enterprising Country*, brings a new perspective on North Korea's economic adaptations and ambivalent relationship with international law. Blending international relations concerns with international political economy and trade analysis, Hastings, who is based at the University of Sydney, has put together an engaging and cohesive monograph. Readers familiar with some of Hastings' work previously published work on North Korean drug smuggling networks will find resonance in the book, plus some expansion within a useful framework. Hastings deals firstly with supply chains in North Korea and the ability of North Korean firms to maintain and recruit entities to make profits and avoid international sanctions enforcement in the aftermath of wave after wave of sanctions since the first nuclear test in the Kim Jong Il era. As he puts it, after 2006, 'The North Korean state was thus faced with an external environment where it was no longer just a backward, neglected country struggling to survive, but now had the full attention of many countries' trade and finance regulators, and faced private companies and banks that were reluctant to do business (openly) with its representatives abroad' (p. 69). Hastings engages in the very complex work of constructing a chronological periodization of the sanctions up to about 2015; although *Enterprising Country* went to press before the two additional North Korean nuclear tests of 2017 that sparked yet tighter sanctions and focus on the textile and seafood export sectors of the DPRK economy, his work provides a very firm foundation for understanding those areas anyway.

In terms of the data collected and used Hastings has done an excellent job of leveraging and synthesizing diverse sources from media outlets such *The Daily NK*, some Chinese and Japanese media, and particularly the United Nations panel expert reports. He has also been able to do extensive interviews—some through a very able PRC research assistant—with Chinese entrepreneurs working in North Korea and with North Koreans in China. Fieldwork on these kind of questions is always a slightly tenuous enterprise given that the Chinese police are increasingly

being encouraged to see spies everywhere, and the quality of data gathered can be fragmentary at times and misleading at others. Hastings does a good job qualifying the data he has gathered from the border regions. For example his eight pages of discussion of North Korean restaurants and waitresses is the best available for a subject that is frequently portrayed in a rather one-dimensional method.

One of the more surprising findings from the book deals with the role of Taiwan in North Korean trade networks. For a period of time, North Korea trading networks had to transform and mutate rapidly. Again 2006 is a type of 'year zero' when lucrative Japanese Korean networks were more or less shut off for investment and trade with North Korea. Hastings ably covers the purge of the North Korean leader's uncle, Jang Sung Taek, and glides briefly into the seafood business and the nascent special economic zones.

The text's abiding lesson, repeated over and over throughout the book, is North Korea's ability to rapidly switch through shell companies and other organizations to find new sources of revenue. But Hastings also points to the paradoxes that these trading partnerships and relationships face when exposed to international pressure. In comparing the balance of land based trade in contrast with shipping, Hastings seems to focus on the maritime aspect as this is a much more important element in the North Korean economy. Indeed it is through international shipping that North Korea has been able to export and import arms and minerals and materials used in its supply chain for its nuclear program.

Scholars with interest in Chinese corruption networks and cross-border provincial ties between Chinese and North Korean officials will find some helpful threads, but not always bound clearly to an overarching thesis. This may be because, every so often (and not unlike any text packed with loads of details) Hastings gets a bit sidetracked by specific anecdotes about drug deals or shell companies. Perhaps this book is a type of gold mine, then, for creative fiction which could be spun out this material, as the contents of the book sometimes veer more toward the stuff of spy novels than Congressional reports. It takes intrepid sorts to do business with North Korea, and the North Koreans out operating in global supply chains appear to mix extreme calculation with fearlessness.

As Washington pivots on North Korean policy, hemmed in by UNSC sanctions and Rep Edward Royce's HR757, it is clear that work like Hastings is certainly worthwhile of consideration and further development. Likewise, it may help scholars to consider the role sanctions play within restructuring the country's approach to economic activity generally. Absent this distorting pressure, could the energies of the North Korean economic trade elite be turned toward more systemic change? Currently, it remains rather difficult to find the line between the military first politics, or Songun, and the new strategic line. Like statistics

in North Korea, precision on ideological matters is a difficult thing to pin down. There is very little room in this otherwise exciting book to dwell on what it all means for the periodization of the past or the future of North Korean economic reforms. If anything it seems that whatever comes from North Korea's elite, and whatever the ideological implications or irrelevancies, amid whatever US-led sanctions activities, players in the middle and within North Korea's bureaucracies and government ministries have been given the space to create wealth. Hastings carefully describes how such people have gone about that extremely complicated process and in some ways very impressive task.

Andreas Schirmer (ed.), *Koreans and Central Europeans: Informal Contacts up to 1950. Vol. 2: Koreans in Central Europe. To Yu-ho, Hang Hŭng-su, and Others …*

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In Area Studies, individuals sometimes become the proverbial pebbles that start an avalanche of scholarly and popular interest. Before the avalanche happens, however, it takes a few unorthodox career decisions, personal effort, passion for inter-cultural connectivity and cooperation with like-minded people to develop new knowledge of other cultures, and further to create a place to cultivate it. Oftentimes, the pioneers are quickly relegated to the past and forgotten. "Koreans in Central Europe. To Yu-ho, Han Hŭng-su, and Others," an edited volume introducing Koreans who arrived in Central Europe in the first half of the 20th century, is a window on what Andreas Schirmer, the editor of this volume, describes as a rare "contact zone" between Koreans and Europeans outside of Korea. It seeks to portray the people who first used that particular "zone" for academic activity. The book is a follow-up of the first publication in the series, "Berlin Koreans and Pictured Koreans" by Frank Hoffman (2015). It is a pioneer work, throwing a considerable amount of light on the development of Korean Studies in Central Europe, and filling the research gap on the presence of Koreans in the region in the pre-1950 years. It comes as a collection of articles containing fascinating accounts of personal stories interwoven with investigation in their scholarly achievements.

The structure of the publication consists of articles focusing respectively on To Yu-ho, Han Hŭng-su, Alice Hyun and Wellington Chung. Six articles address To Yu-ho, five are dedicated to Han Hŭng-su, with an additional fragment of Han's

memoir relating his travel through Moscow and Warsaw, and one to Alice Hyun and Wellington Chung each. The book has been achieved thanks to a strenuous effort by its authors to obtain rare source materials in several places across Europe and Asia, in addition to personal communication with people who either met the Koreans or used to know others who did. What at first glance seems like an imbalance in the portrayal of Korean presence in Central Europe—only four people are the object of this collective study, after all—is in fact a true reflection of the low numbers of Koreans residing in the region: in 1936, when Han Hŭng-Su arrived in Vienna, there were just two other of his compatriots residing there, To Yu-ho and possibly also the composer of the (South) Korean anthem, Ahn Eak-Tai (Schirmer, p. 115). Their paths in Europe extend through several countries and reflect the difficult time of the inter-war period, with the alarming growth of fascism in the 1930s, social upheaval, racial discrimination, and radical shifts in international politics unavoidably influencing the fate of individuals. The Koreans were, after all, citizens of the Empire of Japan, albeit of non-Japanese descent, and after 1945 their now liberated home country was torn apart by internal conflict, which impacted their general situation and, specifically, their ability to obtain residence, work and travel. All of them eventually decided to settle in North Korea, and tragically, each of them (except Wellington Chung) fell victim to ideological purges performed by the regime, while their academic achievements for decades went ignored in South Korea.

To Yu-ho (or Do Cyong-ho, as he spelled his name before receiving his doctoral degree), born in 1905, was the first Korean to earn a PhD degree in Central Europe, and "the only ethnic Korean to have taught Japanese language in an institution of higher learning in Europe before the end of WWII" (Yoshimi Ogawa and Chikako Shigemori Bučar, p. 41). He arrived to Germany in 1930 where he enrolled at the Goethe-University in Frankfurt; he dropped out in 1933, probably for ideological reasons (his documents from Kim Il Sung University, where he later taught, suggest that the German authorities had him imprisoned), and transferred to the University of Vienna, where in 1935 he successfully defended his doctoral dissertation on Korean history (Chang-hyun Lee, p. 21). In mid-1938 he applied for the position of a lecturer for Japanese language at the University of Helsinki. We are offered a few slightly differing simulations of the factors at play that prevented him from being employed in Helsinki. It was most probably the attitude of Japanese authorities who were asked for (financial?) assistance in the opening of a position that would help promote Japanese language and culture in the European context: it was apparently his ethnicity, not his knowledge of the language, which was excellent, that stood behind To's inability to secure the position (see Chang-hyun Lee, p. 22–23, and Yoshii Ogawa and Chikako Shigemori

Bučar, p. 38). The information that To Yu-ho was the "only ethnic Korean to teach Japanese language in an institution of higher learning" is somewhat contradicted in Schirmer's article in the same volume on Han Hŭng Su in Vienna: we are informed that since 1943 Han had taught Japanese, Chinese and also Korean in Prague, at the Oriental Institute, despite the times being "the darkest (…) for Korean language" (Schirmer, p. 139). Certain pieces of information on the two men, when collected from all the articles related to them and put together, offer a slightly confusing, but nevertheless interesting picture of the complicated issues in To and Han's work experience. To would change his object of scholarly interest, probably under the influence of Han, from history to archeology; however, the two would have different ideas and objectives within the field, and so would go to study under different supervisors. Interestingly enough, To was very vocal in his criticism of some of his contemporary scholars and probably ran into trouble because of this staunchness. Remarkably, two chapters of his dissertation were ripped off the existing two copies, never to be seen again (p. 49). To would depart Vienna in 1939 and, despite all the difficulties he experienced, leave behind fond memories, collected in a memoir "Pienna kŭripda", later published in *Chosŏn ilbo*, as well as sound recordings of his voice, here analyzed together with the recordings of another of his nationals, Kim Kyŏng-han, by Christian Lewarth (pp. 76–89). The recordings are being stored at the Vienna Phonogrammarchiv. They contain texts written specially for that purpose by To and Kim. In Lewarth's article we are offered photographs of the files along with the transcription of the hand-written text by To—a valuable material for future research on its contents. To returned to Korea in early 1940, spent the years 1942–1945 in Japan under Oka Masao's instruction, and following Korea's liberation became involved in political activity. He became one of the 135 additional members of the Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence. Here we are given a detailed information on the circumstances which eventually made him move to North Korea, where till the early 1960s he was one of the most important figures within the North Korean academia. Again, the readers' appetite is sharpened but not entirely satisfied by the account of To's purge following his objections to the official, ideological discourse on the center of Kojosŏn being Manchuria, while he argued it would have been P'yŏngyang. The ideologists of the state would stand no opposition from scholars who did not follow the *chuch'e*-inspired version of ancient history, and he was banned from academia. Hong Sŏn-p'yo cites one account that records To's death in 1982 (p. 72).

As Zdenka Klösová puts it, Han Hŭng-Su's "contacts with Alois Pultr (the first head of Korean Studies at Charles University) were a significant impetus to the rise and development of Czechoslovakia after the war" (p. 204). Han was able

to distinguish himself, both as a teacher of three East Asian languages (Korean, Chinese and Japanese), and as a researcher engaged in promoting the knowledge of Asia in Austria and Czechoslovakia. He traveled to neighbouring countries, despite the ongoing war, and defended his doctoral dissertation in archeology in Freiburg, Switzerland, in 1940. He also received habilitation from the University of Vienna, after arduous efforts to obtain a visa to travel between Austria and Czechoslovakia, in 1947. The series of accounts related to the stages of his academic work in Europe are further enriched by a bibliography of his published and unpublished books, articles and translations, compiled by Jaroslav Olša jr. and Andreas Schirmer. The list is impressive and should prove a great source for scholars interested in the development of East Asia studies in Central Europe. This includes translation of Korean poetry and prose into Czech language, for the first time opening the Korean literary world to Czech readers. Moreover, a newsreel showing Han teaching Korean language in Prague is a valuable record of a different kind, similar to the voice recordings of To Yu-ho and Kim Kyong-han (p. 210) Han also left behind notes and memoires containing his personal reflections on the situation in Europe, which were published in Korea. These are particularly fascinating, as they offer a perspective rarely used in history writing, namely that of member of a non-European society looking at and commenting on things European and the problems European societies grappled with at the time. As Han observed the consequences of the Nazi ideology growth in Austria and Germany, he became extremely sensitive to racism and radical nationalism, expressing an, at the time, extremely liberal idea that race had nothing to do with the civilizational advancement of a society (p. 147). It is no wonder that Han's career was broken so early after his return to North Korea; his internationalism and preference for that strand of communism that unites the proletariat of the world must have made him an easy target for the ultra-nationalist regime in Pyeongyang. Similarly, as in To's case, his work and academic achievements became unmentionables on both sides of the DMZ, but also in those places in Europe where he left his friends and traces of his scholarly activities.

The last two articles relate to Alice Hyun and her son, Wellington Chung. Alice Hyun is introduced as the first Korean to be born in Hawaii, a Korean-American who was a dedicated Communist and supporter of the Pak Hŏn-yŏng faction. When Pak was purged by Kim Il Sung in 1956, Alice Hyun would be also executed as his personal secretary. Hyun's biography adds some knowledge to Korean diaspora in Hawaii and Korean political activism in the US. For the purpose of this volume, however, the most important point in her life is her stay in Prague while on her way to P'yŏngyang. As Byung Joon Jung highlights, "Prague served crucially (…) as a stepping stone to North Korea" (p. 295). Hyun's life history

is dotted with important names and connections, such as Han Sorya. Her son, analyzed in the last article of the volume, had the ambition to become a doctor. Prague was chosen precisely because of Han Hŭng-su and his contacts. Wellington Chung would also teach Korean language at Charles University, following Han's steps. Due to his mother political activities he was eventually forced by the State Security Service into cooperation; depressed and feeling trapped, he committed suicide in mid-1960s. The mother and the son's lives are a microcosm of the ideologically strained times; both of their files would be destroyed, respectively in North Korea and Czechoslovakia, after their deaths—a symbolic annihilation of the individual by the state.

Some of the data and analyses provided in the publication by individual authors overlap, but it is not necessarily a flaw, although it may push readers to read selectively. In some cases, a more detailed picture must be assembled, through the reader's own effort, from pieces of the puzzle provided in two or more articles belonging to the volume. Overall, this collective study reveals rich and diverse information concerning the lives of To, Han, Hyun and Chung, and the authors honestly admit the existence of blank spots and open ends that call for extended research. For instance, as implicated in some of the papers, both To and Han were able to study in Europe due to the affluence and social positioning of their families. What does it say about their predilection to choose Europe as a place to study? To what extent did their background inform their academic choices—beside their apparent ideological affiliation with the Left? Also, while there are many similarities between the two men, they ultimately became rivals within the academic field, particularly so under the North Korean regime where "correct" ideological reasoning was crucial for survival. We can regret that earlier contacts between the two when in Vienna have been barely addressed in the book, but apparently the source materials were insufficient to construct a proper hypothesis. There is some speculation, specifically by Hong Sŏn-p'yo who suggests that To must have helped Han at some point when in Czechoslovakia (p. 64), and by Andreas Schirmer who indicates in the Introduction (p. 5) that both their overlapping academic interest and different features of character might played a part in their ultimate antagonism which resulted in To having a hand in the purge of Han, before meeting a similar fate a few years later. In conclusion, the elaborately assembled book offers much food for thought and many prospective questions to academicians working not only on aspects of Korean history or literature, but also on adjacent topics.

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Notes for Submission of Manuscripts to the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

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The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences that examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions that include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

Persons submitting articles for consideration should note the following requirements:

1. Articles should be submitted only in English, using British spelling conventions.
2. The body of the manuscript should normally be around 5,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.
3. The manuscript should use endnotes and follow the 'Chicago style' for references.
4. Romanization of East Asian names, place names and terms should follow the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean, Hepburn for Japanese, and pinyin for Chinese.
5. Where appropriate, the use of Chinese characters and indigenous scripts following the initial occurrence of a term is encouraged. Use Batang font whenever possible.
6. The manuscript should be submitted as a Microsoft Word file attachment and should be written in double-spaced Times Roman 12 point font. This rule applies to both the text of the article and its section headings. All endnotes should be in Times Roman 10 point font. All inserted East Asian characters should be in 11 point font in the text and all East Asian characters in the notes should be in 9 point font.
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8. The manuscript should have a separate cover page that gives the full name of the author, academic affiliation, and full postal and email contact details. The cover

page should also have a one-paragraph summary of the contents of the article, and five (5) key words.

9. The first page of the text of the manuscript should have only the title of the article at top. The name of the author(s) should NOT be included.
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